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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation comprises two papers that examine the employment outcomes and location 
choices of Ph.D.-trained individuals that often face dual-thin marriage and labor markets. The 
first paper investigates the degree to which single Ph.D.-trained workers, both domestic and 
foreign-born, face trade-offs between marriage and labor market opportunities. When job 
markets are not geographically overlapping with marriage markets, single PhDs may be forced to 
choose between metropolitan areas (MSAs) that offer better employment opportunities versus 
better marriage markets. I find significant evidence of a “sorting” effect – the local marriage 
market is a location-specific consumer amenity for which highly trained foreign-born singles 
may sacrifice real wage in equilibrium to access a more active dating environment. The second 
paper uses differencing strategies to compare the location choices of foreign-born versus 
domestic-born Ph.D.-trained workers. Results suggest that single foreign-born Ph.D. workers are 
partly willing to forgo the greater labor market opportunities found in large MSAs in exchange 
for a more active dating scene. In contrast, findings on married foreign-born Ph.D. workers echo 
those from Costa and Kahn (2000) that highly educated couples are disproportionately drawn to 
large MSAs in order to solve their job market co-location challenge. 
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Chapter 1 
Dual-Thin Marriage and Labor Markets: Location Choices and Employment 
Outcomes for Ph.D. Workers 
 
The theme of this dissertation is that spatial features of marriage markets and in particular 
their links to labor markets affect where highly educated households choose to live as well as 
their employment outcomes. Two papers, presented in chapters 2 and 3, use U.S. Census data for 
1990, 2000 and 2010 to investigate the degree to which Ph.D.-trained workers, both domestic 
and foreign-born, face trade-offs between marriage and labor market opportunities. One treats 
the local marriage market as a location-specific consumer amenity, and looks at the degree to 
which single Ph.D. worker may sacrifice real wage in equilibrium to access a more active dating 
environment. The other uses differencing strategies to compare the location choices of foreign-
born versus domestic-born Ph.D.-trained workers, and highlights the role of marriage markets 
and job co-location in driving their location decisions. 
 Single Ph.D. workers that have few marriage market opportunities in their active labor 
markets may be willing to work in a lower-wage metropolitan area (MSA) if that MSA provides 
access to a more active dating environment. The paper in Chapter 2 provides evidence of such a 
“sorting” effect for single, foreign-born, female PhDs, who has potential dating pools in a limited 
number of MSAs and are especially likely to face with dual thin markets. Locating in an MSA 
with 1,000 more own-ethnic college-above single men – the likely dating pool – reduces their 
wage of by roughly 2 percentage points. This effect is larger for young versus older women. No 
such effect arises for domestic Ph.D.-trained single women who have geographically expansive 
marriage markets. Trade-offs between marriage market opportunities and labor market outcomes 
appear to be smaller for single male PhDs. 
2 
 
The paper in Chapter 3 investigates the degree to which the local marriage market and 
job co-location pressure affect the location choices of foreign-born Ph.D. singles and couples 
differently compared to their US-born counterparts. A core modeling principle is that larger 
MSAs help to alleviate job market co-location problems for high-skilled couples while large 
local own-ethnic populations offer better dating opportunities for high-skilled singles. Single 
Chinese and Indian PhDs are disproportionately drawn to MSAs with large own-ethnic college-
above populations even when such populations are not necessarily situated in large MSAs. 
Conversely, foreign-born Ph.D. couples are drawn to large MSAs regardless of the size of the 
local own-ethnic population. These and other patterns suggest that single foreign-born Ph.D. 
workers are partly willing to forgo the greater labor market opportunities found in large MSAs in 
exchange for a more active dating scene. Results on married foreign-born Ph.D. workers echo 
those from Costa and Kahn (2000) that highly educated couples are disproportionately drawn to 
large metropolitan areas in order to solve their job market co-location challenge. 
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Chapter 2 
Marriage Versus Employment: The Impact of Dual-Thin Markets on 
Employment Outcomes for Single Ph.D. Workers 
 
 
 
 
Xirui Zhang 
Department of Economics 
Syracuse University 
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1. Introduction 
Single Ph.D. workers often have two priorities: to secure a job that is well matched to 
their training and to find a marriage partner. Ph.D. labor markets are also notoriously thin in the 
sense that there are a limited number of metropolitan areas (MSAs) in which individuals can 
obtain high-quality employment.1 The same is often true for foreign-born2 Ph.D. marriage 
markets. That is because foreign-born Ph.D. workers display a strong tendency to marry 
individuals with at least a college degree and within their own ethnicity (see Table 1, which will 
be discussed shortly). Moreover, among foreign-born Ph.D. workers, highly educated own-ethnic 
potential dates are generally not ubiquitous in the host country. For these reasons, when faced 
with dual thin labor and marriage markets, single, foreign-born Ph.D. workers are especially 
likely to face trade-offs between marriage and labor market opportunities. As a result, they may 
accept inferior labor market outcomes in exchange for improved marriage market opportunities. 
This paper explores evidence and implications of such trade-offs for foreign-born and domestic 
Ph.D. workers in the United States.    
For several reasons, tradeoffs between labor and marriage market opportunities for highly 
skilled individuals could have important effects on the location and intensity of innovative 
activity in the U.S. In part this is because Ph.D.-trained workers, and especially those not born in 
the U.S., account for a significant share of new product innovation. According to the RIETI-
Georgia Tech inventor survey, 46 percent of the inventors who file patents in the U.S. have a 
doctoral degree (Walsh and Nagaoka, 2009). Moreover, foreign-born Ph.D. workers are 
overrepresented in the STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) fields. In 
                                                            
1 Appendix Table A5 documents the distribution of Ph.D. jobs by industry in 1990 and 2010. 
2 Domestic or US Born is defined as born in the U.S.A. or those born abroad with American Parent(s), and all the 
other are foreign born. 
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the 2010 American Community Survey (ACS), among the scientists and engineers with a Ph.D., 
nearly 55 percent are foreign born, and roughly 30 percent are born in China or India.3 
It is also important to recognize that Ph.D. workers and especially those who are foreign 
born do indeed face thin marriage markets. One contributing reason is that Ph.D. workers 
disproportionately marry individuals with a college or higher level of education.4 Besides, 
foreign-born Ph.D. workers marry primarily within their ethnicity. Table 1 provides evidence of 
these marriage patterns.5 In Panel A Column (6), 71.5% of US-born male Ph.D. holders marry a 
US-born woman with at least a college education attainment. Similarly, among Chinese and 
Indian male PhDs, 80.6% and 72.4% marry an own-ethnic woman with at least a college 
education level, respectively. Moreover, foreign-born female PhDs display a further strong 
tendency to marry a Ph.D. of their ethnicity: roughly 30% marry a Ph.D. of own ethnicity 
compared to just 10% for their male counterparts.6 It should also be noted that there are few 
MSAs in the U.S. with large numbers of single, foreign-born college-educated workers but many 
more MSAs with sizable numbers of domestic-born college-educated singles.7 This distribution 
of potential dating pools suggests that single, foreign-born highly trained workers are likely to 
face much sharper trade-offs between marriage and labor market opportunities than their 
domestic-born counterparts. 
                                                            
3 Since 1990, there is an exceptional growth of U.S. patents created by ethnic inventors. Notably, the share of 
patents created by Chinese and Indian inventors increased from 2% in 1990 to 9% and to 6% as of the year 2004, 
respectively (Kerr, 2010). During the 1990-2010 period, the female share of Ph.D. STEM workers rises from 24% in 
1990 to 31% in 2000, and 40% in 2010. 
4 A college above education level (or col+) refers to having received at least 4-year college education attainment. 
5 The marriage patterns of PhDs in Census 1990 and ACS 2010 are very similar to the Census 2000. 
6 These patterns are consistent with the literature on the trend towards positive assortative mating based on schooling 
(e.g. Greenwood et al., 2014 and 2016) and evidence of marriage within ethnicity (e.g. Angrist, 2002). To explain 
such marriage patterns, the literature on family formation has extended beyond the Becker’s (1981) theory of a 
household-based firm, in which husband and wife specialize in the market and domestic spheres, respectively. In 
particular, recent works (e.g., Chiappori et al., 2009) focus on consumption complementarities and insurance as 
motivations for marriage. For more discussion on this topic, see Stevenson and Wolfers (2007). 
7 Appendix Table A4-1 and A4-2 document the number of MSAs that provide active dating opportunities for Ph.D. 
workers by ethnicity. 
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I consider two mechanisms when modeling the manner in which marriage and labor 
market outcomes are linked for Ph.D. workers in the United States. The primary mechanism is a 
sorting effect. Workers that have few marriage market opportunities in their active labor markets 
may be willing to work in a lower-wage MSA if that MSA provides access to a more active 
dating environment. Beyond that, a distraction effect may also exist. An active dating scene may 
cause singles to reduce their hours worked to free up time for dating. This effect could also 
contribute to lower productivity and wage and reduce an individual’s annual earnings.  
To investigate these issues, I consider several indicators of labor market outcomes, 
including an individual’s hourly wage, hours worked per year and annual earnings. For each 
outcome measure, I estimate the manner and extent to which the quality of a local marriage 
market affects the labor market outcome for foreign-born Ph.D. workers and especially those that 
face dual thin labor and marriage markets in comparison to their US-born counterparts. All of the 
estimation is conducted using Census data from the Integrated Public-Use Microdata Series 
(IPUMS, Ruggles et al., 2010) for the survey years 1990, 2000 and 2010.  
This paper is closely related to the literature on residential migration decision and quality 
of life. Previous studies have shown that households choose metropolitan locations in part by 
trading off employment opportunities for location-specific consumer amenities (e.g. Greenwood 
et al. 1991; Gabriel et al. 2003; Blomquist, 2006; Albouy, 2008; Chen and Rosenthal, 2008; Dahl 
and Sorenson, 2010). Moreover, particular attention has been paid to the colocation pressure that 
explains the educated power couples’ increasing tendency to live in a large metropolitan area 
(e.g. Costa and Kahn, 2000). For singles, marriage market opportunities are an important 
location-specific amenity that affects their location choices, but there is very limited work 
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investigating this topic.8 Gautier et al. (2010) develop a model that emphasizes the important role 
of cities as marriage markets for singles. Their framework abstracts away the labor market and 
focuses on location choices between the city and the suburb.9 Stark (1988) emphasizes that labor 
markets and marriage markets interact in a manner that affects migration — migration that 
facilitates a match in one market will also influence the prospects available and the outcome 
obtained in the other market. This paper contributes to the literature by highlighting the 
premarital trade-offs between labor and marriage market opportunities for Ph.D.-trained singles, 
an influential group that has rarely been investigated by empirical works. 
Given that the local marriage market is a location-specific consumer amenity, the key 
hypothesis I test is that single Ph.D. workers may select into metropolitan areas with lower real 
wage rates in exchange for being in a better marriage market, ceteris paribus. This follows 
previous papers in the Rosen-Roback tradition (e.g. Rosen, 1979; Roback, 1982; Greenwood et 
al. 1991; Gabriel et al. 2003; Blomquist, 2006; Albouy, 2008; Chen and Rosenthal, 2008). In all 
of the empirical models later in the paper, I measure the local marriage market (denoted as M) 
for a given person by counting potential dates in the MSA. More precisely, M is defined as the 
number of singles in an MSA of the opposite gender for the individual in question, within that 
person’s ethnicity, and with a college or higher level of education. 
I next extend my model to take explicit account of situations in which single Ph.D. 
workers operate in dual thin labor and marriage markets. To do this, I add a control variable that 
indicates whether a worker is faced with a dual thin market (“2MktThin”). In specifying the 
                                                            
8 Compton and Pollak (2007) revisit the job market colocation effect put forward by Costa and Kahn (2000), and 
they argue that the rising concentration of highly educated couples in large cities has more to do with the greater 
opportunity for highly educated singles to meet in large urban centers. 
9 According to Gautier et al. (2010), singles are willing to pay a premium in terms of higher housing prices to locate 
in cities, the dense areas where they can meet more potential partners than in rural areas.  
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variable “2MktThin”, an individual is coded as facing a dual thin market if (i) there are few 
MSAs with “active” local marriage markets based on values for M and (ii) there are few MSAs 
with “active” local labor markets. The precise manner in which “thick” and “thin”, “active” and 
“inactive” are defined for these purposes is made clear later in the paper. Here it is sufficient to 
note that individuals facing dual thin markets earn lower wages than other comparable workers 
who do not operate in a dual-thin market setting. 
Key findings in the paper are as follows.  For single, foreign-born, female Ph.D. workers, 
locating in an MSA with 1,000 more single men of their own ethnicity and with college above 
education levels – the likely dating pool – reduces their equilibrium wage rates by roughly 2 
percentage points. This effect grows to 7.2 percentage points when these women face dual thin 
markets and it is also larger for young women (age 25 to 44) than older women (age 45 to 65). 
No such effect arises for single, US-born Ph.D. women, who have geographically expansive 
marriage markets. Secondly, I find that the distraction effect that reduces hours worked, possibly 
to free up time for dating, is present in some models but less robust. A better local dating pool 
decreases work hours by a small magnitude for single female PhDs, both domestic and foreign-
born. Thirdly, I find a significant effect on annual earnings for single, foreign-born female PhDs. 
Increasing the number of potential dates by 1,000 people in the MSA reduces their annual 
earnings by 2.4 percent, while it has no impact on their US-born counterparts. 
I also find that the trade-offs between marriage market opportunities and labor market 
outcomes appear to be smaller for single male Ph.D. workers, particularly at the young age. This 
result suggests that Ph.D.-trained single men, in general, may be more likely to prioritize the 
labor market opportunities when choosing where to locate. Such gender disparity may reflect, to 
some extent, the social norms on gender roles and expectations within marriage. Another 
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contributing factor may be the thinner marriage markets faced by Ph.D. women because it is 
more common for a man to marry a less educated woman than the reverse situation (see Table 1).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
framework and driving mechanisms. Section 3 describes data and sample. Section 4 introduces 
estimation equations, and Section 5 presents main results. Section 6 extends the estimating 
model to explore the trade-offs for those facing dual thin markets and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Main Mechanisms 
This section analyzes the impact of tradeoffs between marriage and labor market 
opportunities on three labor market outcomes, including wage, hours worked per year and annual 
earnings. In all cases, the focus is on highly trained singles. As noted earlier, the primary 
mechanism, a sorting effect, is emphasized, and the secondary effect of distraction is also 
considered. Sorting occurs when Ph.D. workers may tradeoff job opportunities to live in a lower-
wage MSA in exchange for being in a more active dating environment. A distraction effect 
occurs when an active dating scene causes a single Ph.D. worker to reduce hours worked to free 
up time for dating. Each mechanism is modeled below, and their likely impact on foreign-born 
relative to domestic-born workers is then discussed. 
 
2.1. Sorting Effect  
The sorting effect is based on the well-known theoretical framework investigating the 
relationship between location-specific amenities and wage (i.e., Roback, 1982; Greenwood et al. 
1991; Gabriel et al. 2003; Blomquist, 2006; Albouy, 2008; Chen and Rosenthal, 2008). I assume 
that the local marriage market M is a consumer amenity that affects single Ph.D. workers’ utility 
10 
 
but has no direct effect on productivity. In this paper, the local marriage market M is measured 
by the number of potential dates available in an MSA. As the literature on search and matching 
(e.g. see discussion in Burdett and Coles, 1999) has emphasized that the long-term partnership 
formation as with marriage and employment is a time-consuming activity because of market 
frictions and heterogeneity of agents. For this reason, access to a large local market increases the 
arrival rate and contact with potential partners that have different characteristics, and it is 
expected to be an appealing amenity for single Ph.D. workers.  
In an open-city model, single Ph.D. workers would earn lower real equilibrium wage 
rates for being in a better marriage market, ceteris paribus. As Figure 1 shows, holding constant 
the attributes of the local economic environment A, on the labor supply side, real wage must 
adjust so that mobile workers are indifferent between locations. The upward-sloping worker’s 
utility curves equal to a system-wide level, 𝑈𝑈∗. On the labor demand side, wage equals the value 
of workers’ marginal products, and the downward-sloping curve gives firms zero profit, 𝜋𝜋(𝐴𝐴) =
0. The equilibrium wage at the location a is given by 𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎∗ where the zero-profit curve intersects 
equal-utility curve 𝑈𝑈(𝐴𝐴, 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎) = 𝑈𝑈∗. Suppose local marriage market quality increases, 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 < 𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏, 
workers’ utility curve shifts down to maintain the utility level 𝑈𝑈∗. This is because single highly 
trained workers are willing to sacrifice part of real wage in exchange for better marriage 
opportunities in the local area. If the zero-profit function were vertical, then wage would 
decrease by the full amount of the vertical shift in the iso-utility locus, 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏∗∗- 𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎∗ in the figure. 
Given a downward-sloping labor demand curve, we would observe the impact of local marriage 
markets on equilibrium wage is 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏∗- 𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎∗ in Figure 1.  
This sorting effect in principle should only reduce equilibrium wage of single, foreign-
born Ph.D. workers who face dual thin markets. For highly trained singles, the ideal location 
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should offer them abundant high-quality opportunities to find a match in both job and marriage 
markets. While for foreign-born PhDs, there is a small number of MSAs offering active labor 
markets and the same goes for their marriage markets. When facing dual thin markets, single 
foreign-born PhDs can hardly find an ideal location if marriage opportunities are not spatially 
tied up with their high-quality jobs. Instead, they are forced to make a choice — either to (i) 
sacrifice marriage market opportunities for being in an active labor market or to (ii) select into an 
active dating environment but accept a lower wage than that would otherwise occur. If they put a 
high priority on marriage opportunities, they may choose the latter option.10 In this case, better 
local marriage markets should have a negative impact on their equilibrium wage.  
Consider a model investigating the impact of the local marriage market M on the labor 
market outcome Y: Y = 𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀 + 𝑓𝑓(𝑋𝑋,𝐴𝐴) + 𝜀𝜀. In this model, the function 𝑓𝑓(𝑋𝑋,𝐴𝐴) depends on 
individual characteristics 𝑋𝑋 and location attributes 𝐴𝐴,  𝜀𝜀 is an error term, and 𝛼𝛼 is the coefficient 
of interest. Following the analysis above, among those facing dual thin markets, and as indicated 
in the first column of Table 2 Panel A, the sorting effect should cause the sign for 𝛼𝛼 to be 
negative when the outcome measure Y is wage. 
Sorting may also affect observed hours worked and annual earnings of single PhDs that 
face dual thin markets. This is because individuals that choose to live in lower-wage MSAs in 
exchange for access to better dating opportunities may also want to change their working hours 
due to the change in wages. In such instances, lower wages could encourage individuals to work 
longer hours because of income effects. However, it should also be noted that those with a strong 
preference for dating might seek out jobs that require fewer hours worked to leave ample time 
                                                            
10 Previous studies have paid attention to the gender difference in make such a choice (e.g. See discussion in Stark, 
1988). For example, Smith and Thomas (1998) find that for Malaysia family and marriage consideration drive the 
migration for the female while for the male the labor market consideration is the priority. 
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for an active social life. Depending on the size of the substitution and income effect of the labor 
supply curve, the net effect of sorting on observed hours worked can be either positive or 
negative, and therefore, is potentially ambiguous. Since annual earnings are given by the product 
of hours worked per year and wage, the sorting effect on annual earnings is also ambiguous.  
Such trade-offs from the sorting mechanism are unlikely to occur to those who are not in 
dual thin markets such as domestic-born Ph.D. workers. They are operating in one of the 
following two subcases: (i) both marriage and labor markets are thick, (ii) either labor markets or 
marriage markets are thick. For those in the former subcase, there should be no need to make 
these trade-offs, because ideal MSA locations are ubiquitous to provide them opportunities to 
develop a career and to search for a life partner. For those in the latter subcase, there should be 
little need to make trade-offs as well. That is because they potentially can secure an ideal MSA 
location by pursuing the opportunities in the thin markets for which they have location 
constraints. For example, for single Ph.D. workers that face with thick labor markets and thin 
marriage markets at the national level, they can choose to live in an MSA with active dating 
environment, conditional on that high-quality job opportunities are also available in that area. 
For these reasons, no sorting effect should arise for those not facing dual thin markets, as 
indicated in the first column of Table 2 Panel B. 
 
2.2.Distraction Effect 
The distraction effect in principle may reduce the hours worked for all highly trained 
singles, regardless of how thick their marriage markets might be at the national level. Dating 
takes time and energy. With more potential dates available in the local area, the relative price of 
searching for a potential life partner in the local market decreases. In this way, living or working 
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in an active dating scene may cause single Ph.D. workers to reduce hours worked to free up time 
for dating and parties. Such behaviors may potentially have an adverse impact on the Ph.D. 
workers’ productivity, and be observed by employers, which can lead to lower wage rates.11 
Therefore, in Table 2 Panel A and B, as Column (2) indicates, distraction should cause the sign 
of 𝛼𝛼 to be negative for hours worked per year and potentially also for wage and annual earnings. 
Since this study focuses on full-time Ph.D. workers, a notoriously career-oriented group, the 
distraction effect is assumed to be a secondary effect and relatively small in magnitude. 
 
2.3.Differential Marriage Market Effects: Foreign-born vs. US-born 
The total impact of the local marriage market M on the labor market outcome Y is the 
combined effects of sorting and distraction. In Table 2, Column (1) and (2) is for sorting and 
distraction effect, respectively, and Column (3) is for local marriage market effects.  
Table 2 Panel A analyzes those facing dual thin markets (e.g., single foreign-born PhDs). 
Among these individuals, as indicated in Column (3), the local marriage market effect should 
have a negative sign for 𝛼𝛼 when outcome measure Y is wage. When Y is hours worked or annual 
earnings, the sign of 𝛼𝛼 is ambiguous but very likely to be negative. 
Table 2 Panel B analyzes those not facing dual thin markets, which includes US-born 
single PhDs. As outlined in the previous discussion, only distraction effect may be present for 
such individuals. Therefore, in Panel B Column (3), better local marriage markets should have an 
adverse impact on three outcome measures, which causes the sign of 𝛼𝛼 to be negative. 
                                                            
11 Previous studies (e.g., Akerlof, 1976; Rosenthal and Strange, 2008) have demonstrated that hour worked may 
signal productivity and the degree of hard work. Akerlof’s (1976) theory of rat race shows that in some situations, 
workers may work long hours to signal their unobservable productivity. Rosenthal and Strange (2008) find empirical 
evidence to support the theory and they demonstrate that agglomeration increases hours worked among professional 
workers. 
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Differencing Panel A and Panel B, I obtain Panel C, which indicates the differential 
marriage market effects between the foreign-born and the US-born. In doing so, I assume that for 
a given improvement in the local marriage market, the distraction effect for single US-born PhDs 
is no more than that for their foreign-born counterparts.12 Given that the sorting effect should 
only occur to those facing dual thin markets, improvement in the local marriage market is 
expected to further reduce equilibrium wage of single foreign-born PhDs relative to the 
comparable single US-born PhDs. Therefore, as Panel C Column (3) indicates, when outcome 
measure is wage, the sign of the differential marriage market effects is evident: it should be 
negative. While for hours worked and annual earnings, the sign of the differential marriage 
market effects is still ambiguous. 
 
3. Census Data and Core Sample   
The primary data for the study is drawn from the individual-level files of the census for 
the survey years 1990, 2000, and 2010 as obtained from the IPUMS website.13 Data for 1990 and 
2000 are based on 5 percent samples of the underlying Census population while data for 2010 are 
from the 1 percent sample from American Community Surveys (ACS). My core sample pools 
together 18,796 single Ph.D. workers from three survey years, among which 8,647 are female, 
and 10,149 are male.14  
The core sample is confined to individuals with a doctoral degree, age between 25 and 65 
and marital status reported as single (defined as never married, divorced or widowed). They are 
                                                            
12 This assumption is reasonable. Facing thin marriage markets, single foreign-born PhDs might be more sensitive to 
the increase in the number of potential dates in the local area, and they also may have stronger tendency to shift time 
away from work towards pursuing such opportunities. 
13 See www.ipums.org, Ruggles et al., 2010. 
14 Given the similar marriage patterns of PhDs from 1990 to 2010, I assume that the Ph.D.-trained individuals’ 
preference for an ideal marriage partner has not changed much during this period, and I pool these observations 
together to get a larger sample size. 
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full-time workers, 15 not self-employed and live in identifiable MSAs.16 They have reported their 
annual earnings,17 occupations, birth regions, primary industries, and other related information. 
To have a sharp comparison between the US born and the foreign born, I toss out approximately 
1,000 foreign-born Ph.D. workers that have been in the United States for more than 20 years, for 
they may be well assimilated into the host country and they are very similar to their domestic-
born counterparts. In the same spirit, I also construct a pooling-year sample for married Ph.D. 
workers, among which there are 12,621 women and 39,973 men. 
Table 3 presents sample means and standard deviations for key variables in these 
samples. I obtained the MSA level measures by aggregating individual observations using person 
weights. On average, single Ph.D. workers live in MSAs with more potential dates compared to 
the MSAs in which married Ph.D. workers are located. This is suggestive that single Ph.D. 
workers may indeed seek out MSAs with active dating opportunities relative to location 
decisions of married PhDs. Single Ph.D. workers also are less likely to have children at home as 
would be expected. Married male Ph.D. workers earn more in terms of wage and annual earnings 
than other Ph.D. workers. For the other variables listed in Table 3, including demographic 
attributes and other labor market measures such as the tendency to work in STEM occupations, 
the sample means are similar for married versus single and male versus female Ph.D. workers. 
 
                                                            
15 Full-time workers refer to those who worked greater or equal to 35 hours per week last year. Among all single, 
PhD-trained individuals who were not at school, more than 88% report that their usual hours worked per week is 
greater than 35 hours. Since single Ph.D.-trained individuals have invested a lot in their education and are supposed 
to be breadwinners, and also the first-order story in this paper is the wage effect from the sorting mechanism, I only 
focus on full-time workers in the core sample. I have also done some robustness checks by including all those single 
Ph.D.-holders. In doing so, for those who did not work, I use 10 percentile wage in the sample as their wage and 
code their hours worked per year as zero, and my results are almost unchanged. 
16 The metropolitan area codes are based primarily on the 4-digit OMB codes of 1990 metropolitan areas. 
17 A worker’s annual earnings in this paper refer to this person’s total pre-tax wage and salary income - that is, 
money received an employee - for the previous year (Decennial Census) or past 12 months (ACS).  
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4. Estimating the Marriage Market Effects 
This section introduces a double interaction model that investigates the differential 
marriage market effects between the US born and the foreign born.18 The basic idea is to regress 
log (hourly wage) of a given Ph.D. worker on the local marriage market M, the indicator of being 
foreign-born, and the interaction term between M and the foreign-born indicator, controlling for 
a rich set of observable characteristics and fixed effects. Although I also estimate models with 
other dependent variables: hours worked per year and log (annual earnings), the discussion 
mainly focuses on the wage model.  
The estimating equation is as following: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑒𝑒,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡   = 𝛼𝛼1𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝛾𝛾 
                         + 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐 + 𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 + 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑒𝑒,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 ,                                                                       (1) 
where i denotes individual, j is for industry, e for ethnic group, c for MSA and t for year. 
Individual i’s local marriage market, denoted as 𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡, is measured by the number of 
singles of the opposite gender with a college or higher level of education and within individual 
i’s ethnic group e, at MSA c, for survey year t. The coefficient 𝛼𝛼1 captures the impact of local 
marriage markets for the US born, and its sign should be negative (see Column (3) in Table 2 
Panel B). The coefficient on the foreign born indicator, 𝛼𝛼2, measures the average difference of 
the outcome measure between foreign-born and US-born Ph.D. workers. The coefficient of 
interest is 𝛼𝛼3, and it reflects the additional effects from local marriage markets for the foreign-
born relative to their US-born counterparts. As outlined in Section 2, foreign-born PhDs are on 
                                                            
18 I have also tried a baseline regression without the interaction term 𝑀𝑀 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹. The point estimate on M in 
the baseline regression is positive and not significant (see Appendix Table A1-1 for details). 
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average more likely to face with dual thin markets and make sharper trade-offs, and 𝛼𝛼3 is 
expected to be negative when the outcome measure is wage. 
The estimating equation controls for a vector of individual i’s demographic and 
socioeconomic attributes 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖. For example, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 includes age, age squared, English speaking ability, 
occupation's median earned income,19 being foreign born or not, residing in the U.S. no more 
than ten years, in a STEM occupation, having own children at home, Hispanic origin, black race, 
living in the home state.  
Moreover, the regression controls for location-specific time-variant attributes 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡. This is 
because these characteristics contributing to agglomeration economies affect workers’ wage, and 
they are also potentially correlated with the size of the local dating pool. In particular, I control 
for the total population at MSA c for year t (a measure for urbanization effects) and the number 
of workers in own industry j at the MSA c for year t (a measure for localization effects).20 Urban 
literature has a long debate on the degree to which productivity of firms increases when other 
firms from the same industry (“localizations”) versus from other industries (“urbanization”) 
locate nearby (see more discussion in Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). This study documents the 
two effects of agglomeration when considering the productivities of Ph.D. workers, which so far 
is still in a lack in the urban literature.  
The estimating equation also includes several fixed effects. MSA fixed effects 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐 capture 
the time-invariant location attributes like sunshine, river, mountains, air quality, distance to the 
                                                            
19 I use the variable (“ERSCOR90”) constructed by IPUMS. This variable assigns a measure of the median earned 
income for each occupation. It is standardized as a "z-score" and then converted to a percentile rank. It reports the 
percentage of persons in occupations having lower standardized median earnings than the respondent's occupation. 
For more details, please see https://usa.ipums.org/usa-action/variables/ERSCOR90#description_section. 
20 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 also includes MSA-year specific average working age and earnings, and the number of own-ethnic workers 
that are present in the MSA but are not the potential dates for individual i in year t. The latter one helps to mitigate 
the concern that the key coefficient estimate would reflect the degree to which Ph.D. workers are willing to give up 
real wage to have access to other ethnic specific amenities that are present in that MSA in a given year. 
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country border, coastal proximity, the number of universities, and the cost of living, etc. Industry 
fixed effects 𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗 capture the time-invariant attributes for a specific industry such as its ethnic 
concentration, gender density, average skill levels and work hours. Year fixed effects 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 control 
for the year-specific national-wide shock.  In addition, 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑒𝑒,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 is the classical error term.  
The identification of the marriage market effect relies on changes in the dating pool in a 
particular MSA over time as well as the variations of dating pool across MSAs for a given year. 
The magnitude of 𝛼𝛼3 is partly driven by how foreign-born Ph.D.-trained individuals evaluate the 
location-specific amenity M relative to job opportunities when facing the dual thin markets, 
which may be highly correlated with individual characteristics that are unobservable to 
researchers. Such characteristics, which may include the person’s physical attractiveness, desire 
to get married, eagerness to pursue career success, and so on, can vary across individuals and 
also change over time for a given person. Since the repeated cross-section data for the analysis 
could not allow one to track individuals over time, I cannot include individual fixed effects to 
rule out person-specific time-invariant attributes. But I do investigate Ph.D. workers by gender 
and age in the following analysis, trying to shed light on this point. The estimate of 𝛼𝛼3 would be 
upward biased in magnitude if foreign-born single PhDs are less productive and meanwhile more 
eager to get married. Analogically, if a disproportionately large share of foreign-born single 
PhDs in the sample do not worry about their marriage opportunities and choose to live in an 
MSA with high-quality jobs when facing with dual thin markets, the estimate of 𝛼𝛼3 would be a 
lower-bound in magnitude.21  
                                                            
21 This may be especially true for those who have no desire to get married shortly when choosing where to live. It 
may also apply to those that anticipate a good marriage prospect no matter where they go. On the other hand, it is 
important to recognize that attractive singles may also have a strong incentive to live in an MSA with an active 
dating environment, as such individuals benefit most from a dense market (Gautier et al., 2010).  
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5. Results 
In the discussion below, I first present estimates based on hourly wage for single Ph.D. 
workers. In particular, I examine differences in estimates for young versus older and male versus 
female among single Ph.D. workers. Then these comparisons are done for additional models that 
use hours worked per year and annual earnings as the dependent variables. Lastly, I present 
results for married Ph.D. workers. For this demographic group, I expect the distraction effect to 
be limited and the sorting effect will also have attenuated for reasons described later. 
 
5.1. Wage by Age and Gender for Single Ph.D. Workers 
Table 4 provides evidence that locating in an MSA with more potential dates of their own 
ethnicity and with college above education levels – the likely dating pool – reduces the 
equilibrium wage for single, foreign-born, Ph.D. workers on average, while no such effect arises 
for their US-born counterparts. Moreover, the marriage market effects on wage are different for 
young (age 25 to 44) versus older (age 45 to 65) 22 and for male versus female.  
Table 4 Column (1) present estimates for single female PhDs in the core sample (age 25 
to 65). Coefficient estimate on M suggests that no significant marriage market effect arises for 
the wage of single, US-born female PhDs. Given that the sorting is unlikely to occur to the US-
born PhDs, this estimate reveals that the distraction effect does not affect their wage as well. The 
coefficient estimate on the interaction term is -0.019, significant at 5% level. This estimate 
suggests that for every 1,000 more single men within their ethnicity and with college above 
education present in the MSA, the equilibrium wage of single, foreign-born, female Ph.D. 
workers on average decrease by roughly 2 percentage points. Such differential marriage market 
                                                            
22 I also split sample in a way so that individuals aged 25 to 39 fall into young age group and those aged 40 to 65 fall 
into older group. Results are robust to such change of the definition for young versus old.  
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effects between the foreign-born and their US-born counterparts are consistent with the analysis 
in Section 2. Foreign-born female PhDs display a strong tendency to marry highly educated men 
within their ethnicity, and they face with thin marriage markets in comparison with their US-
born counterparts. Operating in dual thin marriage and labor markets, they choose to sacrifice 
their real wage for living in an MSA with a better local marriage market. Additionally, the 
estimate of localization effects in Column (1) is 0.183, twice as large as that for urbanization 
effects, 0.083. The larger impact from localization echoes the old debate in the urban literature 
about the relative importance of the city size and the industrial concentration on productivity 
(e.g. Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; Martin et al., 2011).23 
The next two columns of Table 4 split single female PhDs into two age groups: young 
women (age 25 to 44) and the older women (age 45 to 65), respectively. The wage impact of 
local marriage markets on single foreign-born female PhDs enlarges to 2.9 percentage points for 
young women (Columns 2), while it is almost gone for the older women (Columns 3). This 
noticeable effect for young women is consistent with the literature that usually views this group 
as prone-marriage. For instance, as women may anticipate their physical attractiveness, which is 
often valued as a desirable trait in the marriage market, declines with age, they are more active in 
searching for potential dates at a young age to avoid “being left on the shelf” (e.g., Cole and 
                                                            
23 Rosenthal and Strange (2004) survey the urban literature that investigates the productivity advantages of the city 
size and the industrial concentration. They report that the elasticity of productivity with respect to the size of the city 
or to the size of the industry is generally between 3% and 8%. To make my estimates comparable to previous 
studies, I also run the model that uses log (MSA total population) and log (MSA employment in their own industry) 
instead of using the absolute value. In this double-log specification, I obtain significant estimates for localization 
effects on Ph.D. workers’ productivity: on average, the elasticity of wage with respect to the size of the industry is 
roughly 4% to 5% among Ph.D. workers. But the urbanization effect is not statistically different from zero. This 
result speaks to the recent studies by Marin et al. (2011), which also find little evidence of urbanization effects. 
Their work uses French plant-level data from 1996 to 2004 and GMM estimation to show that firms in the short run 
benefit from localization economies. 
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Francesconi, 2011).24 Moreover, since the decrease in the fecundity of women who have passed 
30 is generally acknowledged,25 single women age mid-30s may have a significant concern 
regarding future fertility loss and thus are eager to get married (e.g., Giolito, 2004). For these 
reasons, young women may be more willing to accept inferior labor market outcomes in order to 
access better marriage markets. In contrast, the older single Ph.D. women may have invested 
more in their career and possibly already taken the life as it is; therefore, they are in no rush to be 
in a relationship and less likely to sacrifice their job opportunities.  
Column (4) to (6) present an analogy results for single male Ph.D. workers by age. The 
marriage market effect seems to become smaller among single, foreign-born male PhDs, and this 
gender disparity is especially apparent in young age group. Among the core sample (age 25 to 
65) in Column (4), the local marriage market effect on wage for single, foreign-born male PhDs 
is 1.1 percentage points, roughly 60 percent as large as that of the comparable foreign-born 
female PhDs in Column (1).26 As would be expected, no such effect arises for single, US-born 
male PhDs. Local marriage markets do not affect young men in Column (5), but a significant 
effect is present among the older men in Column (6). One possible explanation for such 
discrepancy is that single men with stronger career opportunities have a greater option value to 
                                                            
24 Cole and Francesconi (2011) also emphasize that more equal career opportunities for women (captured by greater 
schooling and better occupations) can enlarge their choice set of marriage partners, which potentially explain the 
recent increase of toyboy marriage, in which the woman is at least 5 years older than her partner. In my sample, I 
find roughly 5% of married Ph.D. women aged 45 to 65 are in toyboy marriage, larger than 2.8%, the number for 
young Ph.D. women aged 25 to 44. However, these numbers are still small as compared to the share of Ph.D. 
women that have an older or identical age husband, which is more than 80%. 
25 In 2014, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, together with the American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine, issued a Committee Opinion on Female Age-Related Fertility Decline. According to these 
medical experts, “the fecundity of women decreases gradually but significantly beginning approximately at age 32 
years and decreases more rapidly after age 37 years.” See more details at http://www.acog.org/Resources-And-
Publications/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Gynecologic-Practice/Female-Age-Related-Fertility-Decline. 
26 Among the core sample of single Ph.D. workers (age 25 to 65) in which I pool male and female together, this 
effect is 1.4 percentage points, significant at 1% level. For more details, see Appendix Table A1-2. Table A1-2 
reports estimates of the double-interaction models for three labor market outcome measures among the core sample 
that combines both genders.  
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defer marriage. Ph.D.-trained single men at a young age may be ambitious to develop their career 
and would not trade off job opportunities for marriage opportunities. On the other hand, they are 
also popular among women in the marriage market. In contrast, the older Ph.D. men, who may 
have their career going and still being single, are on average more desperate and aggressively 
pursuing opportunities to find a life partner.  
The larger marriage market effect for single female PhDs, especially in young age, may 
reflect the gender roles and expectations within marriage to some extent. Ph.D.-trained young 
women, who may be concerned about the increasing risk of fertility loss and declining marriage 
prospect as they age, are on average more likely to put a high priority on marriage opportunities 
than Ph.D.-trained young men. Moreover, Ph.D.-trained single women have a limited pool of 
what are traditionally considered as the “marriageable” men — those who are better educated or 
earn more than they do. As the marriage patterns in Table 1 show, regarding the frequency to 
marry a Ph.D.-holding individual within own ethnicity, the share for Ph.D.-trained women is 
nearly three times as large as that for Ph.D.-trained men. The thinner marriage markets for single 
female PhDs may also cause them more willing to trade off job opportunities for being an active 
marriage market.  
 
5.2. Hours Worked and Annual Earnings for Single Ph.D. Workers 
Table 5-1 and Table 5-2 do the same exercise as Table 4 does but change dependent 
variables as hours worked per year and annual earnings, respectively. These three tables together 
provide significant evidence that on average, single female foreign-born PhDs, especially those 
at a young age, accept less annual earnings for improved local marriage markets, and the sorting 
rather than the distraction effect primarily drives such results. 
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Table 5-1 shows that the distraction effect that reduces hours worked, possibly to free up 
time for dating, is present but tiny in magnitude. Among single female Ph.D. workers (age 25 to 
65) in Column (1), for every 1,000 increase in the number of potential dates in the MSA, the 
Ph.D.-trained single women, both domestic and foreign born, work approximately 1.8 hours 
fewer per year than they otherwise would be. This distraction effect is significant and tiny still 
for young women in Column (2), and it is nearly gone for the older women in Column (3). This 
marriage market effect is not different between the domestic and foreign born. But it is also 
noted that on average, foreign-born women work roughly two weeks fewer per year than their 
US-born counterparts. This gap of hours worked does not exist among Ph.D.-trained single men 
from Column (4) to (6). Moreover, local marriage markets have no significant impact on work 
hours among Ph.D.-trained single men, except for a small effect present for foreign-born young 
men in Column (5): these individuals work roughly 15 hours fewer per year for every 1,000 
increase in the number of potential dates in the MSA. Recall that in Table 3, single Ph.D. 
workers on average work 2,310 hours per year. All these estimates suggest that the distraction 
effect on hours worked per year is minuscule and Ph.D.-trained singles do indeed work hard.  
Table 5-2 demonstrates that improving the size of local marriage markets reduces annual 
earnings of single, foreign-born Ph.D. workers, with a larger effect for women than for men. In 
Column (1), for every 1,000 more potential dates living in the MSA, the annual earnings of 
single, foreign-born female PhDs reduce by 2.4 percentage points. This marriage market effect is 
significant and large for young women and older men – 3.2 percentage points and 1.8 percentage 
points, respectively. In contrast, neither the older women nor young men experience such effects.  
As outlined in Section 2, the impact of local marriage markets on annual earnings can be 
decomposed into the effects of wage and hours worked per year. Given the tiny distraction effect 
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in Table 5-1, the estimates for annual earnings in Table 5-2 almost mimic the pattern of wage 
results in Table 4. This comparison indicates that sorting is the primary driving mechanism 
through which single, foreign-born PhDs, especially women, tradeoff their labor market 
opportunities for improved local marriage markets. The estimates suggest that doubling the size 
of the local potential dating pool, single, foreign-born Ph.D. workers on average earn 
approximately 1,195 U.S. dollars less per year.27 Since this effect is primarily attributable to the 
capitalization of the local marriage markets, policymakers that are interested in initiating and 
enhancing innovation in local areas may find it appealing to invite highly trained immigrants by 
subsidizing them with a tax credit for several years.28 
 
5.3. Married Ph.D. Workers vs. Single Ph.D. Workers 
This section discusses the manner and the degree to which these trade-offs change after 
marriage. Once married, the distraction effect should attenuate toward zero if Ph.D. workers are 
happily married and are no longer searching for potential dates. Concerning the sorting effect, it 
might still be present among married foreign-born Ph.D. workers. That is because some of those 
facing dual thin markets chose to live in a lower-wage MSA with an active dating scene when 
they were single, and they stay in the same MSA after marriage. This location lock will tend to 
occur when moving costs are higher than the benefits from relocating the household. Conversely, 
once married, some foreign-born Ph.D. workers may have a tendency to relocate to another city 
                                                            
27 I calculate this number by using estimates among core sample that combines both genders. First, I multiply the 
sample mean of annual earnings, 56,000 (in 1999 U.S. dollars), by 1.5%, which is the estimate of marriage market 
effect on earnings of single, foreign-born Ph.D. workers (see Appendix Table A1-2 Column 3). Then I adjust for 
inflation and convert the number into U.S. dollars of the year 2015 by using the latest US government CPI data 
published on May 17, 2016. 
28 Such policy would contribute to a self-reinforcing growth of the highly skilled ethnic community, which may 
attract high-tech firms that intensively use educated workers to the local areas and possibly generate agglomeration 
economies. On the other hand, this plan may also be controversial because such policies would appear to be unfair to 
some immigrant groups, such as the Hispanics, who are more likely to have low education attainments. 
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that offers higher wages but a less active dating environment. In this way, the marriage market 
effect on wage would vanish for the latter group. For these reasons, the coefficient estimate on 
the interaction term, M × Foreign-Born, should be smaller for married Ph.D. workers compared 
to that of single Ph.D. workers. 
Table 5-3 presents labor market outcomes for married Ph.D. workers (age 25 to 65) by 
gender.29 The first two columns of Table 5-3 show that the distraction effect that reduces hours 
worked disappears for most married PhDs. However, a small effect persists for married, foreign-
born Ph.D. men in Column (2): those individuals work 9.5 hours fewer per year for every 1,000 
increase in the number of potential dates in the MSA. The wage estimates in Column (3) and (4) 
suggest that the sorting effect seems to exist still among married foreign-born Ph.D. workers, 
with similar magnitudes to those for their single counterparts in Table 4. Given the attenuation of 
hours worked effect and the presence of wage effect, it is not surprising that local marriage 
market affects annual earnings for married foreign-born PhDs in the last two columns, with 
smaller magnitudes relative to those for the comparable single PhDs in Table 5-2.  
Then I further explore the reduced wage effect for those that relocated to another MSA 
after marriage in Table 5-4. I restrict the sample to young (age 25 to 44) married Ph.D. women 
who moved to their current MSA after having been married,30 and I pools this subsample with 
                                                            
29 All the specifications in Table 5-4 control for the characteristics of the Ph.D. worker’s spouse, for example, 
spouse’s education, age and so on. That is because once married, a worker’s labor supplies may no longer be a 
personal decision but is decided from the view of the household.  
30 To identify this group, I take advantage of two variables in the ACS 2010: (i) the year in which the person last 
married, and (ii) whether a person moved to current MSA within past year. Young females who reported marital 
status as married are classified into this group if they moved to their current MSA within past year and last married 
no later than the year of 2008. And I also classify into this group another 112 young married women who married 
before the year of 1996 but have not reported whether they moved within past year. That is because highly trained 
young couples that age below 30 are mobile, and they seldom stay in the same MSA for more than 15 years. 
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young single Ph.D. women to conduct a comparison.31 As indicated by earlier results in Table 4, 
a strong sorting effect is present among young, single, foreign-born Ph.D. women. Moreover, as 
just discussed, this marriage market effect may vanish for these women if they relocate to 
another MSA after they get married. To test the differential wage effects between these two 
groups, in the estimating equation, I control for an indicator of being single as well as its 
interaction with the foreign-born indicator and the local marriage market, M × Foreign-Born × 
Single. The coefficient estimate on this triple interaction term is expected to be negative.  
In making this comparison, Table 5-4 also takes account of the influences of children on 
women’s job and location choices.32 Column (1) directly controls for the indicator of having own 
children present in the household while Column (2) further restricts the sample to households 
without children. I prefer the approach of Column (2) because married women, as the summary 
statistics suggest, are more likely to have children at home than comparable single women. 
Column (1) obtains a positive coefficient estimate on the indicator of having own children at 
home, which is primarily driven by the higher wage that married women earn by relocating after 
they got married. Meanwhile, the coefficient estimate on the triple interaction term, M × 
Foreign-Born × Single, is not significantly different from zero. Column (2) rules out the 
influence of children by only looking at no kid households. Column (2) demonstrates that among 
young, foreign-born female PhDs who have no child at home, increasing the size of the local 
marriage market has no impact on the wage of married women who moved to their current MSA 
after they have been married, while it significantly reduces the wage for single women. For 
                                                            
31 I do not run a separate regression for young married women who relocate after marriage because the size of this 
subsample is relatively small. Beyond that, due to a similar concern for the power issue, I cannot draw on married 
women who moved to current MSA before marriage to conduct a robustness check. 
32 Besides women's predominant role in child rearing, the moving cost is relatively high for married couples with 
kids than those without kids (see discussion in Gautier et al., 2010). 
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young US-born female PhDs, regardless of their marital status, no such effect arises. These 
results are consistent with my expectation.33  
 
6. Extensions 
In this section, I examine the trade-offs for single Ph.D. workers that face dual thin 
marriage and labor markets by estimating a triple interaction model. In particular, among the 
foreign-born PhDs, I further differentiate between those that do operate in a dual-thin market 
setting and those that do not. To do so, I construct a dual-thin-market indicator “2MktThin”, 
which is equal to one if a Ph.D. worker’s marriage and labor markets are both thin as measured 
across the U.S. and zero otherwise. I add to the equation (1) this variable and its interaction with 
M × Foreign-Born. The estimating equation becomes: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗, 𝑒𝑒,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡  = 𝛼𝛼1𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝛼𝛼42𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 
             𝛼𝛼5𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 × 2𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝛾𝛾 + 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐 + 𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 + 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑒𝑒,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 . (2)                                            
As discussed in Section 2, sorting effects should in principle only affect individuals who 
face dual thin markets, while for those comparable workers who do not face dual thin markets, 
there should be little need to make such trade-offs. The coefficient 𝛼𝛼3 captures the differential 
distraction effects between the foreign-born who do not face dual thin markets and their US-born 
counterparts. Since earlier results suggest that distraction effect is small for all Ph.D. workers, 
the magnitude of  𝛼𝛼3 should be close to zero. The coefficient of interest, 𝛼𝛼5, in contrast, captures 
                                                            
33 I have noticed that the co-location effect or other unobservable attributes may have affected the estimates. Studies 
on the migration of couples demonstrated the importance of husbands’ career opportunities and that wives are 
typically the “tied movers” who participate in moves that result in a loss for themselves but positive net returns for 
the family (e.g., Nivalainen, 2004; Compton and Pollak, 2007). Even if the wage results of married female PhDs do 
include the tied mover effect, it still makes sense. In this case, the actual magnitude of the marriage market effect for 
the married female PhDs should be more positive than the estimates I have presented for this group, that is, the 
differential effect between single and married may have been underestimated. 
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the additional marriage market effect for foreign-born workers who have dual thin markets. 
Among demographic groups that put a high priority on marriage market opportunities, 𝛼𝛼5 is 
expected to have a negative sign when the outcome measure is wage. 
The main empirical challenge is to choose reasonable cutoffs to construct the dummy 
variable “2MktThin.” In the following discussion, I will first show how I select the preferred 
cutoffs to define a dual thin market. Once the preferred cutoffs have been established, I then 
present a complete set of results based on the associated definition of “2MktThin.” Briefly, for 
now, the preferred definition of “2MktThin” is one that maximizes the magnitude of the negative 
coefficient 𝛼𝛼5 in estimating equation (3) for single female Ph.D. workers in the core sample. It is 
also worth noting here that robustness results presented shortly make clear that the preferred 
definition for “2MktThin” is readily apparent when comparing across alternate definitions of 
“2MktThin.”  
 
 6.1. Dual Thin Markets 
This section first describes my preferred definition of a dual thin market. Then it outlines 
conceptual and numerical arguments used to select the cutoffs that define the “2MktThin” 
variable. Lastly, the section considers alternative estimates based on a grid search over different 
cutoffs for the number of MSAs that must provide active dating opportunities and active 
employment opportunities for an individual to be coded as facing a dual-thin market. 
In the preferred definition, a Ph.D. worker is coded as facing a dual thin market if the 
following two conditions are satisfied. First, the number of active marriage markets is less than 
36 MSAs in the U.S. (“marriage markets are thin”). Secondly, the number of active labor 
markets is less than 36 MSAs in the U.S. (“labor markets are thin”). In this definition, an active 
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marriage market refers to an MSA with the value of M – the number of own-ethnic singles of the 
opposite gender and with college above education levels – greater than or equal to 200. An active 
labor market refers to an MSA with the number of own-industry Ph.D. workers greater than or 
equal to 200.34 Specified in this way, the indicator “2MktThin” varies by ethnicity, industry, and 
gender, and it varies across years as well. Ethnic composition in the U.S. has tremendous changes 
for the period 1990-2010. I treat the variations of dual thin markets as exogenous for individuals. 
Choosing cutoffs to define the dual-thin-market indicator “2MktThin” is necessarily ad 
hoc. Nevertheless, numerical and conceptual arguments do provide guidance. As analyzed in 
Section 2, sorting effects are likely to be most pronounced for individuals who face dual thin 
markets. Because such people will find it difficult to locate in an MSA with both a sizable dating 
pool and high-quality job opportunities, and they may be forced to choose between MSAs that 
offer better job opportunities versus better marriage markets. While for those comparable 
workers who do not face dual thin markets, there should be little need to make such trade-offs. 
As suggested by earlier results, single female Ph.D. workers on average put a high priority on 
marriage market opportunities. Estimating the wage model among single female Ph.D. workers, 
the equation (3) is expected to yield estimates for which 𝛼𝛼5 < 0 and 𝛼𝛼3 ≈ 0.  
Among the core sample of single female PhDs, if  𝛼𝛼5 < 0 and 𝛼𝛼3 ≈ 0 hold, it indicates 
that the coefficient estimate 𝛼𝛼5�  at the true cutoffs to define a dual thin market should be more 
negative than estimates obtained under alternative cutoffs among this demographic group. That is 
because when the cutoffs are set either lower or higher than the true cutoffs — but not in an 
extreme way — the definition of “2MktThin” would be more restricted or looser than it should 
be. As a result, a proportion of single Ph.D. workers who face dual thin markets will be 
                                                            
34 In this way, the US-born will always be coded as 0 for the variable “2MktThin”, and some of the foreign-born will 
fall into the category of facing dual thin markets. 
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misclassified as those not facing dual thin markets or vice versa. Such misclassification should 
cause 𝛼𝛼3�, the coefficient estimate on M × Foreign-Born, to be more negative while cause 𝛼𝛼5�, the 
coefficient estimate on M × Foreign-Born × 2MktThin, to head in a positive direction.  
To check whether such a negative spike of 𝛼𝛼5� is present, I conduct a grid search for using 
alternative cutoffs to define a dual thin in estimating wage model for single female Ph.D. 
workers.35 If it is present, for reasons described above, I will choose the cutoffs that maximize 
the magnitude of the negative coefficient estimate 𝛼𝛼5� as my preferred ones.  
Figure 2 provides a three-dimensional view on how the coefficient estimate 𝛼𝛼5� changes 
as cutoffs to define a dual thin market move. In this grid research, whether an MSA has “active” 
opportunities for marriage and job market is defined as described earlier.36 While the cutoffs for 
the number of MSAs that provide active opportunities, below which a person is coded as having 
thin labor markets and as having thin marriage markets, are exhaustively chosen from the range 
of [0 MSA, 360 MSAs]. In this way, there are 130,321 cutoff pairs to define the “2MktThin” 
variable. For each cutoff pair, I estimate wage model of equation (3) for single female PhDs in 
the core sample to obtain the coefficient estimate 𝛼𝛼5� on the triple interaction term. In Figure 2, 
each point (x, y, z) represents a cutoff pair x-y on the horizontal X-Y plane — where x is the thin 
labor markets cutoff and y the thin marriage markets cutoff — and z on the vertical axis is the 
                                                            
35 Estimates in Section 5 indicate that sorting effect is present among single, foreign-born female PhDs. Therefore, 
discussion here focuses on single female PhDs. For single male PhDs, I also conduct a grid research regarding using 
alternative cutoffs to define a dual thin market and plot the corresponding surface and contour plot of 𝛼𝛼5�. I cannot 
find significant evidence that the sorting effect lowers wage rates for single male Ph.D. workers who are facing the 
dual thin markets. Some estimates for single male PhDs from this grid research are in the Appendix Table A2. 
36 For a given person, an MSA with at least 200 own-ethnic college-above potential dates is defined as an active 
marriage market, and an active labor market refers to an MSA with at least 200 own-industry Ph.D. jobs. I repeat the 
exercise by changing these local-level cutoffs to define whether an MSA has active opportunities for marriage and 
labor market. Not surprisingly, the wage results are also sensitive to the local-level cutoffs. When the magnitudes of 
the local-level cutoffs rise, the corresponding national-level cutoff pair to define that marriage and labor markets are 
thin become more restricted to find the deep negative spike of 𝛼𝛼5�. In the appendix, Table A4-1 and A4-2 document 
the inter-MSA distribution of own-ethnic potential dates with col+ education levels, and Table A5 reports the 
distribution of own-industry jobs for Ph.D. workers. 
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point estimate 𝛼𝛼5� obtained when x-y cutoff pair is used to define a dual thin market.37 A sharp 
downward spike on the Z-axis exists at the corner of the X-Y plane, where the cutoff for thin 
labor markets and that for thin marriage markets are both around 35 MSAs.  
Figure 3 is the corresponding contour plot for Figure 2. Such a two-dimension view is 
obtained when we look straight down along the Z-axis from the top of the surface plot. Figure 3 
demonstrates that only one small black area is present around the point (35 MSAs, 35 MSAs) on 
the X-Y plane, indicating that 𝛼𝛼5� would hit the deep negative spike if and only if the dual-thin-
market indicator “2MktThin” is defined under a cutoff pair within this small black area. 
Therefore, I choose (36 MSAs, 36 MSAs) from the small area as the preferred cutoffs. 
Table 6-1 selects nine different sets of cutoffs from this grid research for single female 
PhDs, and it documents how the other coefficient estimates, such as 𝛼𝛼3�, changes under different 
definitions of dual thin markets (the variable “2MktThin”). Table 6-1 Column (4) uses the 
preferred cutoffs and obtains a significant negative estimate -0.072 for 𝛼𝛼5�; as would be expected, 
that estimate is sharply more negative than all other estimates based on alternative classifications 
of dual thin markets. As discussed above, when moving away from Column (4) to (2), as the 
cutoffs set lower and the definition of “2MktThin” becomes increasingly restricted than it should 
be, a proportion of single Ph.D. workers that face dual thin markets are misclassified as not 
facing dual thin markets. In this case, 𝛼𝛼3�, the coefficient estimate on M × Foreign-Born, 
becomes more negative, while 𝛼𝛼5�  heads in a positive direction. Analogically, Column (4) to (8) 
                                                            
37 For example, in Figure 2 the point (31 MSAs, 36 MSAs, -0.065) refers to the estimate 𝛼𝛼5� = -0.065 when a person 
is defined as facing a dual market if the number of active labor markets < 31 MSAs and the number of active 
marriage markets < 36 MSAs. In Figure 2 and 3, both x and y are integers fallen into the range of [30 MSAs, 360 
MSAs]. That is because when cutoffs are set too low, there would be an extremely small number of observations 
that take value 1 for the variable “2MktThin” and the resulting estimates would not make sense. Besides, to plot 
these figures, when the cutoffs are set too high so that the estimating equation goes back to the double interaction 
model, 𝛼𝛼5� is set to 0. 
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show that when cutoffs are set increasingly higher, some of those not facing dual thin markets 
are mislabeled as having dual thin markets, resulting in a more negative 𝛼𝛼3� and a more positive  
𝛼𝛼5�. It is also worth noting here that when choosing extremely low cutoffs (e.g. 1 MSA in the first 
column) or extremely high cutoffs (e.g. 361 MSAs in the last column), either no one or all 
individuals would be characterized as facing a dual thin market. These extreme definitions cause 
the variable “2MktThin” to drop out of the regression and the specification reverts to the double 
interaction model of Table 4 Column (1).  
 
6.2. Single Ph.D. Workers Facing Dual Thin Markets  
This section presents estimates of the triple interaction model for single Ph.D. workers, 
using the preferred definition for a dual thin market. Table 6-2, 6-3 and 6-4 report hourly wage, 
hours worked per year and annual earnings, respectively. These tables demonstrate that among 
single Ph.D. workers that are facing dual thin markets, sorting effect grows significantly for 
young (age 25 to 44) women, while for the older women (age 45 to 65) and men in general, they 
would not sacrifice job opportunities for better marriage market opportunities.38  
Table 6-2 provides evidence that a sorting effect lowers equilibrium wage rates for single 
female PhDs who face dual thin markets, and in particular for those at a young age. Among core 
sample in Column (1), all else equal, locating in an MSA with 1,000 more potential dates reduces 
the wage of this group by 7.2 percentage points. No such effect arises for either single US-born 
Ph.D. women or single foreign-born Ph.D. women who do not face dual thin markets. Besides, 
when facing dual thin markets, this effect grows to 11 percentage points for young women in 
                                                            
38 Appendix Table A3 presents estimates of the triple interaction model for married Ph.D. workers, which is an 
analogical exercise for Table 5-4. As would be expected, among those married PhDs, when facing dual thin markets, 
the local marriage market has no impact on their hours worked per year, while the sorting effect is still present for 
their wage, and the magnitude is smaller than that of single Ph.D. women facing dual thin markets.   
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Column (2) but is not present for the older women in Column (3). As Column (4) to (6) suggest, 
single Ph.D. men, regardless of their age, would not choose to live in a lower-wage MSA when 
experiencing dual thin markets.  
Furthermore, Table 6-3 and 6-4 show that when facing dual thin markets, old women and 
young men work more and earn more for more potential dates present in the MSA, while no 
significant effect arises for either young women or old men. For example, for every 1,000 more 
potential dates living in the MSA, old single Ph.D. women work roughly 2 weeks more per year 
and earn 14 percent more in annual earnings. One possible explanation is that when encountering 
dual thin markets, old women and young men choose to live in an MSA with high-quality job 
opportunities. Meanwhile, these locations happen to have some potential dates for them.39 The 
results obtained may be driven by some unobservable attributes of these workers, such as their 
eagerness to achieve career success, high expectation for a potential partner, in a lack of desire to 
get married, etc.  
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the degree to which Ph.D.-trained workers — both domestic and 
foreign-born — face trade-offs between marriage and labor market opportunities. This work is 
important because Ph.D.-trained STEM workers, of which a sizable proportion are foreign born, 
account for a large share of innovation in the US. Ph.D. Labor markets are thin because high-
quality jobs are not ubiquitous. Moreover, foreign-born PhDs face thin marriage markets 
compared to their U.S-born counterparts. That is because foreign-born PhDs, and especially 
                                                            
39 For example, among the older women that are facing dual thin markets, 59% live in an MSA with both active 
labor and marriage market, 18% in an MSA that only has active marriage market, and the rest in neither an active 
labor market nor an active marriage market. 
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those from China and India, display a strong tendency to marry highly educated individuals 
within their own ethnicity. This narrows the dating pool and summary measures confirm that 
there are relatively few MSAs in the United States that offer active dating environment for these 
sorts of workers. Facing dual thin marriage and labor markets, single, foreign-born Ph.D. 
workers must sometimes choose between MSAs that provide better job opportunities versus 
better marriage markets.  
I present evidence that on average, single, foreign-born, female Ph.D. workers accept 
inferior labor market outcomes in exchange for improved marriage market opportunities. I also 
show that this result is primarily driven by the soring of such individuals into MSAs with a more 
active dating environment. All else equal, locating in an MSA with 1,000 more single men of 
their own ethnicity and with at least college education levels decreases their equilibrium wage 
and annual earnings by roughly 2 percent. No such effect arises for single, US-born female PhDs 
who have geographically expansive marriage markets. The distraction effect that reduces hours 
worked, possibly to free up time for dating, is present in some models and small in magnitude. In 
addition, I conclude that the trade-offs between marriage market opportunities and labor market 
outcomes are smaller for single male Ph.D. workers, especially at young age. This gender 
disparity suggests that Ph.D.-trained single men may be more likely to put a high priority on job 
opportunities when choosing where to locate.    
This paper also is also relevant for other instances in which highly skilled individuals 
face thin labor markets and also seek spouses within narrowly defined demographic traits.  
Examples beyond ethnicity could include religious background, political attitudes, or other 
defining cultural traits. In future work, it would be informative to study what is the price some 
are willing to pay to search love and find long-term domestic happiness. 
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Figure 1:  Local Attributes (A), Local Marriage Market Opportunities (M), and Wage (w) 
Local Marriage market (M) is a consumer amenity that affects worker utility but has no direct effect on 
productivity. Assume  𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 < 𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U(A , 𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎) = 𝑈𝑈∗ 
U(A , 𝑀𝑀𝑏𝑏) = 𝑈𝑈∗ 
Wage 
𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎∗ 
𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏∗ 
L 
𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏∗∗ 
38 
 
Figure 2: Surface Plot of Coefficient Estimate (𝜶𝜶𝟓𝟓�) on M*Foreign-born*2MktThin 
Sample of Single Female Ph.D. Workers, Age 25 to 65, Dependent Variable = log (Hourly Wage) 
 
  
Z Axis 
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Figure 3: Contour Plot of Coefficient Estimate (𝜶𝜶𝟓𝟓�) 𝒐𝒐𝒐𝒐 M*Foreign-born*2MktThin 
  X 
Y  
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Table 1: Marriage Patterns for Ph.D. Holders by Birth Region (BR), Census Year 2000 a 
Panel A: Marriage Patterns for Male Ph.D. Holders, Age 25 to 65 
 
Male PhDs’  
Birth Region(BR) b 
Frequency of Wife’s Education Level and Birth Region(BR)  
(in Percentage) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Wife from  
Same Birth Region  
US-Born  
Wife 
Wife with  
a Ph.D. Degree 
Wife with  
Col+ Education c 
Same-BR Wife with 
a Ph.D. Degree 
Same-BR Wife with 
Col+ Education c 
US-born 92.8 92.8 12.3 77.1 10.8 71.5 
Foreign-born  71.6 19.6 15.1 80.7 10.0 57.5 
China 95.1 2.4 13.6 84.7 12.8 80.6 
India 83.9 10.4 14.9 86.9 12.0 72.6 
Korea 94.7 3.6 8.6 85.8 7.9 81.8 
Philippines 71.8 21.4 16.9 82.2 14.1 64.9 
Eastern Europe 78.6 13.8 22.1 86.7 17.5 70.0 
Western Europe 41.2 42.3 16.1 81.7 6.7 31.9 
 
Panel B: Marriage Patterns for Female Ph.D. Holders, Age 25 to 65 
 
Female PhDs’  
Birth Region(BR) b 
Frequency of Husband’s Education Level and Birth Region(BR)  
(in Percentage) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Husband from 
Same Birth Region 
US-Born  
Husband 
Husband with 
a Ph.D. Degree 
Husband with  
Col+ Education c 
Same-BR Husband 
with a Ph.D. Degree 
Same-BR Husband 
with Col+ Education 
US-born 93.1 93.1 31.6 83.9 28.2 77.9 
Foreign-born  59.7 29.9 48.0 89.8 30.2 53.6 
China 78.5 15.2 56.2 96.3 44.1 75.8 
India 83.6 12.2 51.6 96.3 44.9 81.1 
Korea 66.2 24.7 54.8 90.1 33.7 60.5 
Philippines 51.4 40.0 27.0 76.0 14.3 42.1 
Eastern Europe 70.6 18.9 54.8 90.7 42.1 65.2 
Western Europe 29.8 56.7 46.6 94.3 17.6 29.2 
a Data are 5% sample decennial census 2000 and are extracted from IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2010). This table is confined to the married individuals who have a PhD degree. 
Moreover, these individuals are living in married-couple households in which both spouses are present and have reported their education levels, nativities and places of birth. 
b US-born is defined as born in the U.S.A. or those born abroad with American Parent(s) and all the others are defined as foreign-born. I group countries into 22 regions mostly 
based on United Nations Statistics Division, see Appendix Table A4-1 and Table A4-2 for the whole list of birth regions.  
c Col+ (College-above) education refers to having received at least 4-year college education attainment. 
41 
 
Table 2: Effect of Local Marriage Markets (M) on Labor Market Outcomes (Y) 
Consider a model Y = 𝛼𝛼𝑀𝑀 + 𝑓𝑓(𝑋𝑋,𝐴𝐴) + 𝜀𝜀, where f( X, A) denotes a function of individual characteristics X and 
location attributes A, and 𝜀𝜀 is a classical error term.  
Panel A: Single PhDs Facing Dual Thin Markets 
Labor Market Outcome 
(Y) 
Sign of  𝜶𝜶 
(1) 
Primary Effect: 
Sorting 
(2) 
Secondary Effect: 
Distraction 
(3) 
Two Effects  
Combined 
 
Hourly Wage 
 
Negative Negative Negative 
 
Hours Worked per Year 
 
Ambiguous Negative Ambiguous 
 
Annual Earnings 
 
Ambiguous Negative Ambiguous 
  
Panel B: Single PhDs Who Are Not Facing Dual Thin Markets 
Labor Market Outcome 
(Y) 
Sign of 𝜶𝜶 
(1) 
Primary Effect: 
Sorting 
(2) 
Secondary Effect: 
Distraction 
(3) 
Two Effects  
Combined 
 
Hourly Wage 
 
Zero Negative Negative 
 
Hours Worked per Year 
 
Zero Negative Negative 
 
Annual Earnings 
 
Zero Negative Negative 
  
Panel C: Differential Effects: Panel A - Panel B 
Labor Market Outcome 
(Y) 
Sign of 𝜶𝜶  
(1) 
Primary Effect: 
Sorting 
(2) 
Secondary Effect: 
Distraction 
(3) 
Two Effects  
Combined 
 
Hourly Wage 
 
Negative Negative 
(close to zero) 
Negative 
 
Hours Worked per Year 
 
Ambiguous Negative 
(close to zero) 
Ambiguous 
 
Annual Earnings 
 
Ambiguous Negative 
(close to zero) 
Ambiguous 
Note:  Each cell of Panel C is the corresponding cell of Panel A subtracting that of Panel B. I assume that the magnitude of the 
distraction effect for those facing dual thin markets in Panel A is no less than that for those who are not facing dual thin markets 
in Panel B.
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Table 3: Sample Means for Key Variables 
 (Standard Deviation Reported in Pretenses) 
Fulltime Ph.D. Workers, Age 25 to 65, Pooling Years (1990, 2000 and 2010) 
 
 Single Ph.D. Workers (Core Sample) Married Ph.D. Workers 
 Both 
Genders Female Male Female Male 
Hourly Wages (in 1 U.S. dollar of year 
1999) 
26.1 
(29.2) 
25.0 
(23.1) 
27.1 
(33.5) 
26.6 
(19.9) 
32.6 
(33.6) 
Annual Earnings (in 1,000s of 1999 U.S. 
dollars) 
56.0 
(31.8) 
53.7 
(28.4) 
58.1 
(34.3) 
57.3 
(33.1) 
73.3 
(38.7) 
Usual Hours Worked per Week 47.7 
(9.94) 
47.3 
(9.53) 
48.0 
(10.3) 
46.2 
(8.62) 
47.7 
(9.32) 
Hours Worked per Year 2,310 
(646.3) 
2,282 
(619.7) 
2,334 
(667.3) 
2,229 
(583.9) 
2,378 
(573.5) 
MSA Count of Own-Ethnic Col+ Single 
of the Opposite Gender at year t (1,000s) 
60.0 
(73.2) 
58.1 
(67.5) 
61.6 
(77.7) 
50.4 
(62.8) 
49.9 
(68.5) 
Total MSA Population at year t 
(millions) 
1.34 
(1.23) 
1.34 
(1.24) 
1.33 
(1.22) 
1.26 
(1.17) 
1.16 
(1.12) 
MSA Employment in Own Industry at 
year t (millions) 
0.107 
(0.126) 
0.108 
(0.122) 
0.107 
(0.129) 
0.103 
(0.114) 
0.094 
(0.119) 
Age 43.6 
(10.3) 
44.3 
(10.3) 
43.1 
(10.3) 
44.0 
(9.29) 
46.4 
(9.36) 
Foreign-Born 0.160 
(0.367) 
0.126 
(0.332) 
0.189 
(0.392) 
0.181 
(0.385) 
0.207 
(0.405) 
Hispanic Origin 0.040 
(0.195) 
0.043 
(0.203) 
0.037 
(0.188) 
0.039 
(0.193) 
0.025 
(0.156) 
Race is black 0.071 
(0.256) 
0.093 
(0.290) 
0.052 
(0.222) 
0.056 
(0.229) 
0.031 
(0.174) 
Has Own Children at Home  0.109 
(0.312) 
0.154 
(0.361) 
0.071 
(0.257) 
0.534 
(0.499) 
0.629 
(0.483) 
English Speaking Ability High 0.959 
(0.198) 
0.964 
(0.187) 
0.955 
(0.208) 
0.956 
(0.204) 
0.949 
(0.222) 
Live in Home State 0.261 
(0.439) 
0.288 
(0.453) 
0.238 
(0.426) 
0.249 
(0.433) 
0.203 
(0.402) 
Years in the U.S. ≤ 10 0.104 
(0.305) 
0.081 
(0.272) 
0.124 
(0.329) 
0.095 
(0.293) 
0.108 
(0.311) 
Occupation's Median Earned Income 
Score in Percentile 
76.4 
(47.1) 
74.4 
(38.9) 
78.0 
(53.0) 
76.6 
(44.6) 
82.1 
(68.3) 
In a STEM Occupation 0.341 
(0.474) 
0.308 
(0.462) 
0.369 
(0.483) 
0.327 
(0.469) 
0.357 
(0.479) 
MSA Average Annual Earnings at year t 
(in 1,000s of U.S. dollars) 
22.6 
(4.51) 
22.5 
(4.51) 
22.7 
(4.51) 
22.6 
(4.55) 
22.4 
(4.56) 
MSA Average Working Age at year t 24.3 
(1.75) 
24.3 
(1.77) 
24.3 
(1.73) 
24.4 
(1.72) 
24.4 
(1.73) 
Observation 18,796 8,647 10,149 12,621 39,973 
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Table 4: HOURLY WAGE in Different Age Groups by Gender 
 
Dependent Variable = log (Hourly Wage) 
 
 Single Female Ph.D. Workers 
 
Single Male Ph.D. Workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Female Age  
25 to 65 
Female Age  
25 to 44 
Female Age  
45 to 65 
Male Age  
25 to 65 
Male Age  
25 to 44 
Male Age  
45 to 65 
MSA Count of Own-Ethnic Col+ Single 
of the Opposite Gender in 1,000s (M) 
6.4e-04 8.3e-04 5.0e-04 -1.5e-04 5.6e-04 -0.002*** 
(8.8e-04) (7.2e-04) (0.001) (2.6e-04) (3.6e-04) (4.5e-04) 
       
Foreign-Born (=1 if the worker is not a 
US-Born) 
0.016 0.077* -0.095 0.056 0.094** -0.041 
(0.035) (0.043) (0.068) (0.035) (0.047) (0.064) 
       
M × Foreign-Born -0.019** -0.029*** -0.008 -0.011* -0.008 -0.023** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) 
       
Urbanization Effects       
Total MSA Population (millions) 0.083* -0.006 0.191** 0.091** 0.079 0.142 
 (0.045) (0.459) (0.80) (0.046) (0.078) (0.0969) 
       
Localization Effects       
MSA Employment in Own Industry 
(millions) 
0.183 0.155 0.178 -0.090 -0.222 0.0357 
(0.130) (0.142) (0.169) (0.119) (0.151) (0.144) 
       
MSA Fixed Effects 299 270 278 305 282 283 
Industry Fixed Effects 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.178 0.220 0.177 0.225 0.233 0.256 
Observations 8,647 4,432 4,215 10,149 5,709 4,440 
a Sample is restricted to fulltime Ph.D. workers whose usual hours worked per week ≥ 35hours. I pool observations from the survey years 1990, 2000 and 2010. Hourly wage = 
annual earnings / hours worked per year. Hours worked per Year = usual hours worked per week × weeks worked last year. ACS 2010 only reports the range of weeks a worker 
worked in previous 12 months, and I use the midpoint as the representative level for an individual’s working weeks.  
b To reserve space here, I suppress the coefficient estimates on individual characteristics, e.g. age, square of age, occupation's median earned income, having own children present 
in the house, number of own children age ≤ 4, age of eldest own child in household ≥20, Hispanic origin, Black race, English speaking ability high or medium, no household 
member age 14+ speaks English very well, years in the U.S.≤10, in a STEM occupation, working on wage/salary in private sectors, living in home state, and also those on MSA 
count of own-ethnic workers excluding the Col+ singles of the opposite gender, MSA average working age and MSA average annual earnings at the given survey year. 
c Standard errors are clustered at MSA level and are reported in parentheses. ***denotes the estimate is significant from zero at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level.  
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 Table 5-1: HOURS WORKED PER YEAR in Different Age Groups by Gender 
 
Dependent Variable = Hours Worked per Year 
 
 Single Female Ph.D. Workers 
 
Single Male Ph.D. Workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Female Age  
25 to 65 
Female Age  
25 to 44 
Female Age  
45 to 65 
Male Age  
25 to 65 
Male Age  
25 to 44 
Male Age  
45 to 65 
MSA Count of Own-Ethnic Col+ Single 
of the Opposite Gender in 1,000s (M) 
-1.803** -2.666** -0.250 -0.197 -0.898 1.460 
(0.761) (1.065) (0.884) (0.760) (0.782) (1.190) 
       
Foreign-Born (=1 if the worker is not a 
US-Born) 
-101.1** -99.42** -85.10 -9.838 -23.39 4.685 
(45.71) (45.33) (86.00) (37.76) (49.15) (66.86) 
       
M × Foreign-Born -5.808 -4.357 -5.331 -8.722 -14.80* 6.362 
 (11.32) (20.66) (13.68) (8.166) (8.644) (13.02) 
       
Urbanization Effects       
Total MSA Population (millions) 20.50 95.44 -70.91 6.165 -2.856 -13.96 
 (54.55) (92.86) (126.0) (44.82) (77.88) (75.83) 
       
Localization Effects       
MSA Employment in Own Industry 
(millions) 
23.75 -162.0 246.9 24.36 87.65 -128.4 
(112.5) (150.1) (171.7) (119.4) (132.4) (158.9) 
       
MSA Fixed Effects 299 270 278 305 282 283 
Industry Fixed Effects 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.070 0.098 0.123 0.063 0.085 0.110 
Observations 8,647 4,432 4,215 10,149 5,709 4,440 
a Sample is restricted to fulltime Ph.D. workers whose usual hours worked per week ≥ 35hours. I pool observations from the survey years 1990, 2000 and 2010. Hours worked per 
Year = usual hours worked per week × weeks worked last year. ACS 2010 only reports the range of weeks a worker worked in previous 12 months, and I use the midpoint as the 
representative level for an individual’s working weeks.  
b I suppress the coefficient estimates on individual characteristics, e.g. age, square of age, occupation's median earned income, having own children present in the house, number of 
own children age ≤ 4, age of eldest own child in household ≥20, Hispanic origin, Black race, English speaking ability high or medium, no household member age 14+ speaks 
English very well, years in the U.S.≤ 10, in a STEM occupation, working on wage/salary in private sectors, living in home state, and also those on MSA count of own-ethnic 
workers excluding the Col+ singles of the opposite gender, MSA average working age and MSA average annual earnings at the given survey year. 
c Standard errors are clustered at MSA level and are reported in parentheses. ***denotes the estimate is significant from zero at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. 
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Table 5-2: ANNUAL EARNINGS in Different Age Groups by Gender 
 
Dependent Variable = log (Annual Earnings) 
 
 Single Female Ph.D. Workers 
 
Single Male Ph.D. Workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Female Age  
25 to 65 
Female Age  
25 to 44 
Female Age  
45 to 65 
Male Age  
25 to 65 
Male Age  
25 to 44 
Male Age  
45 to 65 
MSA Count of Own-Ethnic Col+ Single 
of the Opposite Gender in 1,000s (M) 
-5.6e-04 -6.3e-04 -2.3e-04 -2.6e-04 7.6e-05 -9.0e-04 
(7.8e-04) (7.0e-04) (0.001) (5.4e-04) (6.4e-04) (5.8e-04) 
       
Foreign-Born (=1 if the worker is not a 
US-Born) 
-0.027 0.026 -0.103 0.058* 0.084** -0.015 
(0.037) (0.042) (0.0913) (0.033) (0.042) (0.072) 
       
M × Foreign-Born -0.024** -0.032*** -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 -0.018* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.008) (0.014) (0.010) 
       
Urbanization Effects       
Total MSA Population (millions) 0.107* 0.044 0.179 0.065 0.054 0.098 
 (0.058) (0.072) (0.133) (0.058) (0.081) (0.089) 
       
Localization Effects       
MSA Employment in Own Industry 
(millions) 
0.227** 0.088 0.332** -0.088 -0.152 -0.088 
(0.109) (0.136) (0.137) (0.122) (0.137) (0.185) 
       
MSA Fixed Effects 299 270 278 305 282 283 
Industry Fixed Effects 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.189 0.240 0.196 0.215 0.251 0.211 
Observations 8,647 4,432 4,215 10,149 5,709 4,440 
a Sample is restricted to fulltime Ph.D. workers whose usual hours worked per week ≥ 35hours. I pool observations from the survey years 1990, 2000 and 2010. I suppress the 
coefficient estimates on individual characteristics, e.g. age, square of age, occupation's median earned income, having own children present in the house, number of own children 
age ≤ 4, age of eldest own child in household ≥20, Hispanic origin, Black race, English speaking ability high or medium, no household member age 14+ speaks English very well, 
years in the U.S.≤ 10, in a STEM occupation, working on wage/salary in private sectors, living in home state, and also those on MSA count of own-ethnic workers excluding the 
Col+ singles of the opposite gender, MSA average working age and MSA average annual earnings at the given survey year. 
b Standard errors are clustered at MSA level and are reported in parentheses. ***denotes the estimate is significant from zero at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. 
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Table 5-3: Labor Market Outcomes for Married Ph.D. Workers by Gender, Age 25 to 65 
 
 Hours Worked per Year log (Hourly Wage) log (Annual Earnings) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Female Male Female Male Female Male 
       
MSA Count of Own-Ethnic Col+ Single 
of the Opposite Gender in 1,000s (M) 
-0.309 0.012 -3.7e-04 2.9e-04* -5.2e-04 4.1e-04** 
(0.409) (0.145) (4.1e-04) (1.7e-04) (4.5e-04) (1.8e-04) 
       
Foreign-Born (=1 if the worker is not a 
US-Born) 
-112.7*** -126.0*** -0.035 0.032** -0.075*** -0.021 
(26.95) (17.92) (0.024) (0.016) (0.028) (0.017) 
       
M × Foreign-Born  -4.838 -9.542*** -0.018** -0.008*** -0.018** -0.012*** 
 (4.673) (2.450) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) 
       
Urbanization Effects       
Total MSA Population (millions) -45.08 -53.79** 0.106* 0.057*** 0.092 0.028 
 (37.16) (22.56) (0.057) (0.021) (0.069) (0.021) 
       
Localization Effects       
MSA Employment in Own Industry 
(millions) 
11.68 35.52 -0.104 -0.069 -0.086 -0.048 
(83.74) (59.72) (0.136) (0.051) (0.166) (0.065) 
       
MSA Fixed Effects 310 319 310 319 310 319 
Industry Fixed Effects 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.072 0.063 0.161 0.187 0.167 0.185 
Observations 12,621 39,973 12,621 39,973 12,621 39,973 
a Sample is restricted to fulltime Ph.D. workers whose usual hours worked per week ≥ 35hours. I pool observations from the survey years 1990, 2000 and 2010. I suppress the 
coefficient estimates on MSA count of other own-ethnic workers excluding the Col+ singles of the opposite gender, MSA average working age, MSA average annual earnings, and 
also those on individual characteristics of the worker, e.g. age, square of age, occupation's median earned income, having own children present in the house, number of own 
children age ≤ 4, age of eldest own child in household ≥20, Hispanic origin, Black race, English speaking ability high or medium, no household member age 14+ speaks English 
very well, years in the U.S.≤ 10, in a STEM occupation, working on wage/salary in private sectors, living in home state, and also those on characteristics of the worker’s spouse, 
e.g. spouse’s education, age, age square, employ status, English speaking ability, whether in a STEM occupation, occupation's median earned income and living in home state or 
not. 
b Standard errors are clustered at MSA level and are reported in parentheses. ***denotes the estimate is significant from zero at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level.
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Table 5-4: Influence of Marriage and Children 
HOURLY WAGE for Young (Age 25 to 44) Female Ph.D. Workers 
 
Dependent Variable = log (Hourly Wage) 
 
 All Single Women +  Married Women Who Moved to Current MSA Post-Marriage 
 (1) (2) 
 With or Without Own Children 
In the Household 
Without Own Child  
In the Household 
MSA Count of Own-Ethnic Col+ Single 
of Opposite Gender in 1,000s (M) 
5.3e-04 2.7e-04 
(5.4e-04) (6.3e-04) 
   
Foreign-Born (=1 if the worker is not a 
US-Born) 
0.067* 0.136*** 
(0.038) (0.041) 
   
Single 0.111 -0.665 
 (0.480) (0.668) 
   
M × Foreign-Born -0.023** -0.009 
 (0.010) (0.017) 
   
M × Foreign-Born × Single -0.008 -0.024** 
 (0.007) (0.011) 
   
Has Own Children in the Household 0.081*** - 
 (0.021) - 
   
MSA Fixed Effects 285 264 
Industry Fixed Effects 21 21 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.247 0.222 
Observations 5,600 4,214 
a Sample is restricted to fulltime Ph.D. workers whose usual hours worked per week ≥ 35hours. I pool observations from the survey 
years 1990, 2000 and 2010. I suppress the coefficient estimates on urbanization effects, localization effects, MSA count of own-
ethnic workers excluding Col+ single of the opposite gender, MSA average working age, MSA average annual earnings, and also 
on individual characteristics of the worker, e.g. age, square of age, occupation's median earned income, Hispanic origin, Black 
race, English Speaking Ability high or medium, no household member age 14+ speaks English very well, years in the U.S. ≤ 10, 
in a STEM occupation, working on wage/salary in private sectors, living in home state, and also those on characteristics of the 
worker’s spouse, e.g. spouse’s education, age, age squared, employ status, English speaking ability. 
b Standard errors are clustered at MSA level and are reported in parentheses. ***denotes the estimate is significant from zero at 
1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. 
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Extensions -Table 6-1: Both Marriage Markets and Labor Markets Are Thin, Using Different Cutoffs 
 
HOURLY WAGE for Single Female Ph.D. Workers, Age 25 to 65 
 
Dependent Variable = log (Hourly Wage) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Marriage Markets Are Thin if 
Number of Active Marriage Markets < 1 MSA <31 MSAs <36 MSAs <36 MSAs <36 MSAs <41 MSAs <81 MSAs <161 MSAs <361 MSAs 
 Labor Markets Are Thin  if 
Number of Active Labor Markets 
 
<1 MSA 
 
<31 MSAs <31 MSAs 
 
<36 MSAs 
 
<41 MSAs 
 
<41 MSAs 
 
<81 MSAs 
 
<161 MSAs <361 MSAs 
          
MSA Own-Ethnic Col+ Single 
Men in 1,000s (M)  
6.4e-04 6.1e-04 6.2e-04 6.2e-04 6.1e-04 6.6e-04 6.7e-04 7.2e-04 6.4e-04 
(8.8e-04) (8.8e-04) (8.5e-04) (8.6e-04) (8.5e-04) (8.6e-04) (8.7e-04) (8.9e-04) (8.8e-04) 
          
Foreign-Born (=1 if the worker 
is not a US-Born) 
0.016 0.017 0.014 0.011 0.008 0.001 0.0059 -0.011 0.016 
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036) (0.041) (0.035) 
          
Both Marriage and Labor 
Markets are Thin (2MktThin) 
- -0.015 0.062 0.105 0.106 0.121* 0.040 0.066 - 
- (0.152) (0.111) (0.096) (0.090) (0.072) (0.053) (0.049) - 
          
M × Foreign-Born  -0.019** -0.020** -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 -0.018 -0.020 -0.024** -0.019** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) 
          
M × Foreign-Born × 2MktThin - -0.039 -0.065*** -0.072*** -0.069*** -0.004 0.003 0.009 - 
 - (0.057) (0.025) (0.021) (0.022) (0.036) (0.014) (0.010) - 
          
Observations with 2MktThin=1 0 40 55 67 92 119 342 550 8647 
R-squared 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.178 0.178 
Observations 8,647 8,647 8,647 8,647 8,647 8,647 8,647 8,647 8,647 
a For a person, an MSA is an active marriage market if the number of own-ethnic col+ singles of the opposite gender ≥ 200; an MSA is classified as an active labor market if the 
number of own-industry Ph.D. workers ≥ 200. Under these local cutoffs to define an MSA as an active marriage or labor market, each column in this table change the national-
level cutoffs to define whether an individual is faced with a dual thin market. The variable “2MktThin” = 1 if marriage and labor markets are both thin for a person and 0 
otherwise. Sample is restricted to Ph.D. fulltime workers whose usual hours worked per week ≥ 35hours. And I pool observations from the survey years 1990, 2000 and 2010. 
b To reserve space I suppress the coefficient estimates on individual characteristics, e.g. age, square of age, occupation's median earned income, having own children present in the 
house, number of own children age ≤ 4, age of eldest own child in household ≥20, Hispanic origin, Black race, English speaking ability high or medium, no household member age 
14+ speaks English very well, years in the U.S.≤ 10, in a STEM occupation, working on wage/salary in private sectors, living in home state, and also those on urbanization effect, 
localization effect, MSA count of own-ethnic workers excluding the Col+ singles of the opposite gender, MSA average working age and MSA average annual earnings at the given 
survey year. I also include year fixed effects, MSA fixed effects and industry fixed effects. 
c Standard errors are clustered at MSA level and are reported in parentheses. ***denotes the estimate is significant from zero at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. 
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Extensions -Table 6-2: Both Marriage Markets and Labor Markets Are Thin, Using the Preferred Definition 
 
HOURLY WAGE in Different Age Groups by Gender 
 
Dependent Variable = log (Hourly Wage) 
 
 Single Female Ph.D. Workers 
 
Single Male Ph.D. Workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Female Age  
25 to 65 
Female Age  
25 to 44 
Female Age  
45 to 65 
Male Age  
25 to 65 
Male Age  
25 to 44 
Male Age  
45 to 65 
MSA Count of Own-Ethnic Col+ Single 
of the Opposite Gender in 1,000s (M) 
6.2e-04 7.5e-04 5.2e-04 -1.2e-04 5.8e-04 -0.002*** 
(8.6e-04) (6.9e-04) (0.001) (2.6e-04) (3.6e-04) (4.7e-04) 
       
Foreign-Born (=1 if the worker is not a 
US-Born) 
0.011 0.072* -0.082 0.045 0.095** -0.037 
(0.036) (0.043) (0.071) (0.033) (0.044) (0.065) 
       
Both Marriage and Labor Markets for 
This Worker are Thin (2MktThin) 
0.105 0.123 -0.157 0.095 -0.008 -0.031 
(0.096) (0.115) (0.168) (0.0648) (0.065) (0.162) 
       
M × Foreign-Born -0.016 -0.028** -0.012 -0.012** -0.010 -0.024** 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) 
       
M × Foreign-Born × 2MktThin -0.072*** -0.110** 0.054 0.014 0.021 0.011 
 (0.021) (0.047) (0.057) (0.013) (0.015) (0.023) 
       
MSA Fixed Effects 299 270 278 305 282 283 
Industry Fixed Effects 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.178 0.220 0.177 0.225 0.233 0.256 
Observations 8,647 4,434 4,215 10,151 5,709 4,440 
a Both marriage and labor markets are thin for a given worker if the number of active marriage markets < 36 MSAs and the number of active labor markets < 36 MSAs. An MSA is 
classified as an active marriage market if the number of own-ethnic col+ singles of the opposite gender ≥ 200. An MSA is defined as an active labor market if the number of own-
industry Ph.D. workers ≥ 200. 
b Sample is restricted to fulltime Ph.D. workers whose usual hours worked per week ≥ 35hours. I pool observations from the survey years 1990, 2000 and 2010. I suppress the 
coefficient estimates on individual characteristics, e.g. age, square of age, occupation's median earned income, having own children present in the house, number of own children 
age ≤ 4, age of eldest own child in household ≥20, Hispanic origin, Black race, English speaking ability high or medium, no household member age 14+ speaks English very well, 
years in the U.S.≤ 10, in a STEM occupation, working on wage/salary in private sectors, living in home state, and also those on urbanization effect, localization effect, MSA count 
of own-ethnic workers excluding the Col+ singles of the opposite gender, MSA average working age and MSA average annual earnings at the given survey year. 
c Standard errors are clustered at MSA level and are reported in parentheses. ***denotes the estimate is significant from zero at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. 
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Extensions-Table 6-3: Both Marriage Markets and Labor Markets Are Thin, Using the Preferred Definition 
 
HOURS WORKED PER YEAR in Different Age Groups by Gender 
 
Dependent Variable = Hours Worked per Year 
 
 Single Female Ph.D. Workers 
 
Single Male Ph.D. Workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Female Age  
25 to 65 
Female Age  
25 to 44 
Female Age  
45 to 65 
Male Age  
25 to 65 
Male Age  
25 to 44 
Male Age  
45 to 65 
MSA Count of Own-Ethnic Col+ Single 
of the Opposite Gender in 1,000s (M) 
-1.822** -2.729** -0.216 -0.160 -0.857 1.467 
(0.772) (1.098) (0.868) (0.752) (0.786) (1.158) 
       
Foreign-Born (=1 if the worker is not a 
US-Born) 
-87.53* -86.77* -64.51 6.589 -5.722 7.402 
(45.80) (45.20) (85.65) (38.80) (49.82) (66.46) 
       
Both Marriage and Labor Markets for 
This Worker are Thin (2MktThin) 
-216.7* -247.6 -252.0 -129.2* -131.6 -23.46 
(119.0) (159.9) (219.1) (70.95) (84.00) (126.2) 
       
M × Foreign-Born -8.704 -7.455 -13.10 -12.33 -19.26** 5.696 
 (12.08) (21.89) (12.25) (9.386) (8.807) (14.04) 
       
M × Foreign-Born × 2MktThin 50.90* 48.00 98.20** 33.89* 43.56*** 5.364 
 (26.95) (37.97) (43.48) (18.82) (12.54) (47.16) 
       
MSA Fixed Effects 299 270 278 305 282 283 
Industry Fixed Effects 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.071 0.101 0.086 0.063 0.086 0.112 
Observations 8,652 4,434 4,215 10,151 5,710 4,441 
a Both marriage and labor markets are thin for a given worker if the number of active marriage markets < 36 MSAs and the number of active labor markets < 36 MSAs. An MSA is 
classified as an active marriage market if the number of own-ethnic col+ single of the opposite gender ≥ 200. An MSA is defined as an active labor market if the number of own-
industry Ph.D. workers ≥ 200. 
b Sample is restricted to fulltime Ph.D. workers whose usual hours worked per week ≥ 35hours. I pool observations from the survey years 1990, 2000 and 2010. I suppress the 
coefficient estimates on individual characteristics, e.g. age, square of age, occupation's median earned income, having own children present in the house, number of own children 
age ≤ 4, age of eldest own child in household ≥20, Hispanic origin, Black race, English speaking ability high or medium, no household member age 14+ speaks English very well, 
years in the U.S. ≤ 10, in a STEM occupation, working on wage/salary in private sectors, living in home state, and also those on urbanization effect, localization effect, MSA count 
of own-ethnic workers excluding the Col+ singles of the opposite gender, MSA average working age and MSA average annual earnings at the given survey year. 
c Standard errors are clustered at MSA level and are reported in parentheses. ***denotes the estimate is significant from zero at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. 
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Extensions-Table 6-4: Both Marriage Markets and Labor Markets Are Thin, Using the Preferred Definition 
 
ANNUAL EARNINGS in Different Age Groups by Gender 
 
Dependent Variable = log (Annual Earnings) 
 
 Single Female Ph.D. Workers 
 
Single Male Ph.D. Workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Female Age  
25 to 65 
Female Age  
25 to 44 
Female Age  
45 to 65 
Male Age  
25 to 65 
Male Age  
25 to 44 
Male Age  
45 to 65 
MSA Count of Own-Ethnic Col+ Single 
of the Opposite Gender in 1,000s (M) 
-5.9e-04 -7.3e-04 -1.7e-05 -2.2e-04 1.2e-04 -8.9e-04 
(7.7e-04) (7.0e-04) (0.001) (5.5e-04) (6.5e-04) (5.7e-04) 
       
Foreign-Born (=1 if the worker is not a 
US-Born) 
-0.023 0.028 -0.070 0.058* 0.098** -0.011 
(0.038) (0.043) (0.089) (0.032) (0.040) (0.071) 
       
Both Marriage and Labor Markets for 
This Worker are Thin (2MktThin) 
-0.037 -0.014 -0.389 0.004 -0.108 -0.040 
(0.108) (0.100) (0.254) (0.069) (0.074) (0.162) 
       
M × Foreign-Born -0.023** -0.032*** -0.022 -0.016** -0.018 -0.020** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.008) (0.013) (0.010) 
       
M × Foreign-Born × 2MktThin -0.030 -0.074 0.138** 0.035*** 0.051*** 0.012 
 (0.028) (0.053) (0.066) (0.012) (0.016) (0.021) 
       
MSA Fixed Effects 299 269 270 305 282 283 
Industry Fixed Effects 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.190 0.241 0.196 0.215 0.251 0.211 
Observations 8,647 4,434 4,215 10,151 5,709 4,440 
a Both marriage and labor markets are thin for a given worker if the number of active marriage markets < 36 MSAs and the number of active labor markets < 36 MSAs. An MSA is 
classified as an active marriage market if the number of own-ethnic col+ single of the opposite gender ≥ 200. An MSA is defined as an active labor market if the number of own-
industry Ph.D. workers ≥ 200. 
b Sample is restricted to fulltime Ph.D. workers whose usual hours worked per week ≥ 35hours. I pool observations from the survey years 1990, 2000 and 2010. I suppress the 
coefficient estimates on individual characteristics, e.g. age, square of age, occupation's median earned income, having own children present in the house, number of own children 
age ≤ 4, age of eldest own child in household ≥20, Hispanic origin, Black race, English speaking ability high or medium, no household member age 14+ speaks English very well, 
years in the U.S.≤ 10, in a STEM occupation, working on wage/salary in private sectors, living in home state, and also those on urbanization effect, localization effect, MSA count 
of own-ethnic workers excluding the Col+ singles of the opposite gender, MSA average working age and MSA average annual earnings at the given survey year. 
c Standard errors are clustered at MSA level and are reported in parentheses. ***denotes the estimate is significant from zero at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level.
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Appendix 
Table A1-1: HOURLY WAGE for Single Female Ph.D. Workers, Age 25 to 65 a 
 
Dependent Variable = log (Hourly Wage) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
MSA Own-Ethnic Col+ Single Men in 
1,000s (M) 
0.001* 0.001* 6.4e-04 
(6.6e-04) (6.7e-04) (8.8e-04) 
    
Foreign-Born (=1 if the worker is not a 
US-Born) 
0.005 0.006 0.016 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.035) 
    
M × Foreign-Born - - -0.019** 
 - - (0.010) 
    
Urbanization Effects    
Total MSA Population (millions) 0.081* 0.068 0.083* 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) 
    
Localization Effects    
MSA Employment in Own Industry 
(millions) 
- 0.174 0.183 
- (0.133) (0.130) 
    
MSA Fixed Effects 299 299 299 
Industry Fixed Effects 21 21 21 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.177 0.177 0.178 
Observations 8,647 8,647 8,647 
a Sample is restricted to fulltime Ph.D. workers whose usual hours worked per week ≥ 35hours. I pool observations from the 
survey years 1990, 2000 and 2010. Hourly wage = annual earnings / hours worked per year. Hours worked per Year = usual 
hours worked per week × weeks worked last year. ACS 2010 only reports the range of weeks a worker worked in previous 12 
months, and I use the midpoint as the representative level for an individual’s working weeks. 
b To reserve space here I suppress the coefficient estimates on individual characteristics, e.g., age, square of age, occupation's 
median earned income, having own children present in the house or not, number of own children age ≤ 4, age of eldest own child 
in household ≥20, Hispanic origin, Black race, English speaking ability high or medium, no household member age 14+ speaks 
English very well, years in the U.S.≤ 10, in a STEM occupation, working on wage/salary in private sectors, living in home state 
or not, and also those on MSA count of own-ethnic workers excluding the Col+ singles of the opposite gender in 1,000s, MSA 
average working age and MSA average annual earnings at the given survey year. 
c Standard errors are clustered at MSA level and are reported in parentheses. ***denotes the estimate is significant from zero at 
1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. 
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Table A1-2: Labor Market Outcomes for All Single Ph.D. Workers (Male + Female), Age 25 to 65 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 log (Hourly Wage) Hours Worked per Year log (Annual Earnings) 
    
MSA Count of Own-Ethnic Col+ Single of the 
Opposite Gender in 1,000s (M) 
2.4e-04 -0.141 -1.5e-05 
(2.0e-04) (0.437) (3.0e-04) 
    
Foreign-Born(=1 if the worker is not a US-Born) 0.042* -47.76 0.023 
 (0.025) (30.40) (0.026) 
    
M × Foreign-Born  -0.014*** -4.890 -0.015*** 
 (0.004) (6.659) (0.005) 
    
Urbanization Effects    
Total MSA Population (millions) 0.085** -7.138 0.070 
 (0.037) (38.07) (0.049) 
    
Localization Effects    
MSA Employment in Own Industry (millions) 0.001 33.38 0.023 
  (0.106) (67.61) (0.105) 
    
MSA Fixed Effects 311 311 311 
Industry Fixed Effects 21 21 21 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.184 0.046 0.184 
Observations 18,796 18,803 18,796 
a Sample is restricted to fulltime Ph.D. worker whose usual hours worked per week ≥ 35hours. I pool observations from the survey years 1990, 2000 and 2010. Hourly wage = 
annual earnings / hours worked per year. Hours worked per Year = usual hours worked per week × weeks worked last year. ACS 2010 only reports the range of weeks a worker 
worked in previous 12 months, and I use the midpoint as the representative level for his/her working weeks. 
b I suppress the coefficient estimates on individual characteristics, e.g. age, square of age, occupation's median earned income, having own children present in the house, number of 
own children age ≤ 4, age of eldest own child in household ≥20, Hispanic origin, Black race, English speaking ability high or medium, no household member age 14+ speaks 
English very well, years in the U.S. ≤ 10, in a STEM occupation, working on wage/salary in private sectors, living in home state, and also those on MSA count of own-ethnic 
workers excluding the Col+ singles of the opposite gender, MSA average working age and MSA average annual earnings at the given survey year. 
c Standard errors are clustered at MSA level and reported in parentheses. ***denotes the estimate is significant from zero at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level.  
  
54 
 
 Table A2: Both Marriage Markets and Labor Markets Are Thin, Using Different Cutoffs  
 
HOURLY WAGE for Single Male Ph.D. Workers, Age 25 to 65 
 
Dependent Variable = log (Hourly Wage) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Marriage Markets Are Thin if the 
Number of Active Marriage Markets < 1 MSA <31 MSAs <36 MSAs <36 MSAs <36 MSAs <41 MSAs <81 MSAs <161 MSAs <361 MSAs 
Labor Markets Are Thin  if the 
Number of Active Labor Markets 
 
<1 MSA 
 
<31 MSAs <31 MSAs 
 
<36 MSAs 
 
<41 MSAs 
 
<41 MSAs 
 
<81 MSAs 
 
<161 MSAs <361 MSAs 
          
MSA Own-Ethnic Col+ Single 
Women in 1,000s (M)  
-1.4e-04 -1.3e-04 -1.5e-04 -1.2e-04 -1.2e-04 -1.1e-04 -1.5e-04 -1.6e-04 -1.4e-04 
(2.6e-04) (2.6e-04) (2.6e-04) (2.6e-04) (2.7e-04) (2.7e-04) (2.6e-04) (2.7e-04) (2.6e-04) 
          
Foreign-Born (=1 if the worker 
is not a US-Born) 
0.056 0.049 0.042 0.045 0.046 0.045 0.040 0.018 0.056 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.040) (0.035) 
          
Both Marriage and Labor 
Markets are Thin (2MktThin) 
- 0.098 0.116* 0.095 0.066 0.079 0.045 0.072* - 
- (0.070) (0.0673) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.038) (0.039) - 
          
M × Foreign-Born  -0.011* -0.010 -0.010* -0.012** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.018*** -0.022*** -0.011* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.00516) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
          
M × Foreign-Born × 2MktThin - 0.030 -0.005 0.014 0.013 0.016 0.015** 0.015** - 
 - (0.033) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019) (0.016) (0.007) (0.006) - 
          
Observations with 2MktThin=1 0 155 232 252 293 329 723 1,088 10,149 
R-squared 0.224 0.225 0.225 0.225 0.225 0.225 0.225 0.225 0.224 
Observations 10,149 10,149 10,149 10,149 10,149 10,149 10,149 10,149 10,149 
a An MSA is an active marriage market if the number of own-ethnic col+ singles of the opposite gender ≥ 200. An MSA is an active labor market if the number of own-industry 
Ph.D. workers ≥ 200. Under these local cutoffs to define an MSA as an active marriage or as an active labor market, each column in this table change the national-level cutoffs to 
define whether an individual is faced with a dual thin market. The variable “2MktThin” = 1 if marriage and labor markets are both thin for a person and 0 otherwise. Sample is 
restricted to Ph.D. fulltime workers whose usual hours worked per week ≥ 35hours, and I pool observations from the survey years 1990, 2000 and 2010. 
b To reserve space I suppress the coefficient estimates on individual characteristics, e.g. age, square of age, occupation's median earned income, having own children present in the 
house, number of own children age ≤ 4, age of eldest own child in household ≥ 20, Hispanic origin, Black race, English speaking ability high or medium, no household member 
age 14+ speaks English very well, years in the U.S.≤ 10, in a STEM occupation, working on wage/salary in private sectors, living in home state, and also those on urbanization 
effects, localization effects, MSA count of own-ethnic workers excluding the Col+ singles of the opposite gender, MSA average working age and MSA average annual earnings at 
the given survey year. I also include year fixed effects, MSA fixed effects and industry fixed effects. 
c Standard errors are clustered at MSA level and are reported in parentheses. ***denotes the estimate is significant from zero at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. 
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 Table A3: Both Marriage Markets and Labor Markets Are Thin, Using the Preferred Definition 
 
Labor Market Outcomes for Married Ph.D. Workers by Gender, Age 25 to 65  
 
 Hours Worked per Year log (Hourly Wage) log (Annual Earnings) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Female Male Female Male Female Male 
       
MSA Count of Own-Ethnic Col+ Single 
of the Opposite Gender in 1,000s (M) 
-0.328 0.0215 -4.3e-04 2.7e-04 -6.0e-04 3.9e-04** 
(0.409) (0.149) (4.2e-04) (1.7e-04) (4.5e-04) (1.8e-04) 
       
Foreign-Born (=1 if the worker is not a 
US-Born) 
-116.6*** -122.8*** -0.037 0.016 -0.081*** -0.035** 
(27.43) (18.26) (0.024) (0.016) (0.028) (0.018) 
       
Both Marriage and Labor Markets for 
This Worker are Thin (2MktThin) 
73.75 -25.75 0.024 0.121*** 0.108 0.108*** 
(62.41) (20.02) (0.066) (0.025) (0.081) (0.025) 
       
M × Foreign-Born  -3.429 -10.72*** -0.016** -0.007*** -0.015* -0.012*** 
 (5.261) (2.126) (0.007) (0.003) (0.009) (0.004) 
       
M × Foreign-Born × 2MktThin -32.14 9.726 -0.046*** -0.004 -0.083** 0.001 
 (31.09) (12.03) (0.017) (0.007) (0.036) (0.008) 
       
MSA Fixed Effects 310 319 310 319 310 319 
Industry Fixed Effects 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.073 0.063 0.161 0.188 0.168 0.185 
Observations 12,621 39,973 12,621 39,973 12,621 39,973 
a Both marriage and labor markets are thin for a given worker if the number of active marriage markets < 36 MSAs and the number of active labor markets < 36 MSAs. An MSA is 
classified as an active marriage market if the number of own-ethnic col+ single of the opposite gender ≥ 200. An MSA is defined as an active labor market if the number of own-
industry Ph.D. workers ≥ 200. 
b Sample is restricted to fulltime Ph.D. workers whose usual hours worked per week ≥ 35hours. I pooling observations from the survey years 1990, 2000 and 2010. I suppress the 
coefficient estimates on urbanization effects, localization effects, MSA count of other own-ethnic workers excluding the Col+ singles of the opposite gender, MSA average 
working age, MSA average annual earnings, and also those on individual characteristics of the worker, e.g. age, square of age, occupation's median earned income, having own 
children present in the house, number of own children age ≤ 4, age of eldest own child in household ≥20, Hispanic origin, Black race, English speaking ability high or medium, no 
household member age 14+ speaks English very well, years in the U.S.≤ 10, in a STEM occupation, working on wage/salary in private sectors, living in home state, and also those 
on characteristics of the worker’s spouse, e.g. spouse’s education, age, age square, employ status, English speaking ability, whether in a STEM occupation, occupation's median 
earned income and living in home state or not. 
c Standard errors are clustered at MSA level and are reported in parentheses. ***denotes the estimate is significant from zero at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level.  
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Table A4-1: Distribution of Col+ Single Men among U.S. MSAs by Ethnicity (Birth Region): 
 
Number of MSAs in 6 Size Categories, a 
Size Categories Based on MSA Count of Own-Ethnic Col+ Single Men (M)  
Year 1990 and Year 2010 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MSA Size Categories Are 
Based on MSA Count of Own-
Ethnic Col+ Single Men (M) 
 
200 ≤ M ≤ 499 
 
500 ≤ M ≤ 999 
 
1000 ≤ M ≤ 1999 
 
2000 ≤ M ≤ 3999 
 
4000 ≤ M ≤ 7999 
 
M ≥ 8000 
 Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Ethnicity (Birth Region)             
United States  2b 3 18 10 53 34 73 54 47 80 80 116 
Canada 10 17 5 15 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Other North America 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Central America and Caribbean 16 31 11 16 5 14 0 14 2 4 1 3 
Southern America 14 31 4 10 1 8 2 4 1 2 0 1 
Northern Europe 16 18 6 14 3 6 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Western Europe 13 26 8 10 2 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Southern Europe 10 21 4 9 1 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Eastern Europe 15 29 3 10 1 9 2 2 0 1 0 1 
China 10 31 6 17 4 5 0 4 2 3 0 2 
Japan 7 10 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Korea 6 19 0 6 1 6 1 0 0 2 0 0 
Other East Asia 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Philippines 10 20 4 7 4 8 0 6 1 0 0 1 
Vietnam 7 12 1 13 3 5 0 3 0 1 0 0 
Other Southeast Asia 8 17 1 9 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 
India 20 34 7 22 4 15 2 13 0 3 0 1 
Other South Asia 7 11 6 8 2 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Middle East 9 19 5 10 0 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 
Africa 13 31 6 15 2 7 2 7 0 2 0 0 
Oceania 2 5 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 8 0 6 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
a Column (1) to (6) represent six size categories based on the number of single men within their own ethnicity and with a college or higher level of education at the MSA for a 
given year.   
b Each cell in the table reports the number of MSAs fall into one size category for a given ethnicity and year. For example, for the US-born, the first column under the year 1990 
shows that in 1990, there are 2 MSAs across the U.S. that have a MSA count of US-born col+ single men between 200 and 499.  
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Table A4-2: Distribution of Col+ Single Women among U.S. MSAs by Ethnicity (Birth Region): 
Number of MSAs in 6 Size Categories, a 
Size Categories Based on MSA Count of Own-Ethnic Co+ Single Women (W) 
Year 1990 and Year 2010 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MSA Size Categories Are 
Based on MSA Count of Own-
Ethnic Col+ Single Women (W) 
 
200 ≤ W ≤ 499 
 
500 ≤ W ≤ 999 
 
1000 ≤ W ≤ 1999 
 
2000 ≤ W ≤ 3999 
 
4000 ≤ W ≤ 7999 
 
W ≥ 8000 
 Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Ethnicity (Birth Region)             
United States 0b 0 20 4 54 17 64 55 50 75 85 146 
Canada 13 24 2 8 2 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Other North America 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Central America and Caribbean 15 35 11 24 4 14 1 11 1 5 2 4 
Southern America 7 26 4 17 2 9 1 5 1 2 0 2 
Northern Europe 10 25 7 6 2 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Western Europe 18 19 4 9 2 4 1 2 0 1 0 0 
Southern Europe 5 20 2 7 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Eastern Europe 9 25 2 21 2 9 1 1 0 2 0 2 
China 11 32 5 13 1 7 1 3 2 4 0 2 
Japan 1 15 2 4 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Korea 6 26 2 7 2 6 0 4 0 2 0 0 
Other East Asia 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Philippines 8 28 10 10 4 12 3 8 1 4 1 1 
Vietnam 5 18 4 9 0 6 0 2 0 1 0 0 
Other Southeast Asia 7 17 0 9 1 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 
India 11 33 2 17 1 7 0 7 0 1 0 0 
Other South Asia 6 13 1 3 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Middle East 2 13 2 5 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Africa 7 20 3 14 1 6 0 2 0 1 0 0 
Oceania 2 5 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 8 2 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
a Column (1) to (6) represent six size categories based on the number of single women with own ethnicity and with a college or higher level of education at the MSA for a given 
year.   
b Each cell in the table reports the number of MSAs fall into one size category for a given ethnicity and year. For example, for the US-born, the first column under year 1990 shows 
that in 1990, there is no MSA in the U.S that has a MSA count of US-born col+ single women falling between 200 and 499.
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Table A5: Number of MSAs in 4 Size Categories Based on MSA Count of Own-Industry Ph.D. Workers (I) 
PANEL A: Year 1990 
MSA Size Categories Are Based on  
MSA Count of Own-Industry Ph.D. Workers (I) 
 
100≤ I ≤199 200≤ I ≤499 
 
500≤ I ≤999 
 
I ≥ 1000 
Industry      
Agriculture 9 2 0 0 
Mining 2 2 1 1 
Construction 13 7 2 0 
Manufacturing 36 28 20 21 
Transportation, Communication, Electricity and Gas 21 7 5 0 
Wholesale 14 10 2 0 
Retail 26 8 4 1 
FIRE 28 12 8 3 
Computer and Data Processing 13 8 2 0 
Health Service 48 50 19 23 
Legal Service 29 14 3 3 
Education 41 66 48 90 
Social Service 13 5 1 1 
Museum, Art, Zoo 3 1 0 0 
Membership Organization 30 17 3 3 
Engineering 15 4 4 0 
Accounting, Audit 2 1 0 0 
R&D, Testing 21 22 12 12 
Management and Public Relation 24 23 7 8 
Other Services 20 10 3 1 
Public Administration 33 31 10 3 
 
PANEL B: Year 2010 
MSA Size Categories Are Based on  
MSA Count of Own-Industry Ph.D. Workers (I) 
 
100≤ I ≤199 200≤ I ≤499 
 
500≤ I ≤999 
 
I ≥ 1000 
Industry      
Agriculture 27 17 2 0 
Mining 5 2 0 1 
Construction 14 5 2 0 
Manufacturing 32 40 26 31 
Transportation, Communication, Electricity and Gas 16 17 10 2 
Wholesale 15 13 2 0 
Retail 47 34 21 9 
FIRE 29 25 12 7 
Computer and Data Processing 14 13 11 5 
Health Service 37 62 58 71 
Legal Service 26 38 26 14 
Education 41 66 48 90 
Social Service 22 26 7 0 
Museum, Art, Zoo 6 6 1 0 
Membership Organization 33 49 13 8 
Engineering 30 20 3 4 
Accounting, Audit 7 5 0 0 
R&D, Testing 26 41 17 22 
Management and Public Relation 41 28 13 9 
Other Services 23 19 10 3 
Public Administration 38 50 23 10 
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1. Introduction 
From 1990 to 2010, Ph.D. workers increasingly concentrate in large metropolitan areas 
(MSAs) in the United States. The share of Ph.D. workers located in large MSAs is 25.2% in 
1990, 32.5% in 2000, and 39.4% in 2010 (Appendix Table A1). Moreover, during this period, 
nearly half of foreign-born40 Ph.D. workers live in bigger cities that have a large population of 
their own ethnicity. One possible driver for such trend is the job co-location pressure faced by 
dual-career households — as highlighted by Costa and Kahn (2000), large cities can offer more 
opportunities for both spouses in the family to secure a high-quality job that is also within a 
reasonable commute from their home. Another contributing reason may be that Ph.D.-trained 
singles prefer to live in large cities to access better dating opportunities, as pointed out by 
Compton and Pollak (2007). This may be especially true for foreign-born Ph.D. workers. That is 
because foreign-born PhDs disproportionately marry individuals with at least a college degree 
and within their own ethnicity (Table 1, I will discuss shortly). Moreover, their highly educated 
own-ethnic potential dates are often not ubiquitous in the host country. For these reasons, single 
Ph.D. workers facing thin marriage markets may choose to live in bigger cities that can provide 
an active dating environment.41 This paper explores evidence and implications of the relative 
importance of marriage markets versus job co-location effects in driving location choices of 
Ph.D. workers, in particular for those not born in the US.  
The degree to which local marriage markets can attract Ph.D.-trained workers could have 
substantial impacts on the intensity of innovative activity in the local areas. In part, that is 
because Ph.D.-trained workers, and especially those foreign-born, account for a significant share 
                                                            
40 Foreign-born is defined as those who are not born in the United States and neither parent is American. 
41 For example, as indicated by Table 2-1 and 2-1, among the Top 25 MSAs in 2010 that have scores of new-arrival 
Ph.D. workers from China and India, most of them are large or midsize cities with historically sizable Chinese and 
Indian population. 
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of new product innovation in the United States. According to the RIETI Georgia Tech inventor 
survey, 46 % of the inventors who file patents in the U.S. have a doctoral degree (Walsh and 
Nagaoka, 2009). Moreover, foreign-born Ph.D. workers are overrepresented in the STEM 
(Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics) fields. Among the scientists and engineers 
with a Ph.D., nearly 55% are foreign born, and roughly 30% are born in China or India.42 As 
Figure 1 shows, across top 30 MSAs that generate a large number of high-quality patents in the 
year 2001,43 the number of patents created almost lines up with the MSA count of new-arrival 
Ph.D. STEM workers from China and India in 2000.  
It is also important to recognize that foreign-born Ph.D. workers face with thin marriage 
markets in the sense that there are a few MSAs that can provide them an active dating 
environment. That is because Ph.D. workers tend to marry individuals with a college or higher 
level of education. Besides, foreign-born Ph.D. workers, especially for those from China and 
India, marry primarily within their ethnicity. Table 1 provides evidence of these marriage 
patterns. In Panel A Column (6), 71.5% of US-born male Ph.D. holders marry a US-born woman 
with at least a four-year college education attainment. Similarly, among Chinese and Indian male 
PhDs, 80.6% and 72.4% marry an own-ethnic woman with at least a college degree, respectively. 
Moreover, Chinese and Indian female PhDs display a further strong tendency to marry a Ph.D. of 
their ethnicity: roughly 45% marry a Ph.D. of own ethnicity compared to just 13% for their male 
counterparts. Since there are few MSAs in the U.S. with scores of single, foreign-born college-
educated workers, single foreign-born PhDs may have more restriction in choosing where to live 
                                                            
42 Since 1990, there is an exceptional growth of U.S. patents created by ethnic inventors. According to Kerr (2010), 
the share of patents created by Chinese and Indian inventors increased from about 2% in the year 1990 to 9% and to 
6% in 2004, respectively. 
43 High-quality patents here refer to top cited patents that received a number of citations among top 10% within its 
own technology category. 
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compared to their domestic born counterparts, who can find sizable numbers of potential dates in 
many more MSAs.44  
I focus on and differentiate between two household types when modeling the manner in 
which Ph.D. workers choose among different city sizes. One household type is “Super-Power 
Singles” (SPS), which refers to Ph.D. workers who reported their marital status as never married, 
divorced or widowed. The other household type is “Super-Power Couples” (SPC), in which both 
spouses in the household have a Ph.D. degree. The increasing concentration of Ph.D. workers in 
large cities may be caused by increasing returns to education, rising valuation on urban amenities 
such as access to museums and other cultural activities. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, Super-
Power Singles may choose to live in large cities to access an active dating environment, while 
Super-Power Couples may prefer large cities to solve their job co-location problem. 
To identify the effect of local marriage markets in driving Ph.D. workers’ location 
choices, I adopt the triple-differencing strategy of Costa and Kahn (2000). To examine the co-
location pressure, Costa and Kahn (2000) compare power couples (college-educated couples) 
with low-power couples (households in which neither spouse has a college education) to 
difference out the marriage market effects for singles. This paper highlights the differential 
marriage market opportunities between foreign-born versus domestic-born. In particular, I use 
Chinese and Indian as representative ethnic groups and compare their trends of location choices 
to that of the domestic-born. Such comparison is conducted first within and then across the 
household type. The aim of doing so is to rule out the impact of increasing returns to education, 
different tastes on urban amenities, and different pressure for job co-location. The procedure and 
the underlying assumptions for these purposes are made clear later in the paper.  
                                                            
44 For more details, see Appendix Table A2-1 and A2-2, which document the distribution of college above workers 
among U.S. cities by ethnicity.  
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To better capture the size and quality of labor and marriage markets, I estimate a three-
tiered model in which the triple-differencing strategy is conducted for different classifications of 
city size categories. The first-tier model, following Costa and Kahn (2000), uses the MSA’s total 
population to classify MSAs into large, middle and small size. In contrast, the second-tier model 
uses the size of the own-ethnic population present in the MSA to classify city size categories. 
The third-tier model combines the criteria applied in the first two models: large and midsize 
MSAs in terms of the total population are further classified into those with a large or small size 
of the own-ethnic college-above population. The third-tier model is the preferred one because it 
controls for the scale and quality of both Ph.D. labor and marriage markets in a given city type, 
which also to some extent capture the density of potential dates in the local area.  All of these 
estimations use US census data for the survey years 1990, 2000 and 2010. 
The paper has two main findings as follows. First, facing thinner marriage markets, the 
stronger desire to access an active dating environment causes immigrant Ph.D.-trained singles to 
live in cities with denser potential dates. Foreign-born single Ph.D. workers on average display a 
stronger tendency relative to their US-born counterparts to live in MSAs with a large size of their 
own-ethnic population. In particular, the stronger marriage market effect explains the greater 
tendency of Chinese and Indian Ph.D. women to live in midsize MSAs with a large size of the 
own-ethnic college-above population by 4 to 7 percentage points. Evidence of the marriage 
market effect is present for Ph.D. men but less robust. This gender disparity is consistent with the 
fact that foreign-born Ph.D. women face with thinner marriage markets as compared to the Ph.D. 
men within their own ethnicity, for it might be more common for men to marry less educated 
women than the reverse situation. Secondly, findings in this paper suggest that the size and 
quality of local labor markets are key drivers of the location choices of Super-Power Couples. 
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Chinese and Indian Super-Power Couples display a stronger tendency relative to their US-born 
counterparts to live in large MSAs in terms of total population, regardless of the size of their own 
ethnic population in the local area. Job co-location effects seem to dominate marriage market 
effects in explaining the greater increasing tendency of Chinese and Indian Ph.D. workers to live 
in large MSAs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous studies and 
highlights the contributions of this paper. Section 3 uses a multinomial logit model to analyze the 
Ph.D. workers’ location choices and presents the predicted average probabilities of choosing 
among different city sizes for the survey years 1990, 2000 and 2010. Section 4 describes the 
differencing strategy to investigate the relative importance of marriage market and job co-
location effects. Section 5 first presents key results of the three-tiered model based on different 
classifications of city size categories, and then a robustness check is conducted by estimating a 
linear probability model for a more restricted subsample. Section 6 discusses the policy 
implication of this paper and Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Previous Studies  
Highly trained workers tend to move to places with high-quality jobs and are sensitive to 
regional wage differences (e.g. Borjas, 2001;45 Chen and Rosenthal, 2008;46 Dahl and Sorenson, 
2010). On the other hand, highly educated workers often place high weights on social factors and 
                                                            
45 Borjas (2001) find that the new-arrival immigrants, compared to their US-born counterparts, are much more likely 
to be clustered in states that offer the highest wages for the types of skills they can offer. Fang and Brown (1999) 
also find that Chinese highly educated workers are not closely tied to the ethnic enclave economy as their low-
skilled peers do.  
46 Chen and Rosenthal (2008) demonstrate that young, highly educated households tend to move to places with high 
quality of business environment and that this tendency is especially pronounced among power couples who are 
subjected to job market co-location problem. 
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urban amenities when choosing a metropolitan location. Dahl and Sorenson (2010) use panel 
data of the Danish population to show that technical workers have strong preferences for living 
close to family and friends.47 Gottlieb and Joseph (2006) estimate random parameter logit 
models to investigate the migration decisions of science and technology graduates across the 
U.S. cities. They find that Ph.D. graduates pay greater attention to location-specific amenities 
than other degree holders and that some foreign-born students after graduation migrate to places 
where their ethnic groups are concentrated.  
Marriage market opportunities are an important location-specific amenity that might 
affect the migration decisions of highly educated singles, but there is very limited work 
investigating this topic. Gautier et al. (2010) provide evidence that singles are willing to pay a 
housing price premium to locate in cities, the dense areas where they can meet more potential 
partners than in rural areas.48 In this paper, I focus on the impact of marriage market 
opportunities in driving the metropolitan location choices for Ph.D.-trained singles.  
In particular, to highlight the impact of the local marriage market on foreign-born versus 
domestic born Ph.D. workers, I modify and develop the differencing strategy used in Costa and 
Kahn (2000). Costa and Kahn (2000) put forward job co-location pressure in explaining the 
increasing concentration of college-educated couples (“Power Couples”) in large MSAs from 
1940 to 1990. As mentioned earlier, the key idea is that large MSAs appeal to power couples 
because such cities can provide high-quality jobs for both spouses in the dual career household. 
                                                            
47 Previous studies (e.g., Altonji and Card, 1991; Card, 2001; Peri 2011; Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010; and Kerr 
and Lincoln, 2010) have used this phenomenon to examine the impact of immigrants on the local economy in the 
host country. They usually use the interaction of past immigrant stocks and migration trends as an instrument for 
observed local changes. 
48 This is consistent with the literature on search and matching (e.g. see discussion in Burdett and Coles, 1999) that 
emphasized that the long-term partnership formation as with marriage and employment is a time-consuming activity 
because of market frictions and heterogeneity of agents. Therefore, access to a thick local market increases the 
arrival rate and contact with potential partners. 
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To identify such a job co-location effect, Costa and Kahn (2000) compare the location choice of 
power couples with that of low-power couples (households in which neither spouse has a college 
education), and difference out the marriage market effects for singles. Their work suggests that 
large cities will continue to attract highly educated couples, and such migration will contribute to 
the matching in labor markets as well as the city growth. Building upon their work, this paper 
highlights the differential marriage market effects for foreign-born versus US-born. Moreover, I 
focus on the migration of Ph.D.-trained individuals instead of the college-educated workers. If 
the local marriage market does affect the location choices of new-arrival foreign-born PhDs, it 
will provide an important margin to adjust the innovative activities across U.S. cities.49 
Especially for struggling cities like Cleveland, in order to reinvent cities and achieve urban 
growth, it would be appealing for policymakers to invite the foreign-born Ph.D. workers to local 
areas by using some policy instruments. 
 
3. Location Choices of Ph.D. Workers 
This section first models how Ph.D. workers choose among different city size categories. 
Then a multinomial logit model is estimated to predict Ph.D. workers’ probabilities of living in 
large, middle and small size MSAs for the survey years 1990, 2000, and 2010, conditional on 
their gender, ethnicity (US-born, Chinese or Indian), and household type (Super-Power Couples 
or Super-Power Singles). At the end of this section, the year-specific tendencies of location 
choices are documented for each gender-ethnicity-household group. All of the estimations are 
                                                            
49 Kerr (2010) points outs that spatial adjustments of innovation are highly associated with the mobility of the 
scientists and engineers that develop the technology. Kerr (2010) finds that patenting migrates faster for 
technologies that employ immigrant inventors intensively. 
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conducted using U.S. Census data from the Integrated Public-Use Microdata Series (IPUMS, 
Ruggles et al., 2010).50 
Consider a Ph.D.-trained individual i has preferences over available city size s (e.g., s can 
be chosen from small MSAs, midsize MSAs, and large MSAs). It can be described by a utility 
function as follows: 
𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,                                                                                                             (1)  
where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 denotes a vector of individual specific characteristics (e.g., age, age squared, English 
speaking ability, in a STEM occupation or not, etc.), 𝛽𝛽 is the coefficient, and error term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
allows for different evaluations on living in city size s. 
Individuals choose to live in the city size s that maximizes their expected utilities. If the 
errors term 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is independent and identically distributed draws from a Type I extreme value 
distribution, then the probability that individual i chooses city size s is: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠) = exp {𝛽𝛽′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} ∑ exp {𝛽𝛽′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖}𝑖𝑖⁄  .                                                       (2) 
Doing some transformation on equation (2) yields the estimating equation as follows:  
log(𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠⁄ ) = β′𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,                                                                                           (3) 
where  𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is the probability that individual i chooses to live in a small MSA, which has been 
set up as the baseline group in the multinomial logit model.  
 Then I introduce how to estimate equation (3) to obtain the average tendency to live in 
city size s for each gender-ethnicity-household group: Probability (Live in city size s | gender, 
ethnicity, household type). For each survey year t (1990, 2000 or 2010), conditional on gender 
and household type, I first run equation (3) separately for foreign-born and US-born to get the 
                                                            
50 Data for 1990 and 2000 are based on 5 percent samples of the underlying Census population while data for 2010 
are from the 1 percent sample from American Community Surveys (ACS). 
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coefficient estimates ?̂?𝛽. Then I fix the age at 35 years old and calculate the average standardized 
probabilities of living in city size s in year t, denoted as 𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, for Ph.D. workers in a specific 
gender-ethnicity-household group.  
Take single, US-born male Ph.D. workers as an example to illustrate the procedure. To 
calculate their propensity to live in large, midsize, and small MSAs in 2010, denoted as 
𝑃𝑃�𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒,2010, 𝑃𝑃�𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒,2010, and 𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,2010, I use a sample consisting of 9,203 US-born single male 
workers that had a Ph.D. or master equivalent education level and aged between 25 and 50. 
Equation (3) is estimated in which I control for age, age squared, English language ability, in a 
STEM occupation or not, self-employed or not, Ph.D. holder or not, race is white or not, and 
whether this household is linguistically isolated.51 Once the coefficient estimates ?̂?𝛽 are obtained, 
I fix the age at 35 and calculate the average standardized probabilities among all the single, US-
born male Ph.D. workers whose race is white. It yields the propensities to live in different city 
sizes: 𝑃𝑃�𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒,2010, 𝑃𝑃�𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒,2010, and 𝑃𝑃�𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,2010. 
Table 3-1 and 3-2 report Ph.D. workers’ tendency to living in large, midsize, and small 
MSAs in 1990, 2000 and 2010, where the city size categories are classified based on the MSA’s 
total population for those aged 15 above.52 Table 3-1 is for single Ph.D. workers (Super-Power 
Singles) and Table 3-2 for married Ph.D. workers who have an own-ethnic Ph.D.-holding spouse 
(Super-Power Couples). It should be noted here that all Ph.D. workers, regardless of their 
gender, ethnicity, and household type, increasingly concentrate in large MSAs from 1990 to 
2010. Moreover, for each survey year, conditional on gender and household type, Chinese and 
                                                            
51 Households are linguistically isolated if either no person age 14+ speaks only English at home, or no person age 
14+ who speaks a language other than English at home speaks English "very well". 
52 Following Costa and Kahn (2000), I define large MSAs as metropolitan areas in which the total population for 
those who are aged 15 above was at least 2 million, midsize MSAs as those between 2 million and 250,000, and 
small MSAs as those less than 250,000 or in rural areas. For other classifications of city size categories in the second 
and third tier models, see the yearly tendency of location choices in Appendix 4-1, 4-2, 5-1 and 5-2. 
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Indian PhDs display a greater tendency to live in large MSAs relative to their US-born 
counterparts.  
Table 3-1 shows single Ph.D. workers that are from China and India are on average more 
likely to be located in large MSAs relative to their US-born counterparts. Their probabilities to 
live in large MSAs are 31% to 38% in 1990, 40% to 43% in 2000, and 44% to 50% in 2010, 
larger than those of their US-born counterparts — roughly 26% in 1990, 34% in 2000, and 37% 
to 41% in 2010. This disparity is also present in Table 3-2 among married Ph.D. workers in 
Super-Power Couples (SPC). In 2010, the average probability to live in large MSAs is roughly 
50% for Chinese and Indian Super-Power Couples, larger than just 33% for comparable US-born 
Super-Power Couples. In particular, married Chinese female Ph.D. workers that have a Chinese 
Ph.D. husband display the most increasing tendency to live in large cities: their probability of 
being large MSAs increases by roughly 11 percentage points from the year 1990 to 2000, and 
then further rises by 12 percentage points from 2000 to 2010. 
 
4. Hypotheses and Identification Strategy  
What factors would explain the increasing tendency of Ph.D. workers to live in large 
cities? To what extent is such migration trend driven by social factors relative to the concern for 
job opportunities? In order to answer these questions, this section first considers the benefits of 
being in large MSAs for Ph.D. workers. Then the identification strategy is outlined (Table 4) to 
investigate the degree to which the local marriage markets affect the location choices of foreign-
born Ph.D. workers differently compared to their domestic-born counterparts. 
 Large cities appeal to Ph.D. workers because they have higher returns to education and 
better urban amenities such as access to cultural activities. Moreover, for Super-Power Couples 
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(SPC), large cities are more likely to offer high-quality jobs for both spouses in the family to 
solve their co-location problems. While for Super-Power Singles (SPS), large cities may provide 
better access to an active dating environment as such cities often have more educated young 
people within their ethnicity. Following this analysis, Ph.D. workers’ increasing tendency to live 
in large cities may be caused by the increasing returns to city size, the rising valuations on urban 
amenities, a rising pressure for job co-location, or a strong desire to access a better marriage 
market. 
 As outlined in Table 4, a differencing strategy is adopted to identify the role of local 
marriage market in driving the location choices of Ph.D.-trained workers. For simplicity, I use 
Chinese as an example here to represent an ethnic group that is not US-born. Briefly, this method 
first compares the trend estimates of Chinese Ph.D. workers to live in a given city type to that of 
US-born Ph.D. workers within the household type (Row 3 and Row 6), and then the double 
differencing estimators obtained are compared across household types (Row 7). The rest of this 
section will describe the differencing strategy in details and clarify the underlying assumptions.  
 The first assumption is as follows. There is no discrimination on immigrants in the Ph.D. 
labor markets. Within gender group, returns to education in a given city type are same for all 
Ph.D.-trained workers, both foreign-born and domestic-born.  
Given the first assumption, within the household type, the effect from returns to 
education can be differenced out when the trend estimators of living in a given city size are 
compared across ethnicities. For example, in Row 3 for married Ph.D. workers in Super-Power 
Couples (SPC), subtracting the trend estimator of US-born SPC (Row 2) from that of Chinese 
SPC (Row 1) yields the double-differencing estimator for Super-Power Couples between 
Chinese and US-born, (SPC𝐶𝐶ℎ − SPC𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈). This double-differencing estimator indicates the 
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combined effects of their different valuations on urban amenities (𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶ℎ − 𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈), plus their 
differential pressure from job co-location (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ − 𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈). Similarly, in Row 6, the double-
differencing estimator for single Ph.D. workers between Chinese and US-born, (SPS𝐶𝐶ℎ −
SPS𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈), reveals their different valuations on urban amenities (𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶ℎ − 𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) and local marriage 
markets (𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶ℎ −𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈). 
Once the double-differencing estimators for SPC (Row 3) and SPS (Row 6) are obtained, 
I difference them across the household type to generate the triple-differencing estimator, as 
indicated in Row 7. In doing so, the underlying Assumption 2 is made as follows. Chinese and 
US-born Ph.D. workers may have different tastes for urban amenities, but such disparity in their 
valuation on urban amenities (𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶ℎ − 𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) remains the same for both Super-Power Couples and 
Super-Power Singles.53 Given this assumption, the impact of different tastes on urban amenities 
(𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶ℎ − 𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) can be ruled out when the triple differencing is conducted across these two 
household types. As a result, in Table 4 Row 7, the triple-differencing estimator between 
Chinese and US-born indicate the difference between two effects: the differential marriage 
market effects and the differential job co-location effects, that is, (𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶ℎ −𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) − (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ − 𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈).  
To predict the sign of the triple-differencing estimator, the following discussion analyzes 
the signs of two terms, (𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶ℎ −𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) and  (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ − 𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈). First, it should be noted that the 
marriage market effect in large cities is expected to be stronger for Chinese than that for their 
US-born counterparts, that is, (𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶ℎ −𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) > 0. That is because Chinese and Indian single 
PhDs, as shown in the marriage patterns of Table 1, prefer to a find a spouse with a college or 
                                                            
53 This assumption should hold if the valuation on urban amenity for married Ph.D. workers relative to single Ph.D. 
workers stays the same across ethnicities. For example, if Chines married PhDs care about the school quality in local 
areas as US-born married PhDs do, while single PhDs, both Chinese and US-born, do not have concern for the 
school quality, the valuation on school quality should be differenced out.    
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higher level of education and within their ethnicity. Moreover, there are few MSAs in the U.S. 
with scores of single, foreign-born college-educated workers but many more MSAs with sizable 
numbers of domestic-born college-educated singles. For these reasons, single, foreign-born 
Ph.D. workers often face thin marriage markets compared to their US-born counterparts, and 
large cities with better marriage markets may be more attractive to them.   
Regarding the sign of  (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ − 𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈), it is important to recognize that a given city type 
may have different depth of Ph.D. labor markets between foreign-born and domestic-born, and 
whether (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ − 𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) equals to zero depends on the standard that is used to classify city size 
categories. For example, if the MSA’s total population is a good proxy for the size of the Ph.D. 
labor market in the local area, regardless of the Ph.D. workers’ ethnicities, (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ − 𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) = 0 is 
expected to be held when the city size categories are classified based on the MSA’s total 
population. In contrast, this condition may not hold if Chinese PhDs are heavily concentrated in 
selected industries and occupations as previous studies (Mandorff, 2007) has pointed out, and 
these sorts of jobs are only available in a few numbers of large cities.54 In this circumstance, 
Chinese Super-Power Couples may put higher weights on large cities to solve their co-location 
problems compared to their US-born counterparts; In other words, I expect (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ − 𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) > 0.  
  Given the analysis above, the interpretation of the triple-differencing estimator is 
sensitive to the way I classify the city size categories. When (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ − 𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) = 0 holds, the triple-
differencing estimator should yield the differential marriage markets effects between Chinese 
and US-born Ph.D. workers. For a given city size, the estimator is expected to be positive if 
Chinese Ph.D. workers put higher weights on having access to an active local marriage market 
                                                            
54 Another possible reason why large cities are more important for immigrants to solve their colocation problem is 
that large cities may have more companies that will effectively sponsor the immigrant Ph.D. workers for H-1B visas 
and green cards. 
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than their US-born counterparts. If (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ − 𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) > 0 holds, the triple-differencing estimator 
should indicate the relative importance of differential marriage market effects over the 
differential co-location effects between Chinese and US-born Ph.D. workers. Under this 
circumstance, a positive triple-differencing estimator suggests that the marriage market effects 
dominate the co-location effects, while a negative one indicates the other way around. 
 
5. Results 
This section begins with estimating a three-tiered model in which the triple differencing 
strategy outlined in section 4 is conducted under different classifications of city size categories. 
The discussion mainly focuses on results of the period from 1990 to 2000, while the results of 
the period 1990-2010 are also documented. In particular, from 1990 to 2000, high trained 
individuals from China and India dramatically increase in the United States; moreover, the 
number of new-arrival Chinese and Indian PhDs that work in the STEM fields more than 
doubled.55 In the first-tier model, the MSA’s total population for those aged 15 above is used to 
classify MSAs into large, middle and small sizes. The second-tier model uses the size of the 
own-ethnic population present in the MSA instead of the total population. The third-tier model, 
which is the preferred one, combines the criteria applied in the first two models to controls for 
the size of Ph.D. labor and marriage markets in a given city type, and also, to some extent, 
capture the density of potential dates in the local area.  
                                                            
55 For example, in 1990, the number of new-arrival Chinese Ph.D. workers that have been in U.S. no more than ten 
years is 3,818, and this figure increases by more than four-folds to 20,905 in 2000 and reaches 33,111 in 2010.The 
number of new-arrival Indian STEM Ph.D. workers is 3,711 in 1990, 9,641 in 2000, and 14,937 in 2010. Person 
weights are used to calculate these numbers. Regarding the total count of Chinese STEM Ph.D. workers in the U.S., 
it is 13,169 in 1990, 45,873 in 2000, and 81,972 in 2010. The total number of Indian STEM Ph.D. workers is 10,106 
in 1990, 24,868 in 2000, and 39,947 in 2010.  
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One concern for the triple differencing approach is that some Ph.D. workers chose to live 
in an MSA with an active dating scene when they were single, and they may stay in the same 
MSA after they have been married. In this case, the triple differencing approach may 
underestimate the marriage market effect, for the concentration of these sorts of couples should 
be attributable to the marriage market effect but it has been mistreated as job collocation effect. 
To address this concern, I conduct a robustness check by estimating a linear probability model 
for a sample of young Ph.D. workers that include both marriage and single. The goal of this 
check is to compare the migration decisions of young single Ph.D. workers to those comparable 
married Ph.D. workers who made their moving decisions after they have being married. 
Moreover, observations in this sample also include other foreign-born Ph.D. workers beyond 
Chinese and Indian PhDs. Briefly summarizing the findings, improving the local dating 
environment decrease the probability of single foreign-born PhDs to move while no such effect 
arises for married Ph.D. workers or domestic-born singles.   
 
5.1.City Size Categories Based On the Total Population 
Following Cost and Kahn (2000), the first-tier model categorizes MSAs into large, 
middle, and small size based on the total population size. Table 5-1 shows Ph.D. workers’ trend 
in the propensity to live in large, middle and small size MSAs from 1990 to 2000. For each 
gender-ethnicity-household group, such first-differencing estimates are obtained by differencing 
their tendencies of location choices across two survey years 2000 and 1990, which have been 
documented in Table 3-1 and 3-2. Table 5-2 reports the double-differencing estimates — the 
differential trends between Chinese (or Indian) and US-born from 1990 to 2000, conditional on 
gender and household type. Table 5-3 shows the triple-differencing estimates by gender. 
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Table 5-1 reveals that all Ph.D. workers, regardless of their gender, ethnicity, and 
household type, display an increasing tendency to live in large MSAs from the year 1990 to 
2000. Among single Ph.D. workers in Column 1 and 3, the trend estimates of the propensity to 
live in the large MSAs range from 0.06 to 0.09. Such increasing tendency of Super-Power 
Singles (SPS) to being in large MSAs may be caused by the increasing returns to Ph.D. 
education, the rising valuation on urban amenities, and the appealing local marriage markets that 
large MSAs can provide. Among Super-Power Couples (SPC), as indicated by Column 2, the 
probabilities of being in large MSAs increases by roughly 0.04 for US-born married Ph.D. 
women, smaller than those of Chinese and Indian women, 0.11 and 0.06, respectively. Such 
disparity is also present among married male PhDs in Super-Power Couples in Column 4, with 
smaller magnitudes for the increasing trends across all ethnicities. The increasing tendency for 
Super-Power Couples to be located in large cities, as indicated in Section 4, may result from the 
increasing returns to Ph.D. education, the rising valuation on urban amenities, and the increasing 
pressure for job co-location. 
Table 5-2 presents the estimates of the differential trends between foreign-born and US-
born, and different patterns occur for Super-Power Singles versus Super-Power Couples. Among 
single Ph.D. workers in both Panel A and B, the trends of the foreign-born relative to the US-
born are positive for living in midsize MSAs. These estimates suggest that from 1990 to 2000, 
the Chinese and Indian single Ph.D. workers’ greater valuation on urban amenities and local 
marriage markets explain their greater increasing tendency relative to their US-born counterparts 
to live in midsize MSAs. While regarding the trend of foreign-born single PhDs to be located in 
large MSAs relative to their US-born counterparts, most estimates are non-positive except for the 
Indian single male PhDs in Column 3. In contrast, for both male and female married Ph.D. 
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workers in Super-Power Couples, the trends of Chinese and Indian in the propensity to live in 
large MSAs is significantly greater than those of their US-born counterparts. These estimates, 
compared with those of Super Power Singles, potentially suggest that large cities are especially 
attractive to foreign-born Ph.D. couples by enabling them to solve their job co-location 
problems. 
When further differencing these estimate in Table 5-2 across the household types, the 
resulting triple-differencing estimates for the period 1990-2000 are positive for being midsize 
MSAs but negative for being large MSAs, as reported in the first two columns of Table 5-3. As 
analyzed in Section 4, these estimates indicate that compared to their US-born counterparts, the 
impact of local marriage markets for immigrant single Ph.D. workers are relatively weak in large 
MSAs but strong in midsize MSAs. Why do the local marriage markets in large MSAs appear to 
be less attractive to Chinese and Indian single Ph.D. workers relative to their US-born 
counterparts? One possible explanation is that the first–tier model uses the total population to 
categorize city sizes, but this measure may not be good enough to capture the thickness of local 
marriage markets for immigrant single Ph.D. workers — because foreign-born Ph.D. workers 
disproportionately marry within their own ethnicity, as indicated by marriage patterns in Table 1.  
Also, it should be noted that the triple-differencing estimates in Table 5-3 may reveal the 
differential pressure for job co-location between the foreign-born and US-born Super-Power 
Couples. As mentioned in Section 4, foreign-born Ph.D. workers often concentrate in selected 
industries and occupations, which cause them to have more restriction in choosing where to live. 
Large MSAs, usually with a mix of diverse industries, provide more high-quality job 
opportunities for these foreign-born Super-Power Couples that face thinner labor markets. This 
argument is also consistent with the double-differencing estimates in Table 5-2. For these 
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reasons, the negative triple-differencing estimates for being large MSAs may suggest that the 
impact of job co-location dominates the effect of the marriage market in explaining the greater 
increasing trend of Chinese and Indian Ph.D. workers to live in large cities relative to their US-
born counterparts. 
 
5.2.City Size Categories Based On the Size of the Own-Ethnic Population 
This section estimates the second-tier model in which for each person, all MSAs are 
reclassified into three city size categories based on the own-ethnic population for those aged 15 
above and present in that MSA.56 Compared to the first-tier model, this model does a better job 
in capturing the size of the local marriage market for both foreign-born and US-born PhDs. On 
the other hand, the city size in terms of the own-ethnic population does not necessarily control 
for the size of Ph.D. labor markets in the local areas. Therefore, a differential effect of job co-
location may be present for a given city size between foreign-born and US-born Super-Power 
Couples. For these reasons, the triple-differencing estimates of the second-tier model in Table 6, 
as indicated earlier in Section 4, potentially reveal the relative importance of the marriage market 
effect versus the pressure for job co-location in driving the Ph.D. workers’ location choices.  
Specifically, city size categories in the second-tier model are defined as follows. For a 
given person, large own-ethnic MSAs are metropolitan areas in which his/her own ethnic 
population rank within top 15 among all U.S. MSAs, midsize own-ethnic MSAs as those that 
rank outside top 15 but have at least 1,000 people within the ethnicity of this person (the cutoff 
number is 250,000 for the US-born) present in the local areas, and the rest of MSAs are all 
classified as small own-ethnic MSAs. Based on such classification of city size categories, 
                                                            
56 Table A6-1 and A6-2 show the predicted probabilities of being in different city sizes for Super-Power Singles and 
Super-Power Couples, respectively.  
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Appendix Table A4-1 and A4-2 document the year-specific location choices of Super-Power 
Singles and Super-Power Couples, respectively.  
As shown in Appendix Table A4-1 and A4-2, Chinese and Indian Ph.D. workers, both 
single and married, are more likely to concentrate in MSAs that have a large size of the own- 
ethnic population compared to their US-born counterparts. Moreover, such disparity is increasing 
from 1990 to 2000. For example, the average probabilities of living in large own-ethnic MSAs 
increase by 0.08 — from 0.53 to 0.61— for Chinese single female PhDs, while the 
corresponding probabilities stay at 0.32 for their US-born counterparts.57 Such discrepancy in 
location trend is also present among Super Power Couples in Appendix Table 4-2. In particular, 
during the period of 1990 to 2000, the probabilities of being in large own-ethnic MSAs 
significantly increase by roughly 0.06 and 0.09 for Chinese and Indian Super-Power Couples, 
respectively, while it decreases by approximately 0.02 for US-born Super-Power Couples.  
Table 6 presents the triple-differencing estimates of the second-tier model, which provide 
evidence that marriage market opportunities are the driving force that causes Ph.D. women to 
live in cities with a large population of their own ethnicity. Column 1 shows that from 1990 to 
2000, the marriage market effect dominates the job co-location effect in explaining Indian Ph.D. 
women’s greater increasing tendency to live in large own-ethnic MSAs relative to their US-born 
counterparts, and the magnitude is approximately 3 percentage points. While for Chinese Ph.D. 
women relative to their US-born counterparts in Panel A, the estimate is positive but not 
statistically different from zero. Conversely, among male Ph.D. workers in Table 6 Column 2, 
the triple-differencing estimates for the period 1990-2000 are negative for living in large own-
                                                            
57 Such disparity in geographic sorting also exists among single male Ph.D. workers. The estimate for the tendency 
to live in large own-ethnic MSAs stays at roughly 0.49 for Chinese single men during the 1990-2000 period, and it 
increases from 0.39 to 0.47 for Indian single men, but decreases from 0.32 to 0.30 for US-born single men. 
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ethnic MSAs. It suggests that in explaining foreign-born Ph.D. men’s greater increasing 
tendency to live in large own-ethnic MSAs relative to those comparable US-born Ph.D. men, the 
impact of the differential concerns for job co-location is larger than that of the differential 
marriage markets, by roughly 0.06 and 0.03 for Chinese and Indian, respectively. The disparity 
between Ph.D.-trained men and women seems to be consistent with the traditional view that 
men, in general, may be more likely to put job opportunities into priority concern than women.  
 
5.3.City Size Categories Considering the Density of Potential Dates 
This section presents results for the third-tier model in which city sizes are classified 
based on the size of the total population aged 15 above and the size of the own-ethnic population 
for those that have at least a four-year college education level (OECoAbv) in the MSA. As 
mentioned earlier, this model is the preferred one because it takes into account the size of the 
local Ph.D. labor and marriage markets. Moreover, controlling for these two populations – the 
total population and the own-ethnic highly-educated population – at the same time will shed light 
on the density of potential dates in the local area, which may provide a better proxy for the 
quality of the local dating environment. For these reasons, based on such city size classification, 
the job co-location effect in a given city type is expected to be the same for both foreign-born 
and US-born Super-Power Couples. As indicated in Section 4, the triple-differencing estimates in 
Table 7-3 can be interpreted as the differential marriage market effects between foreign-born and 
domestic-born Ph.D. workers. The discussion below first introduces the city size classification in 
details and the trends of Ph.D. workers’ location choices are documented in Table 7-1 and 7-2, 
and then Table 7-3 shows the triple-differencing estimates of the third-tier model.  
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The third-tier model first classifies MSAs into large, middle, and small sizes based on the 
size of the total population as the first-tier model does, and the baseline group is still small 
MSAs. Meanwhile, for each person, large and midsize MSAs are further categorized into those 
with or without a large size of the own-ethnic population whose education level is at least a four-
year college (OECoAbv). A large or midsize MSA is defined as having large OECoAbv if the 
size of the own-ethnic college-above population present in that MSA rank within top 15 among 
all U.S. MSAs in a given year; otherwise that MSA is classified as having small OECoAbv. For 
example, in the year 1990, Boston, MA is a large MSA with large OECoAbv for Chinese 
workers, and a large MSA with small OECoAbv for Indian workers. In contrast, Detroit, MI in 
1990 is a large MSA with large OECoAbv for Indians but with small OECoAbv for Chinese.  
  Table 7-1 and 7-2 present the trend estimates of location choices for single and married 
Ph.D. workers, respectively.58 Table 7-1 shows that from 1990 to 2000, single PhDs generally 
display an increasing tendency to live in large MSAs. Moreover, Chinese and Indian single Ph.D. 
workers display a further strong tendency to live in midsize cities that have a relatively high 
density of potential dates. During this period, the probabilities of living in midsize MSAs with a 
large size of the own-ethnic college-above population (OECoAbv) increase by 0.01 to 0.03 for 
Chinese and Indian single PhDs and decrease by 0.02 to 0.03 for their US-born counterparts. 
Conversely, among Super-Power Couples in Table 7-2, only Indian married Ph.D. men 
increasingly concentrate in midsize MSAs with large OECoAbv. Instead, all Super-Power 
Couples increasingly concentrate in large MSAs, regardless of the size of the local potential 
dating pool. These estimates may suggest that the size of the total population play a more 
                                                            
58 Appendix Table A5-1 and A5-2, for single and married Ph.D. workers, respectively, document the year-specific 
average probabilities of choosing among these five city size categories. 
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important role than the size of the own-ethnic population to capture the quality of the local labor 
market for Super-Power Couples. 
 The discussion below focuses on the triple-differencing estimates of the third-tier model 
presented in Table 7-3. First, consider the estimates of being in midsize MSAs with large own-
ethnic college-above population – a city size category that probably has the most denser potential 
dates. In Table 7-3 Column 1, the estimates for Chinese and Indian Ph.D. women relative to US-
born Ph.D. women are roughly 0.07 (Panel A) and 0.04 (Panel B), respectively. These triple-
differencing estimates indicate that from 1990 to 2000, the stronger marriage market effect for 
Chinese and Indian Ph.D. women explains their greater increasing tendency to live in midsize 
MSAs that also have a large size of the own-ethnic college-above population. Such effect is still 
present for Chinese Ph.D. men in Column 2, but with a smaller magnitude 0.02, while for Indian 
Ph.D. men, the estimate turns out to be negative. This gender disparity seems to be consistent 
with the thinner marriage markets faced by immigrant Ph.D. women as compared to Ph.D. men 
of their ethnicity, for it is more common for men to marry less educated women than the reverse 
situation.   
Secondly, we look at the estimate of living in large MSAs with a large size of the own-
ethnic college-above population. From 1990 to 2000, the triple-differencing estimates are 
positive for Indian PhDs (Panel B) but negative for Chinese PhDs (Panel A). It suggests that the 
stronger marriage market effect for Indian Ph.D. workers relative to their US-born counterparts 
explain their greater tendency to live in these areas by approximately 0.01 to 0.02, while it is the 
other way around for Chinese Ph.D. workers relative to their US-born counterparts. Comparing 
these estimates to those analyzed in the last paragraph, it suggests that regarding the 
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opportunities for foreign-born Ph.D.-trained singles to find an ideal spouse, the absolute number 
of potential dates matters, but not as important as the density of potential dates in a local area.  
The importance of the density of the local marriage market is also evident among triple-
differencing estimates for the period 1990-2010 in Column 3 and 4 of Table 7-3. Compared to 
those of the period 1990-2000, the estimates of a longer horizon reveals that the smaller cities 
with denser potential dates present in local areas have increasingly become feasible marriage 
markets for immigrant Ph.D. workers. Regarding choosing midsize MSAs with a small size of 
own-ethnic college-above population, most estimates in Column 3 and 4 are 0.07 to 0.19 (except 
for Indian Ph.D. women), much larger as compared to those in Column 1 and 2. Moreover, for 
Ph.D. women to live in small MSAs, the triple-differencing estimates of the period 1990-2000 
are not statistically different from zero, while they become significantly positive in the longer 
time horizon. These changes are consistent with the massive inflow of highly educated Chinese 
and Indian across U.S. MSAs from 2000 to 2010, which makes marriage markets more 
geographically expansive for Chinese and Indian Ph.D. workers.59 For example, during this 
decade, the mean of Indian college-above population in small MSAs rises from 377 to 801, and 
in midsize MSAs from 1,986 to 3,226. The new emerging marriage markets in smaller cities may 
have a potential to attract Chinese and Indian Ph.D. workers to these areas beyond the job 
opportunities. 
 
                                                            
59 During this period, the total count of college-above workers nearly doubles for Indian group, from 566,533 to 
1,055,009, and for Chinese group this number increases by nearly 50% from 465,949 to 671,514. This large inflow 
increases the size as well as the density of potential dates for the Chinese and Indian Ph.D. workers at smaller cities. 
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5.4.Robustness Check 
This section further compares the migration decision of single to that of married for 
young Ph.D. workers by estimating a linear probability model. The previous triple differencing 
approach, as pointed out by Compton and Pollak (2007), may have underestimated the marriage 
market effect because some single Ph.D. workers chose to live in an MSA with an active dating 
scene, and they stay in the same MSA after marriage.60 This location lock will tend to occur 
when moving costs are higher than the benefits from relocating the household. To address this 
concern, I restrict married PhDs to those young (age 25 to 44), full-time workers who made their 
moving decisions after they have being married, and I pool this subsample with young, single 
Ph.D. workers to conduct a comparison. The key hypothesis I test here is that increasing the size 
of the local potential dating pool will reduce the probability of single Ph.D. workers, especially 
for those foreign-born, to move to another MSA, while no such effect is expected to arise for 
married Ph.D. workers. 
The linear probability model is as follows.  
𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖  = 𝛼𝛼1𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹 + 𝛼𝛼4𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡  ×  𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹 + 
 𝛼𝛼5𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡𝛾𝛾 + 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐 + 𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 + ԑ𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑒𝑒,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 , (4) 
where i denotes individual, j is for industry, e for ethnic group, c for the previous 
residential MSA, and t for year. The dependent variable is whether a given Ph.D. worker i moved 
to a different MSA between year t and t+1: coded as one if that person moved and zero if stayed 
in the same MSA. The key regressor is individual i’s local marriage market, denoted as 𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡, 
which is measured by the number of singles of the opposite gender with a college or higher level 
                                                            
60 Compton and Pollak (2007) revisit the job market co-location effect put forward by Costa and Kahn (2000), and 
they argue that the rising concentration of highly educated couples in large cities has more to do with the greater 
opportunity for highly educated singles to meet in large urban centers. 
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of education and within individual i’s ethnic group e, at MSA c, for year t. The coefficient of 
interest is 𝛼𝛼5 on the triple interaction term — 𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 interacted with the indicator of being foreign 
born and the indicator of being single in marital status. As discussed earlier, the sign of 𝛼𝛼5 is 
expected to be negative. 
The estimating equation controls for a vector of individual i’s demographic and 
socioeconomic attributes 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,61 as well as location-specific attributes 𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 of the previous 
residential MSA c for year t.62 MSA fixed effects 𝛿𝛿𝑐𝑐 are included to capture the time-invariant 
location attributes like sunshine, river, mountains, air quality, distance to the country border, 
coastal proximity, the number of universities, and the cost of living, etc. Industry fixed effects 𝜂𝜂𝑗𝑗 
are also included to capture the time-invariant attributes for a specific industry such as its ethnic 
concentration, gender density, average skill levels. Year fixed effects 𝜇𝜇𝑡𝑡 control for the national-
wide shock in a particular year and ԑ𝑖𝑖 is the classical error term. 
Table 8 presents results for this linear probability model. In Column 1 among young 
female Ph.D. workers, locating in the previous MSA with 1,000 more single men of their own 
ethnicity and with a college or higher level of education — the likely dating pool — decreases 
the probability of foreign-born single women to move to another MSA by 3.3 percentage point. 
While no significant impact arises for married Ph.D. women, nor for single Ph.D. women that are 
                                                            
61 For example, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 includes age, age squared, having own children at home, English speaking ability, occupation's 
median earned income, residing in the U.S. no more than ten years, in a STEM occupation, Hispanic origin, black 
race, living in the home state. In particular, I use the variable (“ERSCOR90”) constructed by IPUMS to measure 
occupation's median earned income. This variable reports the percentage of persons in occupations having lower 
standardized median earnings than the respondent's occupation. For more details, see https://usa.ipums.org/usa-
action/variables/ERSCOR90#description_section. 
62 To capture the job opportunities at the MSA c for year t, I control for the total population, the number of workers 
in own industry j, and average working age and average earnings among all workers in the MSA. To rule out the 
effect from being close to family and friends, I also include the number of own-ethnic workers that are present in the 
MSA c but are not the potential dates for individual i. 
85 
 
domestic-born. Male Ph.D. workers in Column 2 obtain similar estimates. Increasing the size of 
the local marriage market has no significant impact for married Ph.D. men, nor for US-born 
single Ph.D. men, while it reduces the probability of moving for single foreign-born Ph.D. men 
by 3.3 percent. As the first two columns show, the presence of children at home reduces the 
Ph.D. workers’ possibilities of moving by roughly 8 percentage points. Since married PhDs, as 
the summary statistics suggest, are more likely to have children at home than comparable single 
PhDs, Column 3 and 4 further restrict the sample to households with no child at home to rule out 
the influence of children. As shown in the last two columns of Table 8, among no-kid 
households, the marriage market effect grows to 3.8 percentage points for single foreign-born 
Ph.D. women while it remains at 3.4 percentage points for single foreign-born Ph.D. men. Again, 
no such effect is present for other demographic groups in the last two columns. 
 
6. Policy Implications 
This paper has implications for the geographic distribution of Ph.D. workers across U.S. 
cities, which has a potential to affect the innovation productivity and economic growth in local 
areas. First, it implies that large cities will continuingly appeal to Ph.D.-trained couples by 
providing better opportunities for both spouses in the household to find a high-quality job that is 
also within a reasonable commute from their home. It is worth noting that the number of Super-
Power Couples is highly likely to grow in the STEM fields. In part, that is because more Ph.D.-
trained women enter the STEM fields. The female share of Ph.D. STEM workers rises from 24% 
in 1990 to 31% in 2000 and 40% in 2010. Moreover, Ph.D. women, display a strong tendency to 
find a Ph.D.-holding spouse.63 The resulting growth of Super-Power Couples and severity of job 
                                                            
63 Foreign-born Ph.D. workers are highly likely to form Super-Power Couples (SPC) within their own ethnic group. 
Beyond their strong tendency to marry a highly educated spouse within ethnic group, the marriage rates among 
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co-location problems may cause increasing concentration of married Ph.D. STEM workers in 
large cities. This suggests that large cities may continue to be more thriving in innovative 
activities versus smaller towns.64  
 Secondly, this paper implies that as ever-growing skilled immigrants arrive in the U.S., 
cities with a historically large ethnic population and those with denser educated ethnic 
population are highly likely to experience a large-scale increase in human capital. That is 
because such cities with appealing local marriage markets will attract the new-arrival highly 
trained singles that are eager to find a life partner with similar education and ethnic backgrounds. 
This increase of human capital might open great opportunities for such cities to develop 
innovative activities. San Jose, CA, for example, in 1990 was a midsize MSA with a large size of 
Chinese and Indian college-above population. Since then it has become one of the top destination 
for Chinese and Indian Ph.D. workers in the U.S and experienced a tremendous amount of new 
product innovation.65  
Thirdly, this paper has provocative and controversial policy implications for declining 
cities like Cleveland. To reinvent cities and achieve urban growth, policymakers in struggling 
cities may find it appealing to invite highly trained immigrants by subsidizing Indian and 
Chinese STEM workers with a tax credit for several years. At a certain point, these cities on their 
own will start to attract new-arrival Ph.D.-trained individuals with similar ethnic backgrounds for 
the active dating environment. The self-reinforcing growth of the highly educated ethnic 
community may attract the firms that intensively use skilled workers to local areas, possibly 
                                                            
foreign-born PhDs, especially for Chines and Indian PhDs in STEM occupations, are quite high. In Census 2000, 
90% of Chinese Ph.D. STEM workers are married, 83% for Indian, 72% for the US-born and 64% for West 
European. 
64 This is consistent with the stylized fact documented by Kerr (2010): three large cities account for 25% of U.S. 
domestic patenting for 1995-2004: San Francisco 12%, New York 7%, and Los Angeles 6%. 
65 See more details in Appendix Table A6, which documents the MSA’s Chinese and Indian population in 1990 
among the top 20 MSAs that create the largest number of patents in 2001. 
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generating agglomeration economies. However, this plan is also controversial because such 
policies seem to be unfair to some immigrant groups like the Hispanic, who are more likely to 
have the low education attainments.  
 
7. Conclusions 
Ph.D.-trained individuals, especially those that are not born in the U.S., increasingly 
concentrate in large metropolitan areas from 1990 to 2010. This paper investigates the degree to 
which the local marriage market and job co-location pressure affect the location choices of 
foreign-born Ph.D. singles and couples differently compared to their US-born counterparts. This 
work is important because Ph.D.-trained STEM workers account for a significant share of 
innovation in the United States, and a sizable proportion of such Ph.D. workers are foreign born. 
Moreover, foreign-born Ph.D. workers face with thin marriage markets compared to their U.S-
born counterparts. The contributing reason is that foreign-born PhDs, and especially those from 
China and India, display a strong tendency to marry highly educated individuals within their own 
ethnicity. This narrows the dating pool and summary measures confirm that there are relatively 
few MSAs in the U.S. that offer active dating environment for these sorts of workers. For these 
reasons, single, foreign-born Ph.D. workers may prefer to live in MSAs that can provide better 
marriage markets.  
Two key findings are as follows. First, marriage market opportunities attract immigrant 
Ph.D.-trained singles to cities with denser potential dates. Chinese and Indian single Ph.D. 
workers display a strong tendency to live in MSAs that have a large population of their own 
ethnicity. The stronger desire to access an active dating environment explains Chinese and Indian 
Ph.D. workers’ greater tendency relative to their US-born counterparts to live in midsize MSAs 
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with large sizes of own-ethnic college-above population. The marriage market effect is 4 to 7 
percentage points for the female group, larger than that for the male group, roughly 2 percentage 
points. This gender disparity is consistent with the asymmetry of marriage markets between 
Ph.D.-trained men and women – it is more common for Ph.D.-trained men to marry less-
educated women than the reverse situation. Secondly, immigrant married Ph.D. workers that 
have an own-ethnic Ph.D. spouse display a stronger tendency relative to their US-born 
counterparts to live in large MSAs, regardless of the size of the local own-ethnic population. 
That is mainly because large cities with better labor markets often enable both spouses in the 
Super-Power Couples to find a job that is well matched to their training and within a reasonable 
commute from their home. Such a job co-location effect seems to dominate the marriage market 
effect in explaining foreign-born PhDs’ greater increasing trend to live in large cities. 
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Figure 1: New-Arrival Ph.D. STEM Workers at Top 30 MSAs in Terms of High-quality Patents Creation at Year 2001 
 
a New-Arrival refers to those foreign-born that have been in US less or equal to ten years. In this figure, San Jose, CA is excluded for visual clarity. In 2000, San Jose has 1,143 
Chinese and 335 Indian New-Arrival Ph.D. workers in STEM Occupations. In 2001, 4,734 patents were created in San Jose, CA, and 276 are top 10% cited patents.  
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Table 1: Marriage Patterns for Ph.D. Holders by Birth Region (BR), Census Year 2000 a 
Panel A: Marriage Patterns for Male Ph.D. Holders, Age 25 to 65 
 
 Frequency of Wife’s Education Level and Birth Region (BR)  
(Numbers Are in Percentage Points) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Male PhDs’ 
Birth Region b 
Same-BR  
Wife 
US-Born  
Wife 
Wife with  
a Ph.D. Degree 
Wife with Col+ 
Education 
Same-BR Wife with 
a Ph.D. Degree 
Same-BR Wife with  
Col+ Education 
US-Born  92.8 92.8 12.3 77.1 10.8 71.5 
Foreign-born 71.6 19.6 15.1 80.7 10.0 57.5 
China 95.1 2.4 13.6 84.7 12.8 80.6 
India 83.9 10.4 14.9 86.9 12.0 72.6 
Korea 94.7   3.6   8.6 85.8   7.9 81.8 
Philippines 71.8 21.4 16.9 82.2 14.1 64.9 
Eastern Europe 78.6 13.8 22.1 86.7 17.5 70.0 
Western Europe 41.2 42.3 16.1 81.7 6.7 31.9 
 
Panel B: Marriage Patterns for Female Ph.D. Holders, Age 25 to 65 
 
Female PhDs’ 
Birth Region b 
Frequency of Husband’s Education and Birth Region (BR) 
(Numbers Are in Percentage Points) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Same-BR 
Husband 
US-Born  
Husband 
Husband with a 
Ph.D. Degree 
Husband with Col+ 
Education 
Same-BR Husband 
with a Ph.D. Degree  
Same-BR Husband 
with Col+ Education 
US-Born  93.1 93.1 31.6 83.9 28.2 77.9 
Foreign-born 59.7 29.9 48.0 89.8 30.2 53.6 
China 78.5 15.2 56.2 96.3 44.1 75.8 
India 83.6 12.2 51.6 96.3 44.9 81.1 
Korea 66.2 24.7 54.8 90.1 33.7 60.5 
Philippines 51.4 40.0 27.0 76.0 14.3 42.1 
Eastern Europe 70.6 18.9 54.8 90.7 42.1 65.2 
Western Europe 29.8 56.7 46.6 94.3 17.6 29.2 
a Data are 5% sample decennial census 2000 extracted from IPUMS (Ruggles et al, 2010). This table is confined to married Ph.D. holders who are living in married-couple 
households in which both spouses are present and have reported their education levels, nativities and places of birth. 
b US-Born is defined as born in the U.S.A. or those born abroad with American Parent(s) and all the others are defined as foreign-born. I group countries into 22 regions mostly 
based on United Nations Statistics Division. 
c Col+ (College-above) education refers to having received at least 4-year college education attainment. 
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Table 2-1: Top 25 MSAs with Largest Population of New-arrival Ph.D. Workers from China, Year 2010 
  Count of New-Arrival Chinese  
Ph.D. Workers 
Count of New-Arrival Chinese  
Ph.D. Workers in STEM Occupations  
Rank MSA Name Total Male Female Total 
Married 
Male 
Married 
Female 
Single 
 Male 
Single 
Female 
1 Washington, DC/MD/VA 3106 2092                                                          1014   2798 1679    924 195 0 
2 Boston, MA 2484                                                                 1362 1122 1833 832    658 343 0 
3 Houston-Brazoria, TX 2088                                                                         1701 387 1201 864 262      75 0 
4 New York-Northeastern NJ 1796                       1347    449 1108                                 666 341     101   0 
5 Chicago-Gary-Lake, IL 1774                                            934 840   1409   828    486 0 95 
6 San Jose, CA 1751                                                                  1334   417 1413   1005   362    46 0 
7 Philadelphia, PA/NJ 1427                                              273 1154    955   0 817 0 0 
8 Oakland, CA 1395                                                                       945 450 1030 547 217    266 0 
9 Baltimore, MD 1248                                                                          834 414 738 271 0   270 197 
10 Atlanta, GA 1208                                                   665 543 926 480   446   0 0 
11 Raleigh-Durham, NC 1188                                               792 396 707   512 0 0 195 
12 Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 1170                                                                         677 493 888 477   142   200 69 
13 Dallas-Fort Worth, TX 962                                                                  803 159 881     573 78    230     0 
14 Seattle-Everett, WA 914                                                  496 418 506    425   81 0 0 
15 Newark, NJ 863                                                                 636 227 608 400     115     93 0 
16 Detroit, MI 750                                                        522 228 574   181    121     70   0 
17 San Francisco-Oakland-
Vallejo, CA 
718                                                                  291 427 718   194   354   97     73 
18 Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 698                                                                     400 298 469      241    177 0 51 
19 San Diego, CA 695                                                                     487    208 391 264    57    0 70 
20 Miami-Hialeah, FL 623                                                                        484 139 464 308   83 73       0 
21 Cleveland, OH 621                                                                     511    110 451   386   0 65 0 
22 Ann Arbor, MI 519                                                     350     169 430    261    169    0 0 
23 Birmingham, AL 502                                                 224   278 224 224   0 0 0 
24 Austin, TX 497                                     392 105 260     199 0 0 0 
25 Cincinnati OH/KY/IN 485                                  393   92     196   104 92 0 0 
a Data are 1% sample from American Community Surveys 2010, extracted from IPUMS (Ruggles et al, 2010). New-arrival Ph.D. workers from China are immigrants who hold a 
Ph.D. degree, born in China, aged 25 and above, employed at the survey year, and had been in the U.S. less or equal to ten years. Person weights are used to calculate these 
numbers. 
b STEM Occupations are classified based on Census code list for STEM and STEM-related occupation, which is available at www.bls.gov/soc. 
 
 
94 
 
Table 2-2: Top 25 MSAs with Largest Population of New-arrival Ph.D. Workers from India, Year 2010 
  Count of New-Arrival Indian  
Ph.D. Workers 
Count of New-Arrival Indian  
Ph.D. Workers in STEM Occupations 
Rank MSA Name Total Male Female Total 
Married 
Male 
Married 
Female 
Single 
 Male 
Single 
Female 
1 Chicago-Gary-Lake, IL  1296                                                                       666 630 476 208   0 0 268 
2 Boston, MA 1276                                                           1055 221 896    666   0   230 0   
3 Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA  1239                                                                 650    589 882 276   334   272    0 
4 Philadelphia, PA/NJ 1207                                                               965 242 769 457   80      135    97 
5 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN  976                                                                 582 394 133 0   133 0    0 
6 State College, PA 845                   845 0                                                        845     0 0    845 0 
7 San Diego, CA 777                                                            530 247 530   429 0       101 0 
8 Houston-Brazoria, TX 725                                      487 238   164 164 0 0 0 
9 St. Louis, MO-IL 695                                            417 278    550 272     278   0 0 
10 Oakland, CA 616                                                          462   154 514 78     154    282 0 
11 Dayton-Springfield, OH 603             603 0 0 0 0 0 0 
12 Washington, DC/MD/VA  577                                                                     521 56 304   248    56     0    0 
13 Atlanta, GA  567                                                                        420 147 500  270     147 83 0 
14 New York-Northeastern NJ  543                                                               305 238 344     0      116 106    122 
15 San Jose, CA  531                                                                     468 63 383   320   63    0    0 
16 Portland-Vancouver, OR 466                                                466     0     466 466 0     0 0 
17 Trenton, NJ 450                                                 236   214  249    141    108   0 0 
18 Baltimore, MD  435                                                61    374 61    61 0 0 0 
19 Cleveland, OH 430                                                              381 49 430 166 49 215 0 
20 Austin, TX  411                       316     95    54              54     0 0 0 
21 Charlottesville, VA 405           0                                                               405   405 0 135    0    270 
22 Seattle-Everett, WA  390                                                                   309 81 321   132   81   108 0 
23 Mobile, AL 364                                            364    0     364   364    0 0 0 
24 Lowell, MA/NH 348                348 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 Dallas-Fort Worth, TX 339                                     339    0 196   196     0 0 0 
a Data are 1% sample from American Community Surveys 2010, extracted from IPUMS (Ruggles et al, 2010). New-arrival Ph.D. workers from India are immigrants who hold a 
Ph.D. degree, born in India, aged 25 and above, employed at the survey year, and had been in U.S. less or equal to ten years. Person weights are used to calculate these numbers. 
b STEM Occupations are classified based on Census code list for STEM and STEM-related occupation, which is available at www.bls.gov/soc.
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Table 3-1: Location Choices for Single Ph.D. Workers by Year, 
Classify City Sizes Based on MSA’s Total Population 
City Size Categories Based 
on MSA’s Total Population 
Single Ph.D. Workers (SPS)  
Predicted Probabilities to Live in Different City Sizes  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Year 1990 Year 2000 Year 2010 
 
Panel A: Single, US-born White Male PhDs 
Large MSAs 0.2644  (.00014) 0.3316  (.00012) 0.4126  (.00035) 
Midsize MSAs 0.4584  (.00044) 0.4289  (.00044) 0.3714  (.00084) 
Small MSAs 0.2772  (.00037) 0.2395  (.00035) 0.2160  (.00069) 
 
Panel B: Single, US-born White Female PhDs 
Large MSAs 0.2678  (.00026) 0.3480  (.00017) 0.3721  (.00031) 
Midsize MSAs 0.4355  (.00048) 0.4117  (.00028) 0.4080  (.00050) 
Small MSAs 0.2967  (.00064) 0.2403  (.00029) 0.2199  (.00041) 
 
Panel C: Single, Chinese Male PhDs 
Large MSAs 0.3238  (.00400) 0.3917  (.00277) 0.4977  (.00598) 
Midsize MSAs 0.4673  (.00408) 0.4445  (.00259) 0.3783  (.00424) 
Small MSAs 0.2089  (.00609) 0.1638  (.00363) 0.1240  (.00324) 
 
Panel D: Single, Chinese Female PhDs 
Large MSAs 0.3751  (.00796) 0.4326  (.00317) 0.4693  (.01038) 
Midsize MSAs 0.4490  (.00893) 0.4399  (.00207) 0.3411  (.00763) 
Small MSAs 0.1759  (.00834) 0.1275  (.00419) 0.1896  (.00868) 
 
Panel E: Single, Indian Male PhDs 
Large MSAs 0.3106  (.00322) 0.3991  (.00228) 0.4365  (.00564) 
Midsize MSAs 0.4359  (.00360) 0.4628  (.00248) 0.4489  (.00411) 
Small MSAs 0.2535  (.00577) 0.1381  (.00264) 0.1146  (.00272) 
 
Panel F: Single, Indian Female PhDs 
Large MSAs 0.3376  (.00831) 0.4020  (.00400) 0.4365  (.00778) 
Midsize MSAs 0.4123  (.01133) 0.4333  (.00258) 0.3568  (.00499) 
Small MSAs 0.2501  (.01313) 0.1647  (.00591) 0.2167  (.01140) 
a City size categories are based on the size of MSA’s total population for those who are aged 15 above. Large MSAs are 
Metropolitan areas in which the total population for those who are aged 15 above was at least 2 million, midsize MSAs as those 
between 2 million and 250,000, and small MSAs as those less than 250,000 or in rural areas. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
b Data for 1990 and 2000 are 5% sample from decennial census, and for 2010 are 1% sample from ACS. For each year, the 
probabilities should sum to one within panel. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3-2: Location Choices for Married Ph.D. Workers in Super-Power Couples (SPC) 
Classify City Sizes Based on MSA’s Total Population 
City Size Categories Based 
on MSA’s Total Population 
Married Ph.D. Workers (SPC)  
Predicted Probabilities to Live in Different City Sizes 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Year 1990 Year 2000 Year 2010 
 
Panel A: Married, US-born White Male PhDs  
Large MSAs 0.2729  (.00024) 0.3011  (.00037) 0.3329  (.00093) 
Midsize MSAs 0.4241  (.00067) 0.4321  (.00058) 0.3944  (.00103) 
Small MSAs 0.3030  (.00075) 0.2668  (.00054) 0.2727  (.00090) 
 
Panel B: Married, US-born White Female PhDs  
Large MSAs 0.2575  (.00056) 0.3010  (.00031) 0.3331  (.00065) 
Midsize MSAs 0.4389  (.00082) 0.4395  (.00069) 0.3895  (.00136) 
Small MSAs 0.3036  (.00130) 0.2595  (.00082) 0.2774  (.00154) 
 
Panel C: Married, Chinese Male PhDs  
Large MSAs 0.3029  (.00499) 0.3703  (.00183) 0.4937  (.00273) 
Midsize MSAs 0.5229  (.00407) 0.4957  (.00105) 0.3392  (.00141) 
Small MSAs 0.1742  (.00656) 0.1340  (.00183) 0.1671  (.00186) 
 
Panel D: Married, Chinese Female PhDs  
Large MSAs 0.2649  (.00505) 0.3737  (.00166) 0.4893  (.00327) 
Midsize MSAs 0.5878  (.00592) 0.5076  (.00168) 0.3482  (.00252) 
Small MSAs 0.1473  (.00547) 0.1187  (.00170) 0.1625  (.00244) 
 
Panel E: Married, Indian Male PhDs  
Large MSAs 0.2897  (.00375) 0.3312  (.00239) 0.4507  (.00573) 
Midsize MSAs 0.4981  (.00319) 0.5206  (.00174) 0.3881  (.00310) 
Small MSAs 0.2122  (.00499) 0.1482  (.00274) 0.1612  (.00342) 
 
Panel F: Married, Indian Female PhDs  
Large MSAs 0.2716  (.00283) 0.3326  (.00246) 0.4242  (.00406) 
Midsize MSAs 0.4940  (.00486) 0.5022  (.00228) 0.3815  (.00412) 
Small MSAs 0.2344  (.00622) 0.1652  (.00278) 0.1943  (.00378) 
a City size categories are based on the size of MSA’s total population for those who are aged 15 above. Large MSAs are 
Metropolitan areas in which the total population for those who are aged 15 above was at least 2 million, midsize MSAs as those 
between 2 million and 250,000, and small MSAs as those less than 250,000 or in rural areas. For each year, the probabilities 
should sum to one within panel. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
b Data for 1990 and 2000 are 5% sample from decennial census, and for 2010 are 1% sample from ACS. Predicted Probabilities 
are averaged among married Ph.D. workers that have a Ph.D.-holding spouse within their own ethnicity. 
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Table 4: Differencing Strategy to Identify the Marriage Market and Job Co-Location Effects: 
Using Chinese as an Example 
 Household Type a Label Benefits of living in a large city b 
1 Chinese Super-Power Couples 
(SPC) 
 
SPC𝐶𝐶ℎ                   Job Co-Location 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ, 
 Urban Amenities 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶ℎ, 
Returns to Education 
 
2 US-born Super-Power Couples 
 
SPC𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈                  Job Co-Location 𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 
 Urban Amenities 𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 
Returns to Education 
 
3 Double Difference: Row1- Row2 
 
SPC𝐶𝐶ℎ − SPC𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈        Urban Amenities �𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶ℎ − 𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 � + 
Job Co-Location (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ − 𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 
 
 
4 Chinese Super-Power Singles (SPS) 
 
SPS𝐶𝐶ℎ   Marriage Markets 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶ℎ, 
Urban Amenities 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶ℎ, 
                 Returns to Education 
 
5 US-born Super-Power Singles  
 
SPS𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈   Marriage Markets 𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 
Urban Amenities 𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈, 
                 Returns to Education 
 
6 Double Difference: Row4 - Row5 
 
SPS𝐶𝐶ℎ − SPS𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 Urban amenities (𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶ℎ − 𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) + 
Marriage Markets (𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶ℎ −𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 
 
 
7 Triple Difference: Row6 - Row3 
 
(SPS𝐶𝐶ℎ − SPS𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈)
− (SPC𝐶𝐶ℎ − SPC𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 
    Marriage Markets (𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶ℎ −𝑀𝑀𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) –  
Job Co-Location (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶ℎ − 𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 
 
 
a “Super-Power” Couples: married couple households where both spouses in the family have a Ph.D. degree. “Super-Power” 
Singles (SPS): Ph.D. workers who report their marital status as never married, divorced or widowed. 
b Within the gender group, returns to education for Ph.D. holders in a given city type are assumed same between Chinese and US 
born, regardless of the marital status. Chinese and US-born Ph.D. workers may have different tastes for urban amenities (like 
access to cultural activities), but the difference between their valuations on urban amenity (𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐ℎ − 𝐴𝐴𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) are assumed to stay the 
same across household types. 
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Table 5-1: Trends in Propensity to Live in Different City Sizes, Year 1990 to 2000, 
Classify City Sizes Based on MSA’s Total Population 
City Size Category Based on  
MSA’s Total Population 
Female Ph.D. Workers Male Ph.D. Workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Single Ph.D. Workers 
(SPS) 
Married Ph.D. Workers 
in SPC 
Single Ph.D. Workers 
(SPS) 
Married Ph.D. Workers 
in SPC 
 
Panel A: US-born 
    
 SPS𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 SPC𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 SPS𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 SPC𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 
Large MSAs  0.0802***   0.0435***              0.0672***     0.0282***   
 (.00031)  (.00064) (.00018) (.00044) 
Midsize MSAs -0.0239***              0.0006   -0.0295***     0.0080***   
 (.00055)  (.00107)  (.00063) (.00088) 
Small MSAs -0.0563*** -0.0441***               -0.0377***   -0.0362*** 
 (.00070)  (.00154) (.00051) (.00092) 
 
Panel B: Chinese 
    
 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶ℎ SPC𝐶𝐶ℎ 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶ℎ SPC𝐶𝐶ℎ 
Large MSAs  0.0575***   0.1088***     0.0679***  0.0674*** 
 (.00856) (.00457) (.00487) (.00539) 
Midsize MSAs            -0.0092   -0.0802***   -0.0228*** -0.0272***   
 (.00917) (.00616) (.00480) (.00421) 
Small MSAs -0.0483***  -0.0286***  -0.0451*** -0.0402*** 
 (.00899) (.00573) (.00686) (.00560)  
 
Panel C: Indian  
    
 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 SPC𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 SPC𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 
Large MSAs   0.0644***   0.0610***  0.0885***  0.0415*** 
 (.00933)  (.00375) (.00386) (.00427)  
Midsize MSAs              0.0210*              0.0082    0.0269***  0.0225*** 
 (.01162)  (.00537) (.00425) (.00364) 
Small MSAs  -0.0854*** -0.0692*** -0.1154*** -0.0640*** 
 (.01395) (.00681)  (.00634) (.00569) 
a City size categories are based on the size of MSA’s total population for those who are aged 15 above. Large MSAs are metropolitan areas in which the total population for those 
who are aged 15 above was at least 2 million, midsize MSAs as those between 2 million and 250,000, and small MSAs as those less than 250,000 or in rural areas. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. ***denotes the estimate is significant from zero at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. 
b The first difference estimators for Single Ph.D. workers (SPS) are obtained by subtracting Column 1 from Column 2 in Table 3-1. Similarly, subtracting Column 1 from Column 
2 in Table 3-2 obtained the first-differencing estimators for Super-Power Couples. 
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Table 5-2: DOUBLE DIFFERENCE Estimators by Gender, Year 1990 to 2000, 
Classify City Sizes Based on MSA’s Total Population 
Panel A: Differential Trends Between Chinese and US-born 
 
City Size Category Based on  
MSA’s Total Population 
Female Ph.D. Workers Male Ph.D. Workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Single PhDs Married PhDs Single PhDs Married PhDs 
 (SPS𝐶𝐶ℎ − SPS𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) (SPC𝐶𝐶ℎ − SPC𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) (SPS𝐶𝐶ℎ − SPS𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) (SPC𝐶𝐶ℎ − SPC𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 
Large MSAs -0.0227***  0.0653***              0.0007  0.0392*** 
 (.00726)  (.00305) (.00419)  (.00225) 
Midsize MSAs  0.0147*** -0.0808***   0.0067*** -0.0352*** 
 (.00439) (.00628) (.00217) (.00414) 
Small MSAs             0.0080*  0.0155***             -0.0074**            -0.0040** 
 (.00426) (.00450) (.00348) (.00202) 
 
 
Panel B: Differential Trends Between Indian and US-born 
 
City Size Category Based on  
MSA’s Total Population 
Female Ph.D. Workers Male Ph.D. Workers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Single PhDs Married PhDs Single PhDs Married PhDs 
 (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 
Large MSAs -0.0158***   0.0175***  0.0213***  0.0133*** 
 (.00469) (.00353) (.00353) (.00260) 
Midsize MSAs  0.0449*** 0.0076**  0.0564*** 0.0145*** 
 (.00599) (.00351) (.00210) (.00244) 
Small MSAs -0.0291*** -0.0251*** -0.0777***            -0.0278*** 
 (.00661) (.00579) (.00650) (.00470) 
a City size categories are based on MSA’s total population for those who are aged 15 above. Large MSAs are Metropolitan areas in which the total population for those who are 
aged 15 above was at least 2 million, midsize MSAs as those between 2 million and 250,000, and small MSAs as those less than 250,000 or in rural areas. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.  
b The double difference estimators are obtained by differencing trends in propensity to Live in a given city size between foreign and domestic born Ph.D. workers, conditional on 
gender and household type. Standard errors are in parentheses. And ***denotes the estimate is significant from zero at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. For each panel 
and within each column, the probabilities should sum to zero. 
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Table 5-3: TRIPLE DIFFERENCE Estimators by Gender, 
City Sizes Based on MSA’s Total Population  
City Size Category Based on  
MSA’s Total Population 
Triple Difference, 
Marriage Markets Effects Relative to Colocation Effects 
  
Year 1990 to 2000 
 
Year 1990 to 2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Female Ph.D. Workers Male Ph.D. Workers Female Ph.D. Workers Male Ph.D. Workers 
 
Panel A: Chinese Relative to US-born 
  (SPS𝐶𝐶ℎ − SPS𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) − (SPC𝐶𝐶ℎ − SPC𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 
    
Large MSAs -0.0881*** -0.0385*** -0.1588*** -0.1052*** 
 (.00234) (.00355) (.00841) (.00859) 
Midsize MSAs  0.0955***  0.0419***  0.1098***   0.1520*** 
 (.00498) (.00058) (.00837) (.00866) 
Small MSAs             -0.0075             -0.0034  0.0490***             -0.0468 
 (.00735) (.00217) (.00271) (.00373) 
 
Panel B: Indian Relative to US-born 
(𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) − (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  − 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 
    
Large MSAs -0.0333***              0.0079 -0.0924*** -0.1232*** 
 (.00268) (.00285) (.00560) (.00793) 
Midsize MSAs  0.0373***  0.0419***  0.0351***  0.1801*** 
 (.00065) (.00058) (.00771) (.00590) 
Small MSAs             -0.0040 -0.0498***  0.0573*** -0.0569*** 
 (.00439) (.00434) (.00772) (.00519) 
a City size categories are based on the MSA’s total population for those who are aged 15 above. Large MSAs are Metropolitan areas in which the total population for those who 
are aged 15 above is at least 2 million, midsize MSAs as those between 2 million and 250,000, and small MSAs as those less than 250,000 or in rural areas.  
b Each cell is obtained by differencing the double-differencing estimators across household type, within gender group. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***denotes the estimate 
is significant from zero at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. Within each panel and for a given column, the probabilities should sum to zero.
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Table 6: City Size Categories Based on MSA’s Own-Ethnic Population, 
TRIPLE DIFFERENCE Estimators by Gender 
City Size Category Based on  
MSA’s Own-Ethnic Population  
Marriage Markets Effects Relative to Colocation Effects 
 
  
Year 1990 to 2000 
 
Year 1990 to 2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Female Ph.D. Workers Male Ph.D. Workers Female Ph.D. Workers Male Ph.D. Workers 
 
Panel A: Chinese Relative to US-born 
 (SPS𝐶𝐶ℎ − SPS𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈)  −  (SPC𝐶𝐶ℎ − SPC𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 
    
Large Own-Ethnic MSAs               0.0014 -0.0606*** -0.1090*** -0.0844*** 
 (.00289) (.00227) (.00419) (.00367) 
Midsize Own-Ethnic MSAs              -0.0369  0.0336*** 0.0311***  0.0802*** 
 (.00522) (.00249) (.00822) (.00391) 
Small Own-Ethnic MSAs               0.0355***   0.0270***             0.0779***             0.0042 
 (.00104) (.00552) (.00647) (.00733) 
 
Panel B: Indian Relative to US-born 
(𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) − (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  − 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 
    
Large Own-Ethnic MSAs 0.0279*** -0.0261*** -0.0521*** -0.1504*** 
 (.00421) (.00317) (.00590) (.00573) 
Midsize Own-Ethnic MSAs -0.1502***  0.0305*** -0.1724***  0.1442*** 
 (.00420) (.00361) (.01313) (.00827) 
Small Own-Ethnic MSAs  0.1223***            -0.0044  0.2245***              0.0062 
 (.00854) (.00555) (.00903) (.00879) 
a City size categories are based on the size of the own-ethnic population that are aged 15 above and present in that MSA. For a given person, large own-ethnic MSAs are 
metropolitan areas in which his/her own ethnic population rank within top 15 among all U.S. MSAs, midsize own-ethnic MSAs as those that rank outside top 15 but have at least 
1,000 people within the ethnicity of this person (the cutoff number is 250,000 for the US-born) present in the local areas, and the rest of MSAs are classified as small own-ethnic 
MSAs. 
b Within a specific gender-period, for each panel, the probabilities should sum to zero. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***denotes the estimate is significant from zero at 1% 
level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level.  
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Table 7-1: City Size Categories Based on  
MSA’s Total Population and Own-Ethnic Col+ Population (OECoAbv), 
Trends of Location Choices for Single Ph.D. Workers 
City Size Category Based on  
MSA’s Total Population and Own-
Ethnic Col+ Population (OECoAbv) 
 
Year 1990 to 2000 
 
 
Year 1990 to 2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Single Female PhDs  Single Male PhDs Single Female PhDs  Single Male PhDs 
 
Panel A: US-born (SPS𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 
    
Large MSAs     + Large OECoAbv  0.0385*** (.00286)  0.0243*** (.00020)  0.0268*** (.00043)  0.0668*** (.00033) 
Large MSAs     + Small OECoAbv  0.0416*** (.00008)  0.0426*** (.00008)  0.0779*** (.00011)  0.0812*** (.00027) 
Midsize MSAs + Large OECoAbv -0.0343*** (.00013) -0.0241*** (.00011) -0.0632*** (.00012) -0.0506*** (.00007) 
Midsize MSAs + Small OECoAbv  0.0105*** (.00045) -0.0051*** (.00052)  0.0353*** (.00063) -0.0361*** (.00094) 
Small MSAs -0.0563*** (.00070) -0.0377*** (.00051) -0.0768*** (.00076) -0.0613*** (.00078) 
 
Panel B: Chinese (SPS𝐶𝐶ℎ) 
        
Large MSAs     + Large OECoAbv    0.0095 (.00784)  0.0207*** (.00463)    0.0001 (.01314)  0.1038*** (.00870) 
Large MSAs     + Small OECoAbv  0.0454*** (.00121)  0.0483*** (.00113)  0.0830*** (.00343)  0.0712***  (.00373) 
Midsize MSAs + Large OECoAbv  0.0226*** (.00696)  0.0153*** (.00443) -0.1019*** (.00764) -0.0838*** (.00451) 
Midsize MSAs + Small OECoAbv -0.0273*** (.00444) -0.0387*** (.00239)  0.0087*** (.00745)  -0.0059 (.00589) 
Small MSAs -0.0502*** (.00920) -0.0456*** (.00696)    0.0101 (.01240) -0.0853*** (.00689) 
 
Panel C: Indian (SPS𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) 
        
Large MSAs     + Large OECoAbv  0.0749*** (.01063)  0.0752*** (.00371)  0.0588*** (.00848)  0.0450*** (.00843) 
Large MSAs     + Small OECoAbv  -0.0016 (.00360)  0.0121*** (.00141)  0.0404*** (.00556)  0.0824*** (.00422) 
Midsize MSAs + Large OECoAbv  0.0278*** (.00385)  0.0078*** (.00272)    0.0004 (.00598) -0.0524*** (.00346) 
Midsize MSAs + Small OECoAbv -0.0202** (.00773)  0.0186*** (.00175) -0.0717*** (.00783)  0.0629*** (.00590) 
Small MSAs -0.0809*** (.01349) -0.1137*** (.00624)   -0.0279 (.01709) -0.1379*** (.00616) 
a City size categories are based on two indicators :1) the MSA’s total population who aged 15 above, and on 2) the size of the own-ethnic population that have at least four-year 
college education levels (OECoAbv) and are present in that MSA. Large MSAs are metropolitan areas in which the total population for those who are aged 15 above was at least 2 
million, midsize MSAs as those between 2 million and 250,000, and small MSAs as those less than 250,000 or in rural areas. For a Ph.D. worker, an MSA is defined as having 
Large OECoAbv if the size of the own-ethnic college-above population in that MSA rank within top 15 among all U.S. MSAs in a given survey year; otherwise, an MSA is 
defined as having Small OECoAbv.  
b For a gender group in a specific period, the probabilities should sum to zero within each panel. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***denotes the estimate is significant from zero 
at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. 
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Table 7-2: City Size Categories Based on 
MSA’s Total Population and Own-Ethnic Col+ Population (OECoAbv), 
Trends of Location Choices for Married Ph.D. Workers in Super-Power Couples (SPC) 
City Size Category Based on  
MSA’s Total Population and Own-
Ethnic Col+ Population (OECoAbv) 
 
Year 1990 to 2000 
 
Year 1990 to 2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Married Female PhDs  
in SPC 
Married Male PhDs 
in SPC 
Married Female PhDs 
in SPC 
Married Male PhDs  
in SPC 
 
Panel A: US-born (SPC𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 
    
Large MSAs     + Large OECoAbv  0.0131*** (.00062)   -0.0001 (.00041)  0.0236*** (.00084)  0.0062*** (.00091) 
Large MSAs     + Small OECoAbv  0.0301*** (.00007)  0.0288*** (.00008)  0.0526*** (.00019)  0.0537*** (.00027) 
Midsize MSAs + Large OECoAbv -0.0208*** (.00026) -0.0186*** (.00021) -0.0565*** (.00015) -0.0517*** (.00013) 
Midsize MSAs + Small OECoAbv  0.0220*** (.00085) 0.0262*** (.00072)  0.0070*** (.00015) 0.0220*** (.00120) 
Small MSAs -0.0444*** (.00154) -0.0363*** (.00092) -0.0267*** (.00202) -0.0302*** (.00117) 
 
Panel B: Chinese (SPC𝐶𝐶ℎ) 
        
Large MSAs     + Large OECoAbv  0.0566*** (.00341) 0.0181*** (.00562)  0.1097*** (.00509)  0.0760*** (.00520) 
Large MSAs     + Small OECoAbv  0.0487*** (.00207)  0.0446*** (.00115)  0.1118*** (.00355)  0.1075***  (.00242) 
Midsize MSAs + Large OECoAbv  -0.0322*** (.00666)  -0.0009 (.00574) -0.1454*** (.00658) -0.1183*** (.00564) 
Midsize MSAs + Small OECoAbv -0.0415*** (.00459)  -0.0196*** (.00629)  -0.0870*** (.00582) -0.0541*** (.00642) 
Small MSAs -0.0316*** (.00588) -0.0422*** (.00564)  0.0109*** (.00533)  -0.0111 (.00671) 
 
Panel C: Indian (SPC𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) 
        
Large MSAs     + Large OECoAbv   0.0395*** (.00317)  0.0296*** (.00487)  0.0934*** (.00526)  0.0845*** (.00690) 
Large MSAs     + Small OECoAbv 0.0187*** (.00163)  0.0165*** (.00067)  0.0641*** (.00277)  0.0791*** (.00322) 
Midsize MSAs + Large OECoAbv    0.0003 (.00274)  0.0224*** (.00326)  -0.0467*** (.00298) -0.0462*** (.00318) 
Midsize MSAs + Small OECoAbv 0.0105*** (.00336)  -0.0062 (.00474) -0.0742*** (.00580)  -0.0692*** (.00570) 
Small MSAs -0.0690*** (.00657) -0.0623*** (.00485) -0.0366*** (.00708) -0.0482*** (.00548) 
a City size categories are based on two indicators :1) the MSA’s total population who aged 15 above, and on 2) the size of the own-ethnic population that have at least four-year 
college education levels (OECoAbv) and are present in that MSA. Large MSAs are metropolitan areas in which the total population for those who are aged 15 above was at least 2 
million, midsize MSAs as those between 2 million and 250,000, and small MSAs as those less than 250,000 or in rural areas. For a Ph.D. worker, an MSA is defined as having 
Large OECoAbv if the size of the own-ethnic college-above population in that MSA rank within top 15 among all U.S. MSAs in a given survey year; otherwise, an MSA is 
defined as having Small OECoAbv.  
b For a gender group in a specific period, the probabilities should sum to zero within each panel. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***denotes the estimate is significant from zero 
at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level. 
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Table 7-3: City Size Categories Based on 
MSA’s Total Population and Own-Ethnic Col+ Population (OECoAbv), 
TRIPLE DIFFERENCE Estimators by Gender 
City Size Category Based on  
MSA’s Total Population and Own-
Ethnic Col+ Population (OECoAbv) 
  
Marriage Markets Effects 
  
Year 1990 to 2000 Year 1990 to 2010 
 (1) 
Female Ph.D. Workers 
(2) 
Male Ph.D. Workers 
(3) 
Female Ph.D. Workers 
(4) 
Male Ph.D. Workers 
 
Panel A: Chinese Relative to US-born 
 (SPS𝐶𝐶ℎ − SPS𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈)  −  (SPC𝐶𝐶ℎ − SPC𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 
    
Large MSAs     + Large OECoAbv -0.0725*** (.00256) -0.0219***   (.00141) -0.1128*** (.00450) -0.0328***    (.00448) 
Large MSAs     + Small OECoAbv -0.0149*** (.00112) -0.0101***   (.00155) -0.0541*** (.00741) -0.0637***    (.00518) 
Midsize MSAs + Large OECoAbv  0.0684*** (.00293) 0.0217***   (.00235)  0.0502*** (.00691) 0.0334***    (.00486) 
Midsize MSAs + Small OECoAbv  0.0257*** (.00192) 0.0123***   (.00053)  0.0673*** (.00434) 0.1063***    (.00482) 
Small MSAs -0.0067 (.00736) -0.0020        (.00218)  0.0494*** (.00264) -0.0432***    (.00373) 
 
Panel B: Indian Relative to US-born 
(𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) − (𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  − 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈) 
    
Large MSAs     + Large OECoAbv  0.0100*** (.00296) 0.0211*** (.00174) -0.0378*** (.00505) -0.1001*** (.00573) 
Large MSAs     + Small OECoAbv -0.0319*** (.00473) -0.0182*** (.00232) -0.0490*** (.00290) -0.0240*** (.00668) 
Midsize MSAs + Large OECoAbv  0.0411*** (.00242) -0.0091*** (.00185)  0.0538*** (.00384) -0.0074**      (.00325) 
Midsize MSAs + Small OECoAbv -0.0192*** (.00188) 0.0561*** (.00155) -0.0258*** (.00841)  0.1902*** (.00583) 
Small MSAs  4.87e-05 (.00435) -0.0499*** (.00378) 0.0588*** (.00163) -0.0587*** (.00516) 
a City size categories are based on two indicators :1) the MSA’s total population who aged 15 above, and on 2) the size of the own-ethnic population that have at least four-year 
college education levels (OECoAbv) and are present in that MSA. Large MSAs are metropolitan areas in which the total population for those who are aged 15 above was at least 2 
million, midsize MSAs as those between 2 million and 250,000, and small MSAs as those less than 250,000 or in rural areas. For a Ph.D. worker, an MSA is defined as having 
Large OECoAbv if the size of the own-ethnic college-above population in that MSA rank within top 15 among all U.S. MSAs in a given survey year; otherwise, an MSA is 
defined as having Small OECoAbv.  
b For a gender group in a specific period, the probabilities should sum to zero within each panel. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***denotes the estimate is significant from zero 
at 1% level, ** at 5% level and * at 10% level.  
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Table 8: Influence of Marriage and Children 
Migration for Young (Age 25 to 44) Ph.D. Workers 
Dependent Variable: 
1 if Moved to a Different MSA, 0 if Stayed in the Same MSA. 
 
All Single Ph.D. Workers + 
 Married Ph.D. Workers Who Made the Moving Decision Post-Marriage 
 With or Without Children Present at Home No Child Present at Home 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Female Male Female Male 
Count of Own-Ethnic Col+ Single of the Opposite 
Gender in 1,000s in the Previous MSA (M) 
0.002 4.0e-04 0.001 4.2e-04 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
     
Single -0.284 1.388 0.771 0.115 
 (1.497) (1.192) (1.809) (2.735) 
     
Foreign-Born (=1 if the worker is not a US-Born) 0.013 0.021 0.015 0.014 
(0.066) (0.039) (0.073) (0.049) 
     
M × Single -9.3e-04 -4.2e-04 -6.1e-04 -5.4e-04 
 (7.4e-04) (5.6e-04) (9.2e-04) (8.2e-04) 
     
M × Single × Foreign-Born  -0.033* -0.033*** -0.038* -0.034*** 
 (0.018) (0.009) (0.021) (0.009) 
     
Has Own Child in the Household -0.072** -0.081** - - 
 (0.032) (0.038) - - 
     
MSA Fixed Effects 236 252 228 247 
Industry Fixed Effects 21 21 21 21 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Individual Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.240 0.193 0.249 0.192 
Observations 2,508 3,494 2,141 3,149 
a Sample is restricted to fulltime Ph.D. workers whose usual hours worked per week ≥ 35hours. I suppress the coefficient estimates on the characteristics of the previous MSA 
locations, e.g., total population, own-industry employment, number of own-ethnic workers excluding col+ single of the opposite gender, MSA average working age, MSA average 
annual earnings. I also suppress the coefficient estimates on individual attributes, e.g. age, square of age, occupation's median earned income, Hispanic origin, Black race, English 
Speaking Ability, years in the U.S.no more than ten, living in birth state, and also those on characteristics of the worker’s spouse, e.g. spouse’s education level, age, English 
speaking ability. Standard errors are clustered at MSA level and are reported in parentheses. ***denotes the estimate is significant from zero at 1% level, ** at 5% level.
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Appendix  
Table A1: Share of Workers Living in Large MSAs by Education Attainment, 1990-2010 
Panel A: Workers Holding a Ph.D. Degree  
Share of Workers Living in Large MSAs 
(1) 
Year 1990 
(2) 
Year 2000 
(3) 
Year 2010 
All Ph.D. Workers 0.252 0.325 0.394 
Female Ph.D. Workers:    
All Female PhDs 0.285 0.352 0.407 
US-born Female PhDs 0.267 0.329 0.378 
Foreign-born Female PhDs 0.380 0.441 0.496 
Male Ph.D. Workers:    
All Male PhDs 0.242 0.313 0.385 
US-born Male PhDs 0.220 0.281 0.338 
Foreign-born Male PhDs 0.329 0.401 0.492 
 
 
Panel B: Workers Having a College or Master Degree  
Share of Workers Living in Large MSAs 
(1) 
Year 1990 
(2) 
Year 2000 
(3) 
Year 2010 
All Workers  0.234 0.318 0.371 
Female Workers:    
All Female  0.239 0.316 0.368 
US-born Female  0.223 0.294 0.341 
Foreign-born Female  0.423 0.494 0.535 
Male Workers:    
All Male  0.230 0.320 0.375 
US-born Male  0.212 0.297 0.347 
Foreign-born Male  0.404 0.483 0.531 
 
 
Panel C: Workers with High School or a Lower Level of Education  
Share of Workers Living in Large MSAs 
(1) 
Year 1990 
(2) 
Year 2000 
(3) 
Year 2010 
All Workers 0.166 0.232 0.282 
Female Workers:    
All Female  0.168 0.231 0.280 
US-born Female  0.143 0.198 0.235 
Foreign-born Female  0.413 0.479 0.496 
Male Workers:    
All Male  0.164 0.233 0.284 
US-born Male  0.132 0.188 0.224 
Foreign-born Male  0.433 0.491 0.498 
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 Table A2-1: Distribution of Col+ Single Men among U.S. MSAs by Ethnicity (Birth Region): 
 
Number of MSAs in 6 Size Categories, a 
Size Categories Based on MSA Count of Own-Ethnic Col+ Single Men (M)  
Year 1990 and Year 2010 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MSA Size Categories Are 
Based on MSA Count of Own-
Ethnic Col+ Single Men (M) 
 
200 ≤ M ≤ 499 
 
500 ≤ M ≤ 999 
 
1000 ≤ M ≤ 1999 
 
2000 ≤ M ≤ 3999 
 
4000 ≤ M ≤ 7999 
 
M ≥ 8000 
 Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Ethnicity (Birth Region)             
United States  2b 3 18 10 53 34 73 54 47 80 80 116 
Canada 10 17 5 15 2 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Other North America 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Central America and Caribbean 16 31 11 16 5 14 0 14 2 4 1 3 
Southern America 14 31 4 10 1 8 2 4 1 2 0 1 
Northern Europe 16 18 6 14 3 6 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Western Europe 13 26 8 10 2 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Southern Europe 10 21 4 9 1 3 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Eastern Europe 15 29 3 10 1 9 2 2 0 1 0 1 
China 10 31 6 17 4 5 0 4 2 3 0 2 
Japan 7 10 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Korea 6 19 0 6 1 6 1 0 0 2 0 0 
Other East Asia 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Philippines 10 20 4 7 4 8 0 6 1 0 0 1 
Vietnam 7 12 1 13 3 5 0 3 0 1 0 0 
Other Southeast Asia 8 17 1 9 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 
India 20 34 7 22 4 15 2 13 0 3 0 1 
Other South Asia 7 11 6 8 2 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 
Middle East 9 19 5 10 0 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 
Africa 13 31 6 15 2 7 2 7 0 2 0 0 
Oceania 2 5 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 8 0 6 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
a Column (1) to (6) represent six size categories based on the number of single men within their own ethnicity and with a college or higher level of education at the MSA for a 
given year.   
b Each cell in the table reports the number of MSAs fall into one size category for a given ethnicity and year. For example, for the US-born, the first column under the year 1990 
shows that in 1990, there are 2 MSAs across the U.S. that have a MSA count of US-born col+ single men between 200 and 499.  
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Table A2-2: Distribution of Col+ Single Women among U.S. MSAs by Ethnicity (Birth Region): 
 
Number of MSAs in 6 Size Categories, a 
Size Categories Based on MSA Count of Own-Ethnic Co+ Single Women (W) 
Year 1990 and Year 2010 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MSA Size Categories Are 
Based on MSA Count of Own-
Ethnic Col+ Single Women (W) 
 
200 ≤ W ≤ 499 
 
500 ≤ W ≤ 999 
 
1000 ≤ W ≤ 1999 
 
2000 ≤ W ≤ 3999 
 
4000 ≤ W ≤ 7999 
 
W ≥ 8000 
 Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Year 
1990 
Year 
2010 
Ethnicity (Birth Region)             
United States 0b 0 20 4 54 17 64 55 50 75 85 146 
Canada 13 24 2 8 2 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Other North America 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Central America and Caribbean 15 35 11 24 4 14 1 11 1 5 2 4 
Southern America 7 26 4 17 2 9 1 5 1 2 0 2 
Northern Europe 10 25 7 6 2 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Western Europe 18 19 4 9 2 4 1 2 0 1 0 0 
Southern Europe 5 20 2 7 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Eastern Europe 9 25 2 21 2 9 1 1 0 2 0 2 
China 11 32 5 13 1 7 1 3 2 4 0 2 
Japan 1 15 2 4 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Korea 6 26 2 7 2 6 0 4 0 2 0 0 
Other East Asia 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Philippines 8 28 10 10 4 12 3 8 1 4 1 1 
Vietnam 5 18 4 9 0 6 0 2 0 1 0 0 
Other Southeast Asia 7 17 0 9 1 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 
India 11 33 2 17 1 7 0 7 0 1 0 0 
Other South Asia 6 13 1 3 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Middle East 2 13 2 5 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Africa 7 20 3 14 1 6 0 2 0 1 0 0 
Oceania 2 5 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 8 2 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
a Column (1) to (6) represent six size categories based on the number of single women with own ethnicity and with a college or higher level of education at the MSA for a given 
year.   
b Each cell in the table reports the number of MSAs fall into one size category for a given ethnicity and year. For example, for the US-born, the first column under year 1990 shows 
that in 1990, there is no MSA in the U.S that has a MSA count of US-born col+ single women falling between 200 and 499.
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Table A3: Number of MSAs in 4 Size Categories Based on MSA Count of Own-Industry Ph.D. Workers (I) 
PANEL A: Year 1990 
MSA Size Categories Are Based on  
MSA Count of Own-Industry Ph.D. Workers (I) 
 
100≤ I ≤199 200≤ I ≤499 
 
500≤ I ≤999 
 
I ≥ 1000 
Industry      
Agriculture 9 2 0 0 
Mining 2 2 1 1 
Construction 13 7 2 0 
Manufacturing 36 28 20 21 
Transportation, Communication, Electricity and Gas 21 7 5 0 
Wholesale 14 10 2 0 
Retail 26 8 4 1 
FIRE 28 12 8 3 
Computer and Data Processing 13 8 2 0 
Health Service 48 50 19 23 
Legal Service 29 14 3 3 
Education 41 66 48 90 
Social Service 13 5 1 1 
Museum, Art, Zoo 3 1 0 0 
Membership Organization 30 17 3 3 
Engineering 15 4 4 0 
Accounting, Audit 2 1 0 0 
R&D, Testing 21 22 12 12 
Management and Public Relation 24 23 7 8 
Other Services 20 10 3 1 
Public Administration 33 31 10 3 
 
PANEL B: Year 2010 
MSA Size Categories Are Based on  
MSA Count of Own-Industry Ph.D. Workers (I) 
 
100≤ I ≤199 200≤ I ≤499 
 
500≤ I ≤999 
 
I ≥ 1000 
Industry      
Agriculture 27 17 2 0 
Mining 5 2 0 1 
Construction 14 5 2 0 
Manufacturing 32 40 26 31 
Transportation, Communication, Electricity and Gas 16 17 10 2 
Wholesale 15 13 2 0 
Retail 47 34 21 9 
FIRE 29 25 12 7 
Computer and Data Processing 14 13 11 5 
Health Service 37 62 58 71 
Legal Service 26 38 26 14 
Education 41 66 48 90 
Social Service 22 26 7 0 
Museum, Art, Zoo 6 6 1 0 
Membership Organization 33 49 13 8 
Engineering 30 20 3 4 
Accounting, Audit 7 5 0 0 
R&D, Testing 26 41 17 22 
Management and Public Relation 41 28 13 9 
Other Services 23 19 10 3 
Public Administration 38 50 23 10 
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Table A4-1: City Size Categories Based on MSA’s Own-Ethnic Population  
Location Choices for Single Ph.D. Workers 
City Size Categories Based on 
MSA’s Own-Ethnic Population 
Predicted Probabilities  
 Single Female Ph.D. Workers  Single Male Ph.D. Workers  
 Year 1990 Year 2000 Year 2010 Year 1990 Year 2000 Year 2010 
Panel A: US-born       
Large Own-Ethnic MSAs 0.3226 0.3208 0.2896 0.3155 0.3021 0.3104 
 (.00028) (.00008) (.00037) (.00011) (.00013) (.00038) 
Midsize Own-Ethnic MSAs 0.3714 0.4236   0.4783 0.3991 0.4423 0.4633 
 (.00045) (.00026) (.00062) (.00039) (.00039) (.00105) 
Small Own-Ethnic MSAs 0.3060 0.2556 0.2321 0.2854 0.2556 0.2263 
 (.00064) (.00031) (.00033) (.00037) (.00036) (.00075) 
 
Panel B: Chinese  
      
Large Own-Ethnic MSAs 0.5262 0.6054 0.4445 0.4842 0.4929 0.4607 
 (.00763) (.00483) (.01209) (.00703) (.00381) (.00873) 
Midsize Own-Ethnic MSAs 0.2948 0.2774 0.3947 0.3097 0.3643 0.4371 
 (.00652) (.00203) (.01019) (.00476) (.00270) (.00647) 
Small Own-Ethnic MSAs 0.1790 0.1172 0.1608 0.2061 0.1428 0.1022 
 (.00480) (.00320) (.00504) (.00549) (.00226) (.00283) 
 
Panel C: Indian 
      
Large Own-Ethnic MSAs 0.3507 0.4831 0.3869 0.3936 0.4706 0.3576 
 (.00572) (.00635) (.00643) (.00465) (.00295) (.00829) 
Midsize Own-Ethnic MSAs 0.3639 0.3413 0.3784 0.3161 0.4084 0.5576 
 (.00788) (.00206) (.00220) (.00286) (.00267) (.00684) 
Small Own-Ethnic MSAs 0.2854 0.1756 0.2347 0.2903 0.1210 0.0848 
 (.00696) (.00498) (.00677) (.00500) (.00158) (.00214) 
a City size categories are based on the size of the own-ethnic population that are aged 15 above and present in that MSA. For a given person, large own-ethnic MSAs are 
metropolitan areas in which his/her own ethnic population rank within top 15 among all U.S. MSAs, midsize own-ethnic MSAs as those that rank outside top 15 but have at least 
1,000 people within the ethnicity of this person (the cutoff number is 250,000 for the US-born) present in the local areas, and the rest of MSAs are classified as small own-ethnic 
MSAs. 
b Within a specific gender-period, for each panel, the probabilities should sum to one. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table A4-2: City Size Categories Based on MSA’s Own-Ethnic Population 
Location Choices for Married Ph.D. Workers in Super-Power Couples (SPC) 
City Size Categories Based on 
MSA’s Own-Ethnic Population 
Predicted Probabilities  
 Married Female Ph.D. Workers in SPC Married Male Ph.D. Workers in SPC 
 Year 1990 Year 2000 Year 2010 Year 1990 Year 2000 Year 2010 
Panel A: US-born       
Large Own-Ethnic MSAs 0.3124 0.2960 0.2704 0.3222 0.2953 0.2740 
 (.00062) (.00035) (.00052) (.00029) (.00030) (.00085) 
Midsize Own-Ethnic MSAs 0.3741 0.4258 0.4461 0.3642 0.4193 0.4442 
 (.00074) (.00055) (.00136) (.00060) (.00052) (.00114) 
Small Own-Ethnic MSAs 0.3135 0.2782 0.2835 0.3136 0.2854 0.2818 
 (.00133) (.00086) (.00155) (.00076) (.00053) (.00097) 
 
Panel B: Chinese  
      
Large Own-Ethnic MSAs 0.4210 0.4841 0.4393 0.4267 0.4825 0.4444 
 (.00383) (.00214) (.00360) (.00909) (.00334) (.00351) 
Midsize Own-Ethnic MSAs 0.3913 0.4104 0.4252 0.3704 0.4033 0.4334 
 (.00383) (.00107) (.00276) (.00396) (.00216) (.00308) 
Small Own-Ethnic MSAs 0.1877 0.1055 0.1355 0.2029 0.1142 0.1222 
 (.00592) (.00132) (.00300) (.00683) (.00153) (.00196) 
 
Panel C: Indian 
      
Large Own-Ethnic MSAs 0.3534 0.4433 0.4328 0.3693 0.4590 0.4405 
 (.00445) (.00286) (.00570) (.00657) (.00407) (.00533) 
Midsize Own-Ethnic MSAs 0.2754 0.4026 0.4273 0.3371 0.4108 0.4501 
 (.00349) (.00140) (.00651) (.00258) (.00250) (.00417) 
Small Own-Ethnic MSAs 0.3712 0.1541 0.1399 0.2936 0.1302 0.1094 
 (.00668) (.00195) (.00507) (.00600) (.00216) (.00327) 
a City size categories are based on the size of the own-ethnic population that are aged 15 above and present in that MSA. For a given person, large own-ethnic MSAs are 
metropolitan areas in which his/her own ethnic population rank within top 15 among all U.S. MSAs, midsize own-ethnic MSAs as those that rank outside top 15 but have at least 
1,000 people within the ethnicity of this person (the cutoff number is 250,000 for the US-born) present in the local areas, and the rest of MSAs are classified as small own-ethnic 
MSAs. 
b Within a specific gender-period, for each panel, the probabilities should sum to one. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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 Table A5-1: City Size Categories Based on MSA’s Total Population and Own-Ethnic Col+ Population (OECoAbv) 
Location Choices for Single Ph.D. Workers a 
City size categories Predicted Probabilities  
 Single Female Ph.D. Workers  Single Male Ph.D. Workers  
 Year 1990 Year 2000 Year 2010 Year 1990 Year 2000 Year 2010 
Panel A: US-born       
Large MSAs     + Large OECoAbv 0.2678 0.3063 0.2947 0.2645 0.2888 0.3313 
 (.00026) (.00011) (.00034) (.00013) (.00014) (.00029) 
Large MSAs     + Small OECoAbv 0.0000 0.0416 0.0779 0.0000 0.0426 0.0812 
 (.00000) (.00008) (.00011) (.00000) (.00008) (.00027) 
Midsize MSAs + Large OECoAbv 0.0632 0.0288 0.0000 0.0506 0.0265 0.0000 
 (.00012) (.00006) (.00000) (.00007) (.00008) (.00000) 
Midsize MSAs + Small OECoAbv 0.3724 0.3829 0.4077 0.4075 0.4024 0.3715 
 (.00038) (.00024) (.00050) (.00039) (.00035) (.00085) 
Small MSAs 0.2966 0.2403 0.2198 0.2774 0.2397 0.2161 
 (.00064) (.00030) (.00041) (.00037) (.00035) (.00069) 
Panel B: Chinese        
Large MSAs     + Large OECoAbv 0.3827 0.3922 0.3828 0.3109 0.3316 0.4147 
 (.00775) (.00357) (.01061) (.00380) (.00254) (.00782) 
Large MSAs     + Small OECoAbv 0.0053 0.0507 0.0883 0.0148 0.0631 0.0860 
 (.00060) (.00105) (.00338) (.00065) (.00093) (.00368) 
Midsize MSAs + Large OECoAbv 0.1775 0.2000 0.0756 0.1735 0.1888 0.0898 
 (.00685) (.00318) (.00339) (.00374) (.00240) (.00253) 
Midsize MSAs + Small OECoAbv 0.2542 0.2269 0.2629 0.2904 0.2517 0.2845 
 (.00422) (.00137) (.00614) (.00188) (.00133) (.00559) 
Small MSAs 0.1803 0.1301 0.1904 0.2104 0.1647 0.1251 
 (.00840) (.00431) (.00861) (.00607) (.00371) (.00325) 
Panel C: Indian       
Large MSAs     + Large OECoAbv 0.2951 0.3700 0.3540 0.2778 0.3530 0.3228 
 (.00692) (.00477) (.00512) (.00283) (.00232) (.00794) 
Large MSAs     + Small OECoAbv 0.0308 0.0292 0.0712 0.0323 0.0447 0.1150 
 (.00357) (.00051) (.00378) (.00128) (.00058) (.00403) 
Midsize MSAs + Large OECoAbv 0.0709 0.0987 0.0714 0.1232 0.1310 0.0708 
 (.00323) (.00167) (.00427) (.00236) (.00156) (.00253) 
Midsize MSAs + Small OECoAbv 0.3586 0.3384 0.2868 0.3149 0.3335 0.3778 
 (.00761) (.00134) (.00183) (.00120) (.00128) (.00578) 
Small MSAs 0.2459 0.1637 0.2166 0.2514 0.1377 0.1135 
 (.01245) (.00575) (.01103) (.00568) (.00258) (.00237) 
a An MSA has large OECoAbv if its own-ethnic col+ population ranks within top15 among all U.S MSAs; otherwise it has Small OECoAbv. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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 Table A5-2: City Size Categories Based on MSA’s Total Population and Own-Ethnic Col+ Population (OECoAbv) 
Location Choices for Married Ph.D. Workers in SPC  
City size categories Predicted Probabilities  
 Married Female Ph.D. Workers in SPC  Married Male Ph.D. Workers in SPC 
 Year 1990 Year 2000 Year 2010 Year 1990 Year 2000 Year 2010 
Panel A: US-born       
Large MSAs     + Large OECoAbv 0.2576 0.2707 0.2812 0.2729 0.2727 0.2791 
 (.00056) (.00027) (.00062) (.00024) (.00034) (.00088) 
Large MSAs     + Small OECoAbv 0.0000 0.0301 0.0526 0.0000 0.0288 0.0537 
 (.00000) (.00007) (.00019) (.00000) (.00008) (.00027) 
Midsize MSAs + Large OECoAbv 0.0565 0.0357 0.0000 0.0517 0.0331 0.0000 
 (.00015) (.00021) (.00000) (.00013) (.00016) (.00000) 
Midsize MSAs + Small OECoAbv 0.3823 0.4042 0.3892 0.3724 0.3987 0.3945 
 (.00067) (.00052) (.00134) (.00056) (.00046) (.00103) 
Small MSAs 0.3036 0.2593 0.2770 0.3030 0.2666 0.2727 
 (.00130) (.00083) (.00154) (.00075) (.00054) (.00090) 
Panel B: Chinese        
Large MSAs     + Large OECoAbv 0.2509 0.3075 0.3605 0.2950 0.3131 0.3710 
 (.00365) (.00125) (.00354) (.00541) (.00190) (.00209) 
Large MSAs     + Small OECoAbv 0.0204 0.0691 0.1322 0.0149 0.0595 0.1224 
 (.00223) (.00075) (.00276) (.00083) (.00040) (.00227) 
Midsize MSAs + Large OECoAbv 0.2208 0.1886 0.0754 0.1893 0.1884 0.0710 
 (.00647) (.00159) (.00121) (.00559) (.00134) (.00077) 
Midsize MSAs + Small OECoAbv 0.3567 0.3151 0.2697 0.3225 0.3029 0.2684 
 (.00416) (.00173) (.00277) (.00616) (.00129) (.00179) 
Small MSAs 0.1513 0.1197 0.1622 0.1783 0.1360 0.1672 
 (.00563) (.00171) (.00230) (.00645) (.00185) (.00185) 
Panel C: Indian       
Large MSAs     + Large OECoAbv 0.2461 0.2857 0.3395 0.2688 0.2984 0.3533 
 (.00228) (.00220) (.00474) (.00446) (.00265) (.00442) 
Large MSAs     + Small OECoAbv 0.0211 0.0398 0.0852 0.0153 0.0318 0.0943 
 (.00154) (.00054) (.00248) (.00061) (.00028) (.00317) 
Midsize MSAs + Large OECoAbv 0.1304 0.1307 0.0838 0.1221 0.1145 0.0759 
 (.00241) (.00148) (.00175) (.00297) (.00134) (.00113) 
Midsize MSAs + Small OECoAbv 0.3703 0.3808 0.2960 0.3846 0.3784 0.3153 
 (.00325) (.00172) (.00516) (.00441) (.00175) (.00362) 
Small MSAs 0.2320 0.1631 0.1955 0.2093 0.1469 0.1611 
 (.00602) (.00263) (.00371) (.00439) (.00266) (.00329) 
a An MSA has large OECoAbv if its own-ethnic col+ population ranks within top15 among all U.S MSAs; otherwise it has Small OECoAbv. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table A6: Top 20 MSAs of Patent Creation in the Year 2001a 
 Total 
Patents at 
Year 2001 
Top Cited 
Patents at 
Year 2001b 
Population at Year 1990 
 
(In 1,000s) 
College-Above Population 
at Year 1990 
(In 1,000s) 
MSA Name 
All 
ethnicities Chinese Indian Chinese Indian 
        
San Jose, CA 4734 276 1173 32.81 13.25 14.46 6.96 
 
San Diego, CA 1404 46 1951 9.15 3.11 3.30 1.14 
 
Minneapolis-Saint 
Paul, MN 
1363 60 1756 3.59 3.90 1.75 1.70 
 
Austin, TX 1024 47 551 3.01 2.60 1.30 1.05 
 
Houston, TX 987 70 2376 15.72 17.32 6.75 7.62 
 
Phoenix, AZ 784 49 1623 4.34 2.99 1.43 1.30 
 
Atlanta, GA 776 36 1870 5.18 6.60 1.99 2.96 
 
Rochester, NY 642 32 745 1.49 1.69 0.71 1.01 
 
Cincinnati, OH-KY-
IN 
465 23 964 1.07 2.48 0.45 1.36 
 
Cleveland, OH 433 23 1366 2.82 3.87 0.89 2.12 
 
Denver, CO 422 22 179 0.85 0.53 0.30 0.28 
 
Milwaukee, WI 396 19 1197 2.78 1.04 0.89 0.55 
 
Sacramento, CA 350 26 1094 1.67 1.39 0.86 0.66 
 
Pittsburgh, PA 340 14 1128 11.39 3.36 2.22 0.97 
 
Riverside-San 
Bernardino, CA 
330 14 1545 2.62 3.54 1.05 1.88 
 
Raleigh-Durham, NC 310 14 1881 5.62 5.19 1.45 2.28 
 
Saint Louis, MO-IL 290 7 1807 2.13 2.10 0.71 1.36 
 
Indianapolis, IN 286 19 953 0.99 1.50 0.41 0.58 
 
Baltimore, MD 281 11 1834 3.82 5.21 1.16 3.07 
 
Ventura-Oxnard-
Simi Valley, CA 
256 10 504 2.47 1.51 1.09 0.80 
a These patents are utility patents with application year in 2001. Data are downloaded from NBER Patent Data Project (PDP) and 
Harvard Patent Network Dataverse. Patents with multiple inventors are distributed evenly across all inventors’ corresponding 
residing MSAs. Population count is calculated by using decennial census data from IPUMS.  
b Citation counts are until 2006, and are truncation-adjusted by using the weight Hall et al. (2001) suggested. Patents whose 
number of received citations among top 10% within its own technology category are regarded as top cited patents. 
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